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INTRODUCTION

The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 declares that securities
prices are susceptible to manipulation 2 and that manipulation precipitates, intensifies and prolongs national emergencies like the depression that followed the stock market crash of 1929.3 The Exchange Act
addresses the problem by forbidding a variety of trading practices that
t

Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
I would like to thank Mark Bagnoli, Victor Brudney, Roberto Finzi, Jill Fisch, George

Hay, Tom Hazen, Ed Kitch, Don Langevoort, Louis Loss, Norman Poser, Dan Richman,
Stewart Schwab, Alan Schwartz, Todd Sullivan, Patricia Thel and Bill Williams for their
help with this Article.
1 Pub. L. No. 7--291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811
(1988)) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
2 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1988).
3

15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (1988).
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it labels manipulative 4 and subjecting others to regulation. 5 It also
gives the Securities and Exchange Commission plenary authority to
regulate the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in connection with securities transactions. 6 These laws were
7
designed to prevent securities manipulation.
Daniel R. Fischel and DavidJ. Ross recently offered a provocative
reexamination of the subject of manipulation.8 Although Fischel and
Ross begin their article with the observation that "[m]uch of the regulation of financial markets seeks to prevent manipulation," 9 their purpose is not to show how the law might achieve this goal. On the
contrary, their position is that manipulation is not really a problem at
all. After offering what they call the first "principled analysis of the
concept of manipulation,"'10 Fischel and Ross argue that the law's efforts to prevent manipulation are misguided. They conclude that "the
concept of manipulation should be abandoned altogether.... Actual
trades should not be prohibited as manipulative regardless of the intent of the trader.""
As Fischel and Ross see it, there is no reason to prohibit manipulative trading because there is nothing to prohibit. They maintain
that people would not engage in manipulative trading even if it were
legal, because it is so difficult to profit by manipulating security prices
with trades. "Profitable (successful) manipulations," they assert, "require two conditions: first, trading must cause the price of the relevant security to rise; and second, the manipulator must be able to sell
4

5

15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1)-(5) (1988).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(6), (b), 78j(a) (1988).

6 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1988). The Exchange Act directly forbids manipulation in particular contexts. The Act forbids brokers and dealers to use manipulative devices and contrivances in the over-the-counter market, and charges the SEC with defining such devices
and contrivances as are manipulative. Id. § 78o(c) (1)-(2). The Act also prohibits any person from engaging in manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer, and
charges the SEC with defining and prescribing means reasonably designed to prevent manipulative acts and practices. Id. § 78n(e). The organized securities markets also have
rules against manipulation. See, e.g., 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9224 (Nov. 1989)
(prohibiting trades for the purpose of influencing market price); Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers
Manual (CCH) 2155, 2168 (Sept. 1, 1976) (prohibiting manipulative quotations and
the use of manipulative devices in connection with transactions); 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2435 (May 1990) (prohibiting the effecting of trades for the purpose of improperly influencing the market); see also id.
2342.21, 2351(e) (Nov. 1992) (requiring members to
review trades).
7
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988); see Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 42 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1990).
8 Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation"in Financial
Markets?, 105 HARv.L. REv. 503 (1991); see alsoJunda Woo, Law Theorists Call Stock Manipulation a Vague Concept, Seek to Abolish Term, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1992, at B4A (recording
reaction to the Fischel & Ross article).
9 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 503.
10

Id. at 506.

11

Id. at 507, 553.
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at a price higher than the price at which the manipulator
purchased."' 2 Unfortunately for the would-be manipulator, purchases
seldom move prices up, and if they do, it is difficult to effect sales at
the inflated price. Accordingly, manipulative schemes are unlikely to
be successful. Given the fact that trading is costly, Fischel and Ross
3
argue that people will not even try to manipulate security prices.'
Fischel and Ross also argue that prohibiting manipulative trades
results in significant social costs. 14 Because manipulative intent is

hard to identify, a rule prohibiting manipulative trades is expensive to
administer and deters some appropriate trading. They conclude that,
on balance, such a rule is unwise because significant social costs outweigh any minimal benefits that the rule might yield. 15 Fischel and
Ross are less hostile toward rules against the classic manipulative devices of wash sales and matched trades, but they insist that such trans6
actions be analyzed as a form of fraud.'
This Article shows that manipulation is not self-deterring. Manipulators can move prices by trading and can profit by doing so. 17 Fischel and Ross base their analysis of the relationship between prices
and trading on empirical research into the impact of securities trading on prices in the organized securities markets, particularly the New
York Stock Exchange. This literature offers important insights into
the effect that trading has on prices. Inasmuch as it shows that many
trades do not change prices and that those trades that do change
prices usually do not change them much, it suggests that manipulation may be quite difficult. Nevertheless, studies consistently show
that some trades occasion price changes. Manipulators can profit
from very small, short-lived price changes, and the evidence in the
economic literature in fact indicates that manipulation is easier to accomplish than Fischel and Ross admit.
12
13

Id. at 512.
Id. at 512-19.

14

Id. at 522-23.

15
16
17

Id. at 522-23.
Id. at 507, 510-12.
When used in this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, the word "manipulation" means buying a security for the purpose of increasing the reported price or selling
a security for the purpose of decreasing the reported price. I think that Fischel and Ross
use the word in a similar way, although they discuss the definition at length. Fischel &
Ross, supra note 8, at 507-10. See also id. at 510-12 (comparing manipulation with fraud);
Richard D. Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: UnderstandingCommodities MarketManipulation,89
MICH. L. Rav. 30 (1990) (discussing the concept of manipulation in commodities regulation); Thel, supra note 7, at 461-64 (discussing the scope of the SEC's authority to regulate
manipulative devices); Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security
Prices and the Text of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 359, 377-88
(discussing the meaning of "manipulative" in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange

Act).
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More importantly, this evidence is only of limited relevance to the
question of whether manipulators can change prices with trades. Market prices are the record of the transactions of profit-maximizing traders. The vast majority of traders (virtually all traders, according to
Fischel and Ross) want to trade at the best price possible, that is, to
buy low and sell high. These traders want to minimize the effect of
their trading on price, and they support a variety of institutions that
minimize the impact that trading might otherwise have on price. 18
Reported market prices are dominated by the trades of people trying
to avoid moving prices. Because manipulators try to do just the opposite, findings based on reported prices cannot be extrapolated to their
trading.
A substantial body of recent literature in the field of finance focuses directly on the subject of manipulative trading, much of it drawing explicitly or implicitly on game theory.' 9 The models developed
in this work indicate that manipulation is possible, with some authors
even suggesting that it may be common. Nonetheless, the only way to
determine whether manipulation actually occurs may be to study actual cases. Yet, trades designed to move prices are presumably relatively rare, and they are certainly hard to identify. Traders who want
18 Fischel and Ross sketch a market in which prices are spontaneous and the services
of the market are provided free to all who trade. However, markets are costly and trading
services are not provided automatically. SeeJ. Harold Mulherin et al., Prices are Property: The
Organization of FinancialExchanges From a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & EcoN. 591
(1991) (developing the thesis that the product of financial exchanges is prices and that the
function of exchanges is to establish property rights in price quotations); see also ROBERT A.
Sci-VARrz, EQurrY MARKETS: STRUCTURE, TRADING, AND PERFORMANCE 514-29 (1988) (discussing the price discovery process);Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as
a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutesfor the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007 (1990) (discussing "listings" as the primary product of competitive exchanges); David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for the Trading of
FinancialAssets, 32 B.C.L. REV. 967 (1991) (explaining the market as a property-based

system).
19 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Stock-Price Manipulation,5 REV. FIN. STUD. 503
(1992); Franklin Allen & Gary Gorton, Stock Price Manipulation, Market Microstructure and
Asymmetric Information, 36 EUR. ECON. REv. 624 (1992); Bruno Gerard & Vikrarn Nanda,
Trading and Manipulationaround Seasoned Equity Offerings, 48 J. FIN. 213 (1993); Robert A.
Jarrow, Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and Short Squeezes, 27J. FIN. & QUANTITATWvE
ANALYSIS 311 (1992); Praveen Kumar & Duane J. Seppi, Futures Manipulation with "Cash
Settlement," 47J. FIN. 1485 (1992); Robert A. Wood, Survival Strategiesfor Exchanges, in THE
CHALLENGE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR THE SECURITIES MARKETS 140 (Henry C. Lucas, Jr. & Robert A. Schwartz eds., 1989) [hereinafter INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY]; MARK
BAGNOLI & BARTON L. LIPMAN, STOCK PRICE MANIPULATION THROUGH TAKEOVER BIDS (Indiana University Department of Finance Working Paper, 1992) (on file with author); Kathleen Weiss Hanley et al., Price Stabilization in the Marketfor New Issues, 34J. FIN. EcoN. 177
(1993); Judith S. Ruud, UnderwriterPriceSupport and the IPO UnderpricingPuzze, 3 4 J. FIN.
ECON. 135 (1993); see also Jean-Luc Vila, Simple Games of Market Manipulation, 29 ECON.
LETTERS 21 (1989) (presenting two games of market manipulation relevant to financial
economics). For an extended discussion of manipulation in the futures markets, see THE
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF FtrrmEs MARKETS

(Ronald W. Anderson ed., 1984).
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to move prices are likely to keep their intentions secret, both because
prices may not move if their intentions are known and because trading with the intention of moving prices may be illegal. 20 Accordingly,
the study of actual manipulative trading may be unavoidably anecdotal. Many of the players are notorious and their stories fascinating,
however, so this may not be all for the bad. For example, when John
Mulheren bought 75,000 shares of the common stock of Gulf & Western Industries in six minutes on October 17, 1985, in response to a
telephone call from Ivan Boesky, Boesky earned an extra $850,000 on
the resulting twenty-five percent rise in the stock's price.2 ' Manipulation is theoretically possible, and it probably occurs fairly often.
If manipulation can be profitable, it cannot be ignored on the
theory that it is self-deterring. Nevertheless, the law should not pursue manipulators unless doing so will actually do some good. As Fischel and Ross emphasize, manipulative intent is often hard to identify,
and the possibility of erroneous prosecution may discourage appropriate trading. Moreover, even an effective rule against intentional manipulation would be an incomplete solution to the underlying
problem, because price-affecting trades may cause damage regardless
of the reason that those trades are undertaken.
These difficulties suggest that the law should respond carefully to
manipulative trading. The sponsors of the Exchange Act understood
this. They recognized that securities-market practices change quickly
and that the process of price formation is not fully understood. Faced
with what they knew was a complicated problem, they concluded that
the law should be carefully calibrated to eliminate destructive practices without unduly interfering with appropriate trading, and that the
law should develop as market practices change and understanding of
20

It may sometimes be possbile to document the extent of manipulative trading indi-

rectly without studying particular cases of manipulation. For example, several recent studies have explored the extent and effect of underwriter price stabilization in connection
with initial public offerings by analyzing market data. See Hanley et al., supra note 19;
Ruud, supra note 19. Firms are sometimes said to repurchase their stock in order to increase its price, and these trades are typically disclosed. Issuer repurchases may not be
analogous to the manipulative trading considered here, however. While opportunities for
'manipulation may exist in this context, the matter might better be analyzed as fraud. The
price effect of repurchases may come not from the trades, but from the information conveyed by the fact that the issuer is buying, and this information is typically conveyed by the
explicit announcement that the issuer is repurchasing. See Theo Vermaelen, Common Stock
Repurchasesand Market Signalling,9J. FIN. ECON. 139 (1981); cf Richard A. Booth, Discounts
and OtherMysteries of CorporateFinance,79 CAL L. REV. 1053, 1087-91, 1114-16 (1991) (rejecting the signalling explanation of price impact of issuer repurchases in favor of elastic
demand, and thus concluding that repurchases are not manipulative).
21
See United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 366-68 (2d Cir. 1991); see also infra
notes 155-74 and accompanying text. The allegations against Mulheren were litigated, and
Boesky, who pleaded guilty to his own crimes, testified at Mulheren's trial. Mulheren did
not deny receiving the call or trading. Rather, the primary issue was whether Mulheren
was a willing conspirator or whether Boesky had manipulated him as well as the market.
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the market grows. Instead of broadly prohibiting securities manipulation, the Exchange Act charges regulators with studying the problem
and adopting appropriate rules in response.
I
MANIPULATING

A.

PRICES WITH

TRADES

Trades Sometimes Change Price

Securities are often traded without any apparent effect on market
prices, and trades affect security prices much less than most people
probably think they do. 22 The vast majority of trades on the New York
Stock Exchange, for example, take place at or near the same price as
the previous trade,2 3 and even relatively large trades are often effected
at prevailing prices. 24 In considering the issue of manipulative trading, it is important to recognize that trades do not automatically
change price. Fischel and Ross are probably right when they suggest
that many legal commentators and institutions have underestimated
25
the difficulty of manipulating price with trades.
One might assume that entering the market to buy a security increases the demand for the security and thus tends to increase its
price. One might also assume that entering the market to sell increases supply and thus tends to depress price. Purchases and sales
are supposed to change price because they must be made with people
who will sell only at a premium or buy only at a discount.2 6 The nature of securities is such, however, that the relationship between trading and security prices is more attenuated than conventional wisdom
suggests.
For many market participants, a security is simply the right to a
stream of income. These people view different securities as substitutes for each other, especially within a diversified portfolio, and they
are willing to replace one security with another without insisting
on a premium. 2 7 It follows that "the supply of near-perfect substi22

Cf RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE

307-08 (4th ed. 1991) (criticizing the common belief that new stock can be sold only at
substantial discounts).
23 NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE FACT BOOK 22 (Ellen Duttweiler ed., 1990) ("In
1989, 95.9% of all transactions occurred with no change or a 1/8 point variation.") [hereinafter NYSE FACT BOOK].
24 See id. at 22 (In 1989, "the average stock showed no change or 1/8 point change in
3,000 shares of volume 87.1% of the time.").
25
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 512-19.
26 See Booth, supra note 20, at 1071.
27 See BREALE & MYERS, supra note 22, at 13149, 307-08; JAMES H. LORIE ET AL., THE
STOCK MARKET.TmoIES AND EVIDENCE 108-31 (2d ed. 1985);JAMES C. VAN HORNE,FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 55-76 (7th ed. 1986); Booth, supra note 20, at 1077-79; Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 513-14; Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price,Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 124143 (1990).
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tutes for any particular security is likely to be much larger than the
supply of the security itself" 28 and because substitutes are available, "theoretically, trading need not have any effect on securities
29
prices."
The fact that very large quantities of securities are regularly
bought and sold at prevailing market prices might seem to suggest
that trades do not affect price at all. If trading did not influence
prices, manipulation by trading would be impossible. 30 However not
all trades are effected at prevailing prices, and trading and price
changes are connected. 3 1
Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 514.
29 Id.; see BREALEY & MYERS,supra note 22, at 307-08; Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins,
Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 61, 62 (1986); William J. Carney,
ShareholderCoordinationCosts, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Meigers: The Case Against Fiduciary
Duties, 1983 AM. B. Foum. RES.J. 341, 355-57; RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 629-30 (1984); Lawrence Harris &
Eitan Gurel, Priceand Volume Effects Associated with Changes in the S&P 500 List. New Evidence
for the Existence ofPice Pressures,41J. FIN. 815, 815 (1986); Alan Kraus & Hans R. Stoll, Price
Impacts of Block Trading on the New York Stock Exchange, 27J. FIN. 569, 569-70 (1972); Stout,
supra note 27, at 1238 n.24, 1241-42.
28

The figure below illustrates situations in which any trade can be made at the prevailing
price.
FIGURE 1: PERFECTLYELASTICEXCESS DEMAND FUNCTIONS
price per share

D2
Dl

+

0
Quantity of securities sold or bought

If investors will buy or sell any amount of a security at a certain price, the net demand for
that security can be illustrated by a horizontal line intersecting the price axis at that price.
The lines labeled D, and D2 each represent such an excess demand function, with a higher
market price for the security whose excess demand is represented by line D 2. All trades will
occur at the market price, and trades will not move price merely because of their size,
because investors can buy or sell an unlimited quantity of the security at the market price.
30 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517.
31 Many commentators attribute the stock market break of October 1987 at least in
part to the concerted selling of institutional investors, especially those engaged in program
trading or following reactive portfolio insurance plans. See, e.g., REPORT or Tm PRESmENTmQATASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS at v, 29 (Jan. 1988); DiviSION OF MARKET REGULATION, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

REPORT ON THE OCTOBER

1987 MARKEr

BREAK at xiii (Feb. 1988) (with changes in investor perceptions regarding such fundamentals "as the 'trigger,' institutional stock selling was the largest single direct factor responsible for the initial opening declines on October 19. Finally, panic selling... was primarily
responsible for the free-fall decline."). See generalyJonathan R Macey et al., Restrictions on
Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in riew of the October 1987 Stock Market
Crash, 74 CORNELL L. Rxv. 799, 822-32 (1989) (discussing the effects of program trading
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At the extreme, a substantial premium over market price must
typically be paid to buy enough stock to acquire control of a publicly
held company.3 2 This is the case whether the buyer acquires control
from a large holder in a single purchase3 3 or from dispersed shareholders through a tender offer.3 4 Similarly, when issuers repurchase
their stock, the more they buy, the higher the price they pay.3 5 Conversely, prices typically decline when issuers or substantial holders sell
36
large quantities of securities.
Large transactions effected in the normal course of trading may
affect price as well, with seller-initiated trades depressing price and
buyer-initiated trades increasing it.a7 About one-half of very large
trades effected on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are reported
to occur at a price different from the previously prevailing price, and
and the contemporary response). The impact that large trades have on prices also underlies the controversy over front-running, that is, the practice of trading a security while
aware of an impending large trade in the same or a related security, with a view toward
profiting from the price change occasioned by the large trade. See Jerry W. Markham,
"Front-Running"-InsiderTrading under the Commodity Exchange Ac 38 CAmr. U. L. REV. 69
(1988); see also David P. Doherty et al., The New York Stock Exchange and Regulation of Market
Manipulation, in MARxET MANIPULATION 141 (Theodore A. Levine & Joseph I. Goldstein
eds., 1989); Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Protectingthe Market-An Overview of Regulatory Efforts to
Combat Market Manipulationon the Stock Exchanges, in MAR=ET MANr'uLATIo,

id. at 94, 118-

24; Mahlon M. Frankhauser & David S. Frye, FrontRunning 21 REv. SEC. & COMMODrnEs
REG. 179 (1988); Mark S. Howard, Frontrunningin the Marketplace:A Regulatory Dilemma, 19
SEC. REG. LJ. 263 (1991); Thomas A. Russo & SusanJ. Lobel, Frontrunningand Block Trading, 23 REv. SEC. & COMMODrrEs REG. 75 (1990).
32
See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate ControL The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously:
The Implications of "Discounted"Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891,
908 (1988); Richard Roll, EmpiricalEvidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth, in
KNIGHTs, RAIDERS, AND TARGE-rs 241 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988).
33 See Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, The Law and Large-Block Trades, 35
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1992).
34 Ellen B. Magenheim & Dennis C. Mueller, Are Acquiring-FirmShareholdersBetter Off
After an Acquisition?, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGErS, supra note 32, at 171, 188.
35
See Laurie Simon Bagwell, DutchAuction Repurchases:An Analysis of ShareholderHeterogeneity, 47J. FIN. 71 (1992) [hereinafter Bagwell, Dutch Auctions); Laurie Simon Bagwell,
ShareholderHeterogeneity:Evidence and Implications, 81 AM. EcoN. REv. 218 (1991) [hereinafter Bagwell, Heterogeneity].
36
See Asquith & Mullins, supra note 29; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29; Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, Stock PriceEffects and Costs of SecondaryDistributions, 14J. FIN. ECON.
165 (1985); John E. Parsons & Artur Raviv, Undeipricingof Seasoned Issues, 14J. FIN. ECON.
377, 381-92 (1985); Myron S. Scholes, The Marketfor Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45J. Bus. 179 (1972).
37
SeeRobertW. Holthausenetal., The Effect ofLarge Block Transactionson Security Prices,
19J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1987); NYSE FACT Boor, supra note 23, at 22 (noting that, in 1989,
the average stock moved more than 1/8 point on 3000 shares of volume about 13% of the
time); Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29. For particular examples, see infra notes 141-62, 235-47
and accompanying text; cf. Stout, supra note 27, at 1254-55 (discussing how index funds
buy substantial amounts of stocks included in the S&P 500 Index, and noting that when a
stock is added to the index, its price typically increases).
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the larger the trade, the more likely price will change.38 Moreover,
due to rules on the priority of orders, the record of completed trades
understates the frequency with which large trades actually change
price.a9 Finally, prices are volatile, and much of this volatility is related to trading. Prices change as market makers and other market
40
participants respond to orders entering the market.
B.

Using Trades to Change Price

In sum, trades sometimes change prices. Economists disagree
about the reasons that trades influence price, but broadly speaking
they offer three explanations. 4 1 A trade may affect the price of a security because market participants disagree about the value of the
traded security; because offsetting trading interest may be temporarily
absent from the market when the trade is effected; or because the
trade communicates information about the value of the security.
So long as trades can change reported price, manipulation may
be possible regardless of what causes the price change. Although a
manipulator need not understand why prices change, it may be difficult to construct legal responses to manipulation without understanding the process by which trades influence prices. 42 Unfortunately, the
discord among economists will not be resolved easily, inasmuch as the
price effects attending particular trading practices are consistent with
38
Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 244-47; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 582-83;
cf Joel Hasbrouck, Measuringthe Information Content of Stock Trades, 46J. FIN. 179, 199-200
(1991) (noting that trades in smaller issuers have greater impact on price than trades in
larger issues).
39 NYSE rules generally require that, before a block trade is executed, all limit orders
between the previous price and the block price, and all earlier-entered orders at the block
price, must be satisfied. See 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2127; see also 5 Louis Loss &JOEL
SELIGMAN, SEcU~rTES REGULATiON 2575 n.265 (3d ed. 1990). The exchange member handling the block trade satisfies these public orders when the block trade is executed. If the
last public order effected is executed at the block price, the tape will show that the block
traded at the prevailing price even though the block traded at a price different from that
prevailing at the time that the block came to the floor (which different price presumably
would have continued to prevail had the block trade not been effected). Accordingly,
large blocks presumably move price more often (and to a greater degree) than the analysis
of trading data indicates. See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 257-60, 266; see also id. at
266 ("Block brokers contend that the mechanics of block trading can cause some buyer- or
seller-initiated transactions to trade at the same price as the prior trade .... even though
the block price is different from the market price prior to the block."); Kraus & Stoll, supra
note 29, at 582-83.
40
See Victor Niederhoffer & M.F.M. Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock
Exchange, 61J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 897 (1966); see also infra notes 70-76, 180-89 and accompanying text.
41
See Harris & Gurel, supranote 29, at 815-16; Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 23942; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 569-71;J. Randall Woolridge & Chinmoy Ghosh, Institutional Trading and Security Prices:The Case of Changes in the Compositionof the S&P 500 Index, 9
J. FiN. REs. 13 (1986).
42
See infra note 335 and accompanying text.
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more than one hypothesis. 43 In addition, because the process by
which trades influence price is complicated, and because trades are
handled differently in different securities markets, similar trading
practices may affect prices differently in different markets. 44 In regu-

lating trading, policy makers should recognize that the premises underlying regulation are necessarily complicated and controversial. In
any case, I have no firm view about why trades sometimes change security prices, and I do not intend the commentary that follows to rest
on any particular vision. 45
1. DisparateValuation
The perfect substitution hypothesis rests on the presumption that
all market participants agree on the value of all securities. As a result,
the theory goes, it should be possible to buy or sell any amount of a
security at the current market price. The remarkable depth of the
securities markets does suggest that many market participants are willing to buy or sell at current prices. Securities are more easily replaced
than almost anything else conventionally thought to be unique. Even
someone who will not accept a substitute for a particular security will
not need to pay a premium price for it if those from whom she must
buy are prepared to accept substitutes. A startlingly large amount of
43 Cf Asquith & Mullins, supra note 29 (finding that price effects of seasoned equity
issues are consistent with sloping demand curves and information); Bagwell, Dutch Auctions, supra note 35, at 79-80 (discussing various explanations for the price effects of large
block sales); id. at 86-88 (stating that, if supply curves slope because holders have different
information, "then the change to a new marginal shareholder may be tantamount to a
change in the information impounded in the market price."); Fischel & Ross, supra note 8,
at 517 (discussing alternative explanations for price effects of changes in the composition
of the S&P 500 Index); Harris & Gurel, supra note 29, at 815-16 (noting that the price
effects of block sales and new issues may be explained by price pressure or new information); Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 569-71; Richard H. Pettway & Robert C. Radcliffe,
Impacts of New Equity Sales Upon Electric Utility Share Prices, 14 FIN. McaMT. 16 (1985) (classifying price changes associated with new issues of stock by public utilities according to information and liquidity effects); Stout, supra note 27, at 1253-54 (conceding that several
hypotheses can explain the price effects of large transactions).
44 See KALMAN J. COHEN ET AL, THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF SECURITIES MARKETS 15-70
(1986) (comparing stock exchange trading arrangements);JOEL HASBROUCK & ROBERT A.
ScI-wvARTz, THE EFFICIENCY OF STOCK EXCHANGE AND OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS 31-33
(Salomon Bros. Ctr. for the Study of Fin. Insts. Working Paper No. 390, 1986) (concluding
that trading-system design influences the accuracy of market prices).
45
I understand Fischel and Ross to be agnostic as well. At times, however, they seem
reluctant to concede that some trades do affect prices. For example, they introduce their
discussion of manipulation with the statement: "If trading has no effect on price because of
the substitution effect, a successful manipulation is impossible." Fischel & Ross, supra note
8, at 517. In addition, they maintain that considerable evidence supports the proposition
that trading need not have any effect on price. Id. at 514. On the other hand, they acknowledge that "many block trades have stock price consequences," and state that because
of bid-ask spreads, the sequence with which random buy and sell orders arrive in the market will cause price reversals. Id. at 515-16.
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most securities can be bought or sold at or near the prevailing price, 4 6
and the demand for most actively publicly traded securities seems
quite elastic. 47
The fact that many large trades are made at prevailing prices does
not prove that all market participants believe that all securities are
worth the prevailing price, however.4 8 The resources devoted to finding buyers for large secondary offerings that might simply be sold into
the market suggests that not all investors ascribe the same value to all
securities. 49 Heterogeneous shareholder valuation may also help explain why buyers often must pay more than the prevailing market
price to buy a very large amount of a particular security.50 In any
event, as skeptical commentators frequently remark, the assumption
that all market participants have homogeneous expectations and
ascribe the same value to all securities runs counter to common expe5
rience and intuition. '
Even if most securities have many near-perfect substitutes for
most purposes, sometimes no adequate substitute exists for a particular security. A security is more than just the right to an income
stream; it is the right to a particular income stream, with common
stock also carrying the right to participate in the management of the
See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
But see Stout, supra note 27, at 1252-58 (discussing evidence of unit elasticity).
Although Fischel and Ross appear to acknowledge the possibility that the supply
and demand for any given security might not be perfectly elastic, they seem unconvinced.
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 516-17; see also id. at 517 n.62 (suggesting that price
changes associated with changes in the S&P 500 Index may be due to real economic
changes occasioned by inclusion in the index, rather than by trading). Others understand
Fischel and Frank H. Easterbrook to have taken the position that demand is perfectly elastic. See Booth, supra note 20, at 1083; Carney, supra note 29, at 354-55; Stout, supranote 27,
at 1242 n.39.
49
See ROBERT L. KuHN, INvEsTmENT BANKING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF HIGH-STAKES
DELM 'AIN' 271 (1990) (noting that firms selling stock typically encourage investment
bankers to find long-term investors who will be loyal to incumbent management); Claudio
F. Loderer et al., The Pricingof Equity Offerings, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 36 (1991) (suggesting
that underwriters actively promote seasoned offerings because they have incomplete
knowledge of individual investors' demand schedules); cf Parsons & Raviv, supra note 36,
at 392-94 (contrasting underwritten and rights offerings).
50 See Bagwell, Dutch Auctions, supra note 35; Bagwell, Heterogeneity, supra note 35; Carney, supra note 29, at 355-57; see alsoBooth, supra note 20, at 1087-1103 (surveying evidence
and suggesting that block buying forces stock prices upward); Stout, supra note 27, at 125258 (providing empirical evidence regarding heterogeneous shareholder valuation); cf.
Booth, supra note 20, at 1059 n.12 (listing works implicitly based on heterogeneous
valuation).
51 See ScHwARTZ, supra note 18, at 227-36, 272-73; Booth, supra note 20, at 1077-1103;
RonaldJ. Gilson, Value Creationby Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 YALE L.J.
239, 252-53 (1984); Paul S. Schreiber & Robert A. Schwartz, Efficient Price Discovery in a
Securities Market: The Objective of a Trading System, in MARKr MAKING AND THE CHANGING
SmaUCruaE OF THE SECuRrriEs INDusrRY 19, 22-23 (Yakov Amihud et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter MARKET MAKING]; Stout, supra note 27, at 1238 (describing the assumption of homogeneous expectations as "pure fiction"); cf. Booth, supra note 20, at 1059 n.12 (listing works
implicitly based on the assumption that securities have sloping supply curves).
46
47
48
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issuer. The supply of any particular security is limited, and someone
who wants a particular security-for whatever reason-must pursue
that finite supply. If some owners are unwilling to sell their securities
at the prevailing price, a buyer will have to pay a premium price to get
them. 5 2 Thus, a person may be able to raise price by buying more
stock than owners are prepared to sell at the prevailing price.
A purchase is presumably most likely to exceed the supply available at the prevailing price, and thus to move price, when only a small
amount of a security is available for trading. Supply may be limited
because little was issued in the first place or because a substantial
amount is held by people who are reluctant to sell, perhaps because
they are closely associated with the issuer.53 Conversely, sales are most
52
The figure below illustrates situations in which the amount of a security that investors will buy or sell depends on the price.
FIGURE 2: DOWNWARD SLOPING EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTIONS

price per share

D2

0

+

Quantity of securities sold or bought

The curves labeled D, and D2 each represent excess demand functions in which a change
in price will alter net demand. The market clearing price (i.e., the price at which purchase
and sale interest offset each other) is the price at which the curves intersect the price axis.
At higher prices (represented by the portion of the curve on the negative side of the quantity axis), market participants as a group would want to sell more than they would want to
buy. At lower prices, buying interest would exceed selling interest.
When a new trader enters the market, the excess demand function shifts to the right
(left) by the number of shares the new trader is willing to buy (sell) at a particular price.
Thus, if a person who wanted to buy entered a market characterized by curve D, the excess
demand curve would shift to the right to curve D2 and the price would rise. Excess demand still shifts to the right (left) when a new buyer (seller) enters a market characterized
by perfectly elastic demand, as in Figure 1, supra note 29, but shifting the horizontal line
does not result in a change in the price at which purchase and sale interests intersect. This
price stability follows from the willingness of other traders to buy or sell any amount of the
security at the prevailing price.
53
See Booth, supra note 20, at 1079-81 (discussing the value of controlling a block of
shares). Small-capitalization stocks have recently figured prominently in so-called pennystock manipulations. See Ferrara et al., supra note 31, at 224-41;Joseph I. Goldstein et al.,
An Investment Masquerade:A Descriptive Overview of Penny Stock Fraudand The FederalSecurities
Laws, 47 Bus. LAw. 773, 774 (1992); Joseph I. Goldstein & L. Delane Cox, Penny Stock
Markups and Markdowns, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 676, 676 (1991); Theodore A. Levine & Gerard
S. Citera, ManipulativePractices-CurrentEnforcement and Regulatory Initiatives, in MARKET MANIPULATION, supra note 31, at 3, 35-41; see alsoJoseph A. Grundfest, FinancialScandals in the
United States and Japan,Am. ENTER., May/June 1992, at 34, 38-39 (noting that in both the
United States andJapan, targets of manipulation typically have small capitalizations or easily controlled float). The untoward behavior attributed to penny-stock brokers is often

1994]

SECURITIES MANIPULATION

likely to exceed the amount demanded at the prevailing price when
only a few people are interested in buying a security, as in the case of
thinly traded securities 54 or speculative penny stocks. Thus, manipulation by taking advantage of inelastic supply is likely to be easier with
thinly traded securities. In fact, such securities are the subject of
55
many allegedly manipulative schemes.
2.

Immediacy

Even if some market participants disagree with the market's valuation of a security, it may take very large trades-and the concomitant
commitment of substantial resources-to move price by absorbing all
either grossly excessive commissions or simple fraud. See Goldstein & Cox, supra; see also
Fischel and Ross, supra note 8, at 539-42. Calling this behavior manipulation may do little
to farther analysis. Id. at 540. Fischel & Ross minimize the possibility of a broker dominating the market, suggesting that customers could simply take their trades to other market
makers. Id. at 541. Most descriptions of the penny-stock market, however, suggest that
brokers in this market do not face effective competition. Nonetheless, penny-stock operators are often alleged to bid up the price of the stocks in which they deal, and they are able
to do so because as they buy from the weakest holders, the reservation price of the marginal holders rises. Aggressive brokers are said to pressure clients to buy stock while effectively discouraging others from selling. See Goldstein et al., supra, at 786-88; William H.
Lash, III, Loose Change: The Campaignfor Penny Stock Reform, 60 UMKC L. RE,. 1, 6, 13
(1991); Levine & Citera, supra, at 35-36, 38, 47.
54 See Booth, supra note 20, at 1100, 1105; Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The AppraisalRemedy and the Goals of CorporateLaw, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429, 446 (1985) ("it is more
likely that shares ... are fairly associated with inframarginal value when they are not actively and widely traded"); Stout, supra note 27, at 1251-52, 1256 n.107, 1258 n.119. A
recent study of Dutch auction issuer repurchases developed preliminary findings indicating "that supply curves are more elastic when institutional holdings are high, dividend
yield is high, price has not varied much in the past 5 years, and the fraction bought ... is
large." Bagwell, Heterogeneity, supra note 35, at 221. The author of that study subsequently
concluded that elasticity is larger "for firms with large trading volume, firms included in
the S&P 500 Index, and firms that have been the targets of takeover activity." Bagwell,
Dutch Auctions, supra note 35, at 97. The market for the stock of companies that repurchase their stock in Dutch Auctions may differ from the market for thinly traded companies, but the factors that seem to indicate inelasticity in this study also characterize the
thinly traded and speculative stocks that are typically the subject of alleged manipulations.
5
See William R. McLucas & Alma M. Angotti, Market Manipulation, 22 REv. SEC. &
COMMODrrIEs REG. 103, 111 (1989); John E. Pinto, Jr., The NASD's Enforcement Agenda, 85
Nw. U. L. Ra,. 739, 745-46 (1991) (noting that NASD penny-stock cases typically involve
brokers who control the market in certain securities); see also Fischel & Ross, supranote 8,
at 518 ("It is frequently asserted that thinly traded stocks are more prone to manipulation
... perhaps because information and price pressure effects... may be accentuated in this
case."); Lawrence Kryzanowski, Misinformationand Security Markets, 24 McGiL L.J. 123, 123
(1978). When the Exchange Act was enacted, it was widely believed that manipulators
were most likely to operate in stocks with "easily controllable floating supply." Comment,
Market Manipulationand the SecuritiesExchange Ac 46 YAI.E L.J. 624, 626-27 (1937). Manipulators were said to control supply by getting large holders to promise to keep their shares
off the market. Id. at 627 n.14; see also 8 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 39, at 3973 (listing
devices used by manipulators to " 'dry up' the overhanging supply of the [manipulated]
security."). After restricting supply, manipulators could allegedly bid up the share price by
buying, without fear that their purchase orders would be met by a flood of sales.
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of the securities supplied or demanded at the prevailing price.5 6 How-

ever, even if enough people are willing to trade at the prevailing market price, so that a trade "need not have any effect on securities
prices," those willing to trade at prevailing prices are not always represented in the market.5 7 A trade may move price when people who
would be willing to trade at the prevailing price are absent from the
market.5 8 In other words, even if the potential supply and demand
are perfectly elastic, a trade may move price if potential offsetting
traders are not mobilized.5 9
56 That is, all but the largest traders may effectively face perfectly elastic demand. See
Carney, supra note 29, at 355; Alan Schwartz, The Fairnessof Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian
Theory, 17J. LECAL STUD. 165, 188-89 (1988) (concluding that it is realistic to assume that
shareholder values are captured in market values, although some people do derive unique
value from particular securities); Stout, supra note 27, at 1249-51 (Because investor demand for stock is convex, at "the margin, the demand function is relatively 'flat,' so that
transactions exert only modest pressure on prices."); see also Fischel & Ross, supranote 8, at
513 n.39. This proposition is illustrated by an excess demand curve that is close to horizontal around the price axis in Figure 2, supra note 52.
57 See SanfordJ. Grossman, The InformationalRole of Upstairsand Downstairs Trading,65
J. Bus. 509, 511-14 (1992) (discussing reasons people do not participate continuously in
the market).
58 See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting,82 QJ. ECON. 33, 36 (1968); Grossman,
supra, note 57; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 570-71; cf. Harris & Gurel, supranote 29, at
815-16 (stating that the price-pressure hypothesis, which the authors conclude may explain
the price effect of inclusion in the S&P 500 list, "assumes that long-run demand is perfectly
elastic... [but recognizes that] short-term demand curves may be less than perfectly elastic."); Scholes, supra note 36, at 186 ("In any attempt to measure the slope of a demand
curve, it is, of course, essential to specify the relevant time span. In the very shortest of
short runs, all demand curves will be almost perfectly inelastic. Yet, by waiting perhaps
only a trivial length of time until news of a proposed sale had spread throughout the market, the sale might be effected without price-pressure effects."); HASBROUCK & ScHWARz,
supra note 44, at 15 (noting the possibility that demand is relatively inelastic in very brief
trading intervals).
59 The figure below illustrates situations in which traders must pay a premium price
for trading quickly.
FIGURE 3: EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTIONS THAT VARY WiTH TIME

instaotaoeous
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This model assumes that the long-run demand for a security is perfectly elastic, so that an
infinite amount can be bought or sold at the prevailing price. The market maker will trade
some quantity at close to the prevailing price, but to trade more immediately, a buyer
(seller) will have to pay a premium (accept a low price). This premium will increase as
more securities are traded. Excess demand functions representing the situation faced by
traders who want to trade quickly are shown by the curves labeled "instantaneous" and
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Most of the cost associated with trading stock reflects the expense
of finding someone to take the other side of the trade. 60 Investors
61
turn to the markets to find trading partners quickly and cheaply,
and organized securities markets are conventionally thought to develop in response to investors' desires to trade quickly. 62 In an earlier
article, Fischel himself stated that, "[a ] s with all marketplaces, the primary benefit of [stock] exchanges is that they save traders the cost of
independently searching for someone on the other side of the
63
transaction."
Some trading interest is likely to be represented in the markets at
any given time, as traders enter market orders and price changes trigger limit orders.64 A significant part of NYSE trading, for example, is
made up of transactions between public customers.6 5 Those who
might buy or sell are not constantly represented in the market, how"very quick." These curves are relatively flat around the price axis because the market
maker will trade small quantities around that price. The demand function faced by a
trader in a hurry depends on the speed with which the trader wishes to complete the
transaction. The trader can reduce the premium necessary to trade a particular quantity
by waiting to trade, thereby moving to a longer-term demand function (e.g., from instantaneous to very quick). The trader can avoid the premium entirely by waiting long enough
to trade. The wait necessary to avoid any premium may be very short.
60 RcHARD
IL LnmIsEy & ULRKE SCHAEDE, SPECIAuST vs. SAIrORI, MARKET MAKING IN
NEwYoRK AND TOKYO 21 (Yale Sch. of Org. & Mgmt. Working Paper No. 26, 1992); see also
Charles C. Cox & Douglas C. Michael, The Marketfor Markets: Development of International
Securities and Commodities Trading, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 833, 842-43 (1987).
61 Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, The Effect of Computer Based Trading on Volatility
and Liquidity, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 19, at 59, 59-60; Macey & Kanda,
supra note 18, at 1018-20.
62 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BusmNss 648 (1989);
Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 61, at 59-82; Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock
Markets: A CriticalLook at the SEC's NationalMarket System, 56 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 883, 886 (1981);
see also H. Kent Baker & Richard B. Edelman, AMEX-to-NYSE Transfers, Market Microstructure,
and Shareholder Wealth, 21 FIN. MGmT. 60 (1992) (noting that issuers switch from AMEX to
NYSE when the latter provides liquidity benefits); Arnold R. Cowan et al., Explaining the
NYSE Listing Choices of NASDAQFirms, 21 FIN. MGmT. 73 (1992) (finding that issuers look to
liquidity benefits when choosing between NASDAQ and NYSE markets); cf Macey &
Kanda, supra note 18, at 1010-24 (arguing that liquidity is only one of the services that
exchange markets offer).
63 Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation ofDual Class Common Stock,
54 U. Ci. L. Rxv. 119, 121 (1987); see also Cox & Michael, supra note 60, at 842-43 (noting
that markets reduce search costs for buyers and sellers); Nicholas Wolfson et al., The Securities Markets: An Overview, 16 How. L.J. 791, 811 (1971) ("The economic purpose of a stock
exchange is to bring together buyers and sellers in one central market.").
64 See Demsetz, supra note 58, at 40-41, 43-44; Grossman, supra note 57, at 513.
65 See NYSE FAcr BOOK 19 (1990) (specialists were either buyer or seller in 19% of
share volume in 1989, and less than half of volume involved a NYSE member trading as
principal); Poser, supra note 62, at 889; see also Cowan et al., supra note 62, at 75 (investors
can bypass specialists and trade with each other on the exchanges within the spread); LINDSET & SCHADE, supra note 60, at 17 (suggesting that since specialists rarely participate in
block trading, the 19% specialist-participation figure implies that specialists participate in
about 39% of trading at their posts).
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ever, 6 6 and an investor who wants to trade more than other investors
present in the market at prevailing prices must either wait or offer a
premium to attract other traders to the market.67 Market makers,
such as specialists on the exchanges, stand willing to take the other
side of many trades. 68 This service has a price, however, since market
makers must be compensated for being available and for bearing the
risk of taking a position. 69 This compensation takes the form of a
premium price; market makers offer to buy at one price and to sell at
a higher one.
If market makers supply immediacy, 70 then the bid-ask spread is a
cost of trading immediately.7 1 Because of the spread, the sequence of
orders reaching the market may cause changes in reported prices.
For example, if a market maker buys at the bid price and then sells at
66

See Schreiber & Schwartz, supra note 51, at 24-25 (explaining how costs of trading

impede price discovery); see also Grossman, supra note 57, at 511-14 (discussing the failure
of continuous participation and its consequences).
67
A price that either triggers limit orders or attracts the attention of other market
participants may mobilize traders. See Grossman, supra note 57, at 513 ("The customer who
was interested in selling the stock [but was not in the market] will see the price rise and
offer his stock for sale. The overall transaction is effected by prices conveying information
to customers. .. ."); HASBROUCK & SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 15 ("The temporary price
changes act primarily as a sweetener to attract new orders to the market."); Allen R. Myerson, Less is Brewing in Witching Hours, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 1993, at D1 (finding that NYSE
announcements of order imbalances attract offsetting orders and stabilize prices); cf. P.C.
Grier & P.S. Albin, Nonrandom Price Changes in Association with Tradingin LargeBlocks, 46 J.
Bus. 425 (1973) (suggesting that investors need about 15 minutes to trade in response to a
trade's appearing on the tape).
68
See 17 C.FR. § 240.1lb-1 (a) (2)(iii) (1993) (requiring specialists to maintain fair
and orderly markets); 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2104 (1991); 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH)
9310 (1989); see also Dale A. Oesterle et al., The New York Stock Exchange and Its Outmoded
Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive?, 17J. CORP. L. 223 (1992); Nicholas
Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
1970 DuKE LJ. 707.
69
See Demsetz, supra note 58; Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 240; Niederhoffer &
Osborne, supra note 40, at 904-05. Market makers must also be compensated for the possibility that they may be trading with informed investors. See Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider
Trading,Liquidity, and the Role of the Monopolist Specialist,62J. Bus. 211 (1989); see also David
Easley & Maureen O'Hara, Pice, Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets, 19 J. FIN.
EcoN. 69 (1987) (suggesting that the possibility that large trades convey information can
fully account for the price impact of large trades).
70
See Demsetz, supra note 58, at 35-37; see also Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 61
(noting the immediacy services that market makers provide); ScmvARrz, supra note 18, at
332-40, 389-91; Hans R. Stoll, Alternative Views of Market Making, in MARKET MAKING, supra
note 51, at 67, 78-82 (same);Jack L. Treynor, The Economics of the DealerFunction,FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 27 (defining market maker as someone who accommodates
traders for whom time is important).
71
See Demsetz, supra note 58, at 39-45; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 169-70, 33233, 389-91; Cox & Michael, supra note 60, at 843-44; cf.SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 391-97
(discussing other services provided by market makers). The spread is usually very small on
the NYSE. See NYSE FACT BOOK 22 (1990). The spread is larger for smaller issuers with less
trading volume. See Richard Roll, A Simple Implicit Measureof the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an
Efficient Market, 39 J. FIN. 1127 (1984); HASBROUCK & SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 14, 31.
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the ask price, the price of the two consecutive trades will differ by the
amount of the bid-ask spread.72 Thus, as Fischel and Ross recognize,
an order to sell (buy) stock at the market that is filled after a buy (sell)
order will decrease (increase) the reported price.73 Brokerage firms
and their employees are well situated to engineer the change between
bid and ask prices, and sometimes this price change can create substantial profits.7 4
The bid-ask spread may not be the full measure of the potential
price impact of executing a trade quickly, however.7 5 Market makers
will be reluctant to take the opposite position in extremely large
trades even at a premium, and they may lack the capital to do so anyway.76 Stock exchange specialists are required to trade to keep the
market orderly, but they are not required to support prices or keep
them stable. The prices at which they offer to buy or sell are good for
77
only limited quantities of securities.
Traders usually take care not to overwhelm the market when they
believe that the unaided market cannot immediately accommodate
their large trades.78 Their brokers may search for offsetting interest
72 Demsetz, supra note 58; Niederhoffer & Osborne, supra note 40; Roll, supra note
71, at 1128-30; see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 516; ScmvAR-rz, supra note 18, at 40809 (distinguishing between realized and quoted spreads); HASBROUCK & SessVARrz, supra
note 44, at 14-15 (discussing bid-ask spreads in larger markets).
73 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 516; cf.Ronald C. Lease et al., An Investigation of
Market MicrostructureImpacts on Event Study Returns, 46J. FIN. 1523 (1991) (arguing that a
significant part of abnormal returns conventionally associated with seasoned equity offerings can be explained by spread bias resulting from a preponderance of sell orders on the
day before the offering).
74 See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
75 Fischel and Ross can be understood to treat the bid-ask spread as the full measure
of the price impact of trading immediately. They call the price premium (discount) that a
trader must pay (accept) a liquidity cost, and indicate that all traders bear it because of bidask spreads. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 516. They do not, however, acknowledge that
it may be impossible to trade large quantities at the quoted spread, nor do they discuss the
upstairs market, the existence of which documents the limits of the liquidity that market
makers provide. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text. They do, however, acknowledge that a trader who insists on trading immediately may be unable to do so at the prevailing price because offsetting interest may be absent at the moment that the order reaches
the market. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 515-16.
76 See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2514-16; Hasbrouck, supra note 38, at 20002; Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1028-32; see also Poser, supra note 62, at 952-56 (noting that specialists may not always have sufficient capital to function properly).
77 See, e.g., 2 NYSE Guide (CCH)
2104.10 (1991); see also 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 39, at 2524-25 (noting that specialist's obligation to deal for his own account is not
unlimited); ScIvARTz, supra note 18, at 30; Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1025-34
(noting that market makers do not always have the incentive or capital to maintain price
continuity); Oesterle et al., supra note 68, at 268-95 (discussing evaluation of specialists);
Stoll, in MARKET MAKING, supra note 70, at 74-77 (discussing the market as price stabilizer);
cf.United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368-70 (2d Cir. 1991) (price increase created
by buying more than the specialist would sell).
78 Consider the Bank of England's sale of approximately $970,000,000 of British Petroleum stock at only a small discount, which Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers cite as a
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or effect the trades in smaller amounts over an appropriate period of
time.7 9 When traders believe their orders cannot be handled on the
exchange floor without a price concession, they often turn to the
firms that comprise the so-called upstairs market.8 0 These firms make
a business of facilitating large trades and locating any trading interest
that is not registered on the floor.8 ' The upstairs market, which competes with the floor in providing liquidity, exists in part because very
large trades can overwhelm the trading interest that is present on the
floor.8 2 The capital, expertise and specialized facilities devoted to the

remarkable example of the extreme elasticity of demand for securities. See BREALEv & MYERS, supra note 22, at 308. As Brealey and Myers emphasize, the Bank took applications for
nearly two weeks before the sale. Id.
79 See SCHwARTZ, supra note 18, at 108 ("Medium size orders are worked on the exchange to avoid the price impact of a market order or the price impact attributable to the
option value of a revealed limit order.");Jerry A. Hausman et al., An OrderedProbitAnalysis
of Transaction Stock Prices, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 321 (1992) ("A floor broker seeking to
unload 100,000 shares of stock will generally break up the sale into smaller blocks to minimize the price impact of the trades."); see also MARTIN MAYER, MARKETs 37 (1988) (recognizing that brokers with large orders will bide their time and split orders); Hausman et al.,
supra,at 351, 352-53 (noting that brokers tend to split large orders and time the execution
of trades); cf Lawrence M. Benveniste et al., What's Special About the Specialist, 32 J. FIN.
ECON. 61, 67 (1992) (finding that specialists extract concessions from brokers by working
orders for them).
80 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2573; ScHwARrz, supra note 18, at 26-27.
81 See SclrwARTz, supranote 18, at 111 ("the negative market impact [of large trades is]
limited by the information gathering, selling, and risk taking activities of the block
trader"); Grossman, supra note 57, at 511-14; see also Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1032
("[T]he rise of block trading has caused trading by investment bankers, serving in their
capacity as 'upstairs market makers,' to assume the role traditionally performed by specialists on the exchange. These investment bankers, and not the exchange specialists, are the
real providers of liquidity for the block trading that has become the dominant form of
trading in modem securities markets."). Indeed, the NYSE rules that regulate block positioning recognize the limited ability of the floor to handle large trades. See 2 NYSE Guide
(CCH) 2127 (1991); see also id. 2097; Russo & Lobel, supra note 31, at 79. The NYSE
defines trades of over 10,000 shares as block trades, and over half of the trading volume on
the NYSE is effected in such block trades. NYSE FACr BOOK 17 (1990). However, the
market is able to handle many trades of 10,000 shares without disruption. See Holthausen
et al., supra note 37, at 244 n.9.
82
See Grossman, supra note 57, at 512-13 (describing the upstairs market as a depository for information about unexpressed demand); see also DuaneJ. Seppi, EquilibriumBlock
Trading and Asymmetric Information, 45 J. FIN. 73, 89 (1990) (noting that in the upstairs
market, a trader can obtain better prices by signalling that she is uninformed); HAMILTON,
supra note 62, § 18.7; 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2570-78; SCHWARTZ, supra note

18, at 106-13, 147; Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 265-66; Macey & Kanda, supra note
18, at 1028-29. The off-exchange market in exchange-listed stocks developed, in part, as a
response to fixed commission rates on the NYSE, which have since been abolished. See
MAYER, supra note 79, at 38-39;James L. Hamilton, ElectronicMarket Linkages and the Distribution of OrderFlow: The Case of Off-Board Trading of NYSE-Listed Stocks, in INFORMTION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 19, at 265; Poser, supra note 62, at 898-901, 937; Wolfson et al., supra
note 63, at 824-25.
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upstairs market cogently document the fact that large trades taken
directly to the trading floor will disrupt price. 3
The idea that rapidly executed trades can distort prices might
seem inconsistent with the fact that very large blocks of stock are usually traded at or very near the prevailing market price. It might also
seem inconsistent with the widely held belief that much of the price
change occasioned by large trades is due to the information thought
to be impounded in those trades and not to the pressure of those
trades overwhelming the market.8 4 For example, Fischel and Ross argue that the evidence suggesting that almost one-half of all large
trades are effected at the same price as the preceding trade demonstrates that a would-be manipulator cannot be confident that large
trades will move price.8 5 However, the minimal price effects that typically attend large trades do not show that a large trade designed to
move price will not do so. In fact, this evidence does not even show
that a carelessly executed trade can be made at the prevailing price.
The large blocks that are traded at or near prevailing market
prices are typically constructed so as to minimize or entirely avoid
making price concessions. Traders usually want to trade at the best
price possible, and if they expect a trade to overwhelm the market
they will not trade immediately. Instead, they will instruct their brokers to work the trades or turn to the upstairs market 8 6 Thus, it is
hardly surprising that large trades are seldom effected in a way that
dramatically changes price by temporarily overwhelming supply or demand. Indeed, it would be surprising to find that many traders were
87
willing to pay extra to trade quickly.

Most of the evidence indicating that large trades have a minimal
impact on stock prices relates to NYSE trading. The prices at which
83 The firms that handle large trades have specialized communications facilities and
expertise in locating trading interest, all developed at considerable cost. See HAMILTON,
supra note 62, at 426; 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2573-77; ScmvARrz, supra note
18, at 107-13. Computerized institutional trading systems allow institutions to trade large
blocks among themselves. HAMILTON, supra note 62, at 426-27; 5 Loss & SFsGMAN, supra
note 39, at 2577-78.
84 See infra part I.B.3.
85 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517. Fischel and Ross offer Robert W. Holthausen
and others to support the statement that "nearly half of all block trades occur with no
change in price." Id. at at 517 n.63 (citing Holthausen et al., supra note 37). However,
Holthausen et al. explain that stock exchange rules may distort the trading record, so
that their figures understate the frequency with which large trades change price. See
Holthausen et al., supranote 37, at 257-60, 266; see also supra note 39 (discussing the execution of large trades).
86
See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Fischel has noted elsewhere that a broker handling a large trade will bypass the specialist on the exchange floor and directly "call
other dealers and institutions to find one interested in the other end of the deal." Fischel,
supranote 63, at 126.
87
Cf ScmvARTz, supra note 18, at 106-07 (suggesting that institutions will pay extra
transaction costs to sell but not to buy).
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trades are effected on the Exchange are the product of the profitmaximizing behavior of traders. In addition, large trades are often
executed on the floor of the Exchange only after they are arranged in
the upstairs market.88 Accordingly, the great liquidity indicated by an
analysis of NYSE trading data reflects the use of liquidity-enhancing
devices. The fact that trades carefully structured to minimize their
impact do not move price much does not mean that unstructured
trades or trades structured to have an impact will fail to change prices.
On the contrary, traders go to considerable lengths to minimize the
effects of their trades precisely because unstructured trades might
"generate severe, adverse price effects if simply presented to the
89
market."
The same article that Fischel & Ross cite for the proposition that
large blocks typically trade at market price emphasizes the limited relevance of this finding to our inquiry.9 0 It begins with the caveat that
traders can select the lowest cost alternative for trading, and "[t]hus,
the results in the paper do not measure the costs of immediacy (i.e.,
the price disadvantage of transacting immediately) for a security selected at random. Rather, the results indicate the actual price effects
associated with large trades given traders' maximizing behavior."9 1
The article ends on the same note, reiterating that the transactions
studied resulted from maximizing behavior-in particular, searches
for low-cost execution-and stating that "[t]he price effects documented in this paper should not be extrapolated to large transactions
92
in securities selected at random."
Studies that focus on the impact of corporate sales of new stock
and substantial secondary distributions reveal even less about the effect of immediate trading, for such sales are typically handled by investment bankers who expend time and resources to find buyers. 93
88
Cf. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2576 (block positioners are generally obligated to execute block trades on an exchange floor).
89
Roberts, at 106.
90 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 514 n.46 (citing Holthausen et al., supra note
37).
91 Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 239.
92
Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 265; see also Hausman et al., supra note 79, at
350-53 (even flexible and powerful statistical model of stock trading does not reveal the
price impact of large orders that are not executed in small bundles to obtain the best
average price).
93 Myron Scholes' study is probably the most influential. Scholes studied secondary
distributions that were typically underwritten by investment bankers and sold after the
close of the market to subscribers at a subscription price at or near the closing price. See
Scholes, supra note 36, at 185. Scholes found these distributions uniquely appropriate for
his study precisely because the investment bankers had informed potential buyers of the
availability of the block. Id. at 186. In any event, Scholes analyzed daily return data, and
thus, his results do not illuminate any immediacy costs that sellers may have incurred. See
id. at 186-87; see alsoTHOMAS E. COPELAND &J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPoRATE POLicY 371-72 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing the Scholes study). Studies of blocks
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Moreover, many new issues and secondary distributions must be registered with the SEC before they can be completed, and the delay between the filing of a registration statement and its effective date allows
94
substantial time for potential buyers -to mobilize.
Conventional traders try to get the best prices they can, employing disruption-minimizing techniques to ensure that they buy at the
lowest price possible and sell at the highest. Manipulators, on the
other hand, desire just the opposite: they want their purchases to
push prices up, and their sales to pull them down. Inasmuch as manipulators act on perverse incentives, the mechanisms that have developed to help conventional traders will not keep manipulators from
moving prices. Indeed, the development of these mechanisms suggests that unassisted large trades do change price. A manipulator who
wants to disrupt reported prices may be able to do so simply by foregoing investment bankers or the upstairs market and taking a large trade
directly to the trading floor and effecting it all at once.
Although hastily effected trades can be used to move prices, the
would-be manipulator who takes this tack faces a special problem. If
the price of a security changes because a trade is effected too quickly,
the new price will be short lived.9 5 The price change occasioned by
executing a trade without allowing the market to mobilize is temporary because market participants who were away from the market
when the trade occurred will come to the market when they see that
trades are being effected at premium prices. In fact, the predictability
of this reaction allows specialists and other market makers to provide
offsetting trades for a relatively small premium, thereby reducing the
price effect of large trades. 96 It follows that the more people pay attention to trading in a particular security, the less impact large trades
will have on price. Again, the prices of thinly traded securities are
97
moved more easily than those of widely held securities.
traded during regular market hours consistently indicate that large sales often depress
price temporarily, suggesting that there is an immediacy cost, even for traders trying to get
the best price possible. See Larry Y. Dann et al., Trading Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of
Price Adjustment, 4J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1977); Holthausen et al., supra note 37; Kraus & Stoll,
supra note 29.
94 See Pettway & Radcliffe, supra note 43 (studying registered new issues and noting
effect of offering announcement on price); Scholes, supra note 36, at 204-06 (discussing
price effects of registered secondary distributions).
95
Economists look to the duration of price changes to determine whether they result
from immediacy or some other factor. See Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29; Pettway & Radcliffe,
supra note 43.
96 See Fischel, supra note 63, at 121-22; cf Treynor, supra note 70 (arguing that the
spread is determined by trades of value-based investors).
97 See WilliamJ. Carney, Signallingand Causationin Insider Trading,36 CATH. U. L. REV.
863, 887 (1987) ('In perhaps as many as seven hundred firms, liquidity is sufficient to allow
institutions to take substantial investment positions or liquidate their holdings without lowering prices.").
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I address the possibility of profiting from manipulated prices below, but it is not giving away much to say that it may be hard to profit
from price changes that last only a few minutes. However, if a price
move triggers a sympathetic response in the market, the trading of
other market participants may prevent price from returning to its previous level, even as other market participants are mobilized. 98 More
importantly, a manipulator may be able to profit from moving prices
even briefly. Remarkably large profits can sometimes be secured by
moving prices just a very small amount for a very short time.99
3.

Altered Expectations

Security prices rise and fall with changes in the market's expectations about the income that securities will produce, and those expectations change as new information becomes available. 10 0 Trades may
convey relevant information, and as such are important determinants
of market prices.' 0 ' For example, if market participants believe that
the person who initiated a particular trade possessed nonpublic information relevant to a security's value, the trade will cause them to
reevaluate the security and its price will change accordingly. 02 Indeed, Fischel has suggested elsewhere that insider trading tends to
move prices, 10 3 and there is at least some evidence that informed trad98 See infra part I.B.3.
99 See infra part ILA.
100 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29. The price effect of changed market expectations is illustrated by a shift of the excess demand function for a security. For example, in
both Figure 1, supra note 29, and Figure 2, supra note 52, line D 2 represents a situation in
which investors will purchase more of the security at any price than investors will purchase
at that price in the situation represented by line Dr. A positive development that leads the
market to a more optimistic evaluation of a security is illustrated by a shift from line DI to
line D2.
101
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 569-79.
102
See, e.g., BREALEv & MYERs, supra note 22, at 349-50 (discussing market reaction to
new issues); Scholes, supra note 36, at 182-84 (discussing price changes under the efficientmarket model); cf. Glosten, supra note 69, at 215-23 (suggesting that competitive market
makers will sometimes refuse to trade when some market participants have informational
advantages); Seppi, supra note 82 (a trader who can demonstrate it lacks information can
get better price in upstairs market). The information thought to be contained in trades
continues to influence price until it ceases to be relevant or is discovered to be incorrect.
Trades that change market participants' expectations about the value of a security change
the security's price even if the demand for the security is perfectly elastic and always present in the market. See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 240; see also Fischel & Ross, supra
note 8, at 514-15.
103
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of InsiderTrading,35 STAN. L.
REv. 857, 866-68 (1983); ef. id. at 892-93 (recognizing that insiders might use the information signal of their purchases to manipulate price, but concluding that this is a short-run
phenomenon that corporate insiders will not use for fear that it will damage the value of
their human capital); see also FRANK H. EAsrERooK & DANIEL P- FiscHmL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTRE OF CORPORATE LAw 256-57 (1991) ("At the extreme, trading by insiders is as
revealing as disclosure."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel i Fischel, The ProperRole of a
Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAv. L. REv. 1161, 1168 n.18 (1981)
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ing moves prices significantly even when informed traders try to hide
their trades. 10 4 The communicative aspect of trading is one of the
conventional explanations for the fact that some trades do cause price
changes. 10 5 In fact, the information content of trades may explain all
price changes associated with trading, including price changes associated with rapidly executed trades and price changes sometimes said to
10 6
show that investors place different values on securities.
A manipulator may be able to change a security's price by trading
in a way that convinces other market participants that privately informed traders believe the security is mispriced. For example, a manipulator might increase (decrease) a security's price by entering
purchase (sale) orders in a pattern that suggests that people with valuable nonpublic information are buying (selling).' 0 7 Some trading
practices may be so indicative of an informed trader that the manipu10 8
lator will be able to achieve the desired result by mimicking them.
Large trades may be well tailored to convey the impression that
the trader has information. Market participants may believe that
those with the resources to trade on a large scale are more likely to
have access to nonpublic information, and that those with information will make large trades, since their profits are a function of the
amount they trade. 10 9 Large trades effected in a way that overwhelms
(arguing that "if there were no prohibitions against insider trading, shares would not sell
for less than a price incorporating all information, since insider trades would move prices
to reflect even corporate secrets").
104 Lisa K. Meulbroek, An EmpiricalAnalysis of illegal Insider Trading,47 J. FIN. 1661
(1992).
105 See BREALm. & MYERs, supra note 22, at 349-50; Holthausen et al., supra note 37;
Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29; Scholes, supra note 36; cf Martin Kimel, Note, The Inadequacy
of Rule 10b-5 to Address Outsider Trading by Reporters, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1549, 1565 (1986)
("The underlying principle of the [efficient capital market hypothesis] is that investors
transmit information to the market by trading.").
106
Cf Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517 (suggesting that new information may explain price effect of changes in S&P 500 list).
107
See Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 509; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 574
n.81, 576 n.88. Market participants and researchers usually understand trades effected
above the previous price to be buyer-initiated and trades effected below the previous price
to be seller-initiated. See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 244, 254-56, 265-66.
108 Mimicking trades play a key role in many economic models of manipulation. See
Allen & Gale, supra note 19; Allen & Gorton, supra note 19; Gerard & Nanda, supra note
19; Jarrow, supra note 19; Kumar & Seppi, supra note 19; Karl S. Okamoto, RereadingSection
16(b) of the SecuritiesExchange Act, 27 GA. L. REv. 183 (1992); BAGNOLI & LIPMAN, supra note
19.
109
See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 240 ("The size of the transaction may...
proxy for the amount of information the trader has about a firm."); Scholes, supranote 36,
at 183-84; Thel, supra note 17, at 403-04; see also Easley & O'Hara, supra note 69 (arguing
that informed traders prefer trading large blocks because trade size changes perceptions of
the value of the underlying asset); Glosten, supra note 69; Hasbrouck, supranote 38, at 20002 (bid-ask spread widens in response to large trades, suggesting that market-makers infer
information from large trades); cf ScmVARTz, supra note 18, at 107 (Block sellers cannot
use limit orders because they will, "correctly or erroneously,... be interpreted as a symbol
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the trading interest present in the market may be particularly likely to
lead market participants to believe that the trader has important insights. Since most traders want to trade at the best price possible
(buying low or selling high), a trade that appears not to have been
structured to minimize the cost of trading quickly may convey the impression that the trader has reason to be confident that price will
change soon.11 0
Purchases may be more likely to create the impression of informed trading than sales.1"' Sales are more apt to be motivated by
reasons unrelated to the traders' sense that the market price is wrong.
While a need to raise cash or diversify may motivate an individual to
sell,"12 investors seldom need to spend money quickly or make block
purchases to diversify.. 1 3 Additionally, because restrictions on short
sales make it difficult for informed persons to sell on bad news, informed traders may be more likely to buy than to sell."14 Market participants may also expect security owners to be impatient to realize
their profits, and thus the market may not read sales made after an
increase in a security's price to indicate that the seller knows of impending bad news. 115 Finally, very large purchases may hint of a takeover of the issuer, thus foreshadowing an imminent and substantial
of informational change."); Jennifer Conrad & Cathy M. Niden, Order Fow, Trading Costs
and CorporateAcquisition Announcements, 21 FiN. MGrm. 22, 23 (1992) (volume is high but
trades are not large before acquisition announcements); Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at
1016 (suggesting that the Exchange Act's requirement that large buyers disclose the size of
their investments effectively reveals the information they have acquired); Meulbroek, supra
note 104, at 1691-96 (volume is high on days that insiders trade illegally, but insiders'
trading is only a small part of total volume on those days). While large trades seem to
convey information, the size of a large trade may not be directly correlated with the
amount of information it is thought to convey. Compare Scholes, supra note 36 (no correlation), with Hasbrouck, supra note 38 (correlation exists).
A trade need not be large to change the market's collective judgment of value. Cf
Meulbroek, suprd note 104, at 1691-96 (discussing market's response to relatively small
insider trades). Indeed, if the trading plans of a person thought to be well informed become widely known, price may change even before she trades. See Pettway & Radcliffe,
supra note 43, at 19 (price changes around announcement of new issue); see also Scholes,
supra note 36 (price corrections after traders' identities are revealed).
110 Cf Grossman, supra note 57, at 522-23 (discussing limits of arbitrage between upstairs and downstairs markets).
111 Purchaser-initiated large transactions tend to have greater permanent effects on
price than do seller-initiated transactions. See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 265; see
also Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 573-74, suggesting that purchases contain more information than sales. Block positioners that are willing to buy large blocks for inventory are
reluctant to sell short to facilitate a purchase. Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 265;
Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 573-74. This may indicate that block buyers are more likely
than sellers to possess non-public information.
112 See Scholes, supra note 36, at 200-04.
113 See Allen & Gorton, supra note 19, at 624-25; cf Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 573
(stating that "blocks are sold, not bought").
114

Id. at 627-28.

115

Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 519-20.
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rise in share price.1 16 Indeed, given the natural interest of potential
sellers in the identity of those who wish to buy large blocks, a would-be

manipulator might increase price simply by refusing to reveal his iden117
tity when buying a block.
Trades are more likely to change price if the market overreacts to

new information or if market participants evaluate securities on the
basis of something other than issuer income. Now maybe the market
responds in a systematic way only to information about the value of
the income that securities are likely to produce, so that market prices

reflect the collective assessment of market participants regarding the
present value of that income."18 Yet, "[tihe popular image of the securities markets is one of a noisy crowd easily manipulated by and
hypersensitive to rumors and fads."" 9 There is some support for this
image. Citing evidence that market prices overreact to certain events,
some economists suggest that market participants focus on something
other than the prospects of security issuers, such as the expected reactions of other traders to fads or rumors. 20 If fads or information unrelated to fundamental values influence market prices in a predictable
way, "the correct smart money strategy may well be to jump on the
bandwagon, so long as it can be done early enough and the position

116

See Kraus & Stoll, supra note 19, at 573-85, 587; Scholes, supranote 36, at 184 n.12.

Scholes focused on secondary distribution in his early study of the effect of trades on price,
in part to exclude the information effect of large purchases. Scholes, supra note 36.
117 See Seppi, supra note 82; see also Carney, supra note 97, at 888-89 n.114 (block traders set price based on the likelihood that they are dealing with informed trader).
118 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 103, at 1165-68; see also COPELAND &
WEsTON, supra note 93, at 339-43 (discussing rational expectations and market efficiency).
119 Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. RPv. 851, 852 (1992).
120
1d. at 857-72 (surveying existing literature); see also RCaAR H. THALER, QUAsI RATIoNAL ECONOMICS 239-300 (1991) (discussing the theory of quasi-rational behavior in the
securities market context); Werner F. M. DeBondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market
Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793 (1985) (discussing the "overreaction hypothesis"); Kenneth A.
Froot et al., Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation, 47J. FIN. 1461 (1992) (suggesting herding equilibria in which rational market participants focus on information unrelated to fundamental value); id. at 1478-81 (discussing
other models); Thomas L. Hazen, RationalInvestments, Speculation, or Gambling?-Derivative
Securities and FinancialFutures and TheirEffect on the Underlying CapitalMarkets, 86 Nw. U. L.
Ray. 987, 995-1003 (1992) (discussing "irrational" factors contributing to investor behavior); Kraakman, supra note 32, at 899-900 (suggesting that uninformed traders operate on
misconceived strategies, fashions and fads); RobertJ. Shiller, Fashions,Fads, and Bubbles in
FinancialMarkets, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARcErs, supra note 32, at 56 (noting that
"capricious changes in investor sentiments" influence prices in speculative markets); RobertJ. Shiller, Book Review, 47J. FIN. 2076 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER, QuAsI
RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991)). But seeJosef Lakonishok et al., The Impact of Institutional
Tradingon Stock Prices, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 23 (1992) (suggesting that institutional traders engage in relatively little herding or positive-feedback trading).
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liquidated in time." l2 ' A manipulator might go one step further and
make "visible 'irrational' purchases to trigger an overreaction.' 2 2
Fischel and Ross doubt that manipulators will be able to use information-conveying trades to change price. Noting again that most
trades do not move price, they argue that it is hard to appear informed in an anonymous market. 2 3 Moreover, if the best way to appear informed is to effect large trades, the manipulator who would
use trades to cause the market to reevaluate (and reprice) a security
might have to put substantial capital at risk to try to move price.
Of course, a would-be manipulator cannot be sure that even large
trades will convince the market that he is well informed. Large trades
cannot always be counted on to move prices, let alone change perceptions. 12 4 However, the fact that many large trades do not change market price does not mean that a manipulator cannot use trades to
change perceptions. Recall, once again, that most traders want to get
the best price possible and that reported market prices are the product of profit-maximizing traders. Not surprisingly, those who think
that their trades may change the market's judgment of a security's
value try to disguise their identities, sometimes violating the law in
doing So.125 Conversely, traders without information have a strong incentive to signal their ignorance before they trade in order to avoid
26
affecting price.'
Again, large trades effected at prevailing prices do not show that
it is impossible to trade in a way that will influence price, nor do such
trades show that market participants are skeptical about the possibility
121 Langevoort, supra note 119, at 870; see also Froot et al., supra note 120, at 1480
(suggesting that if many traders use chartist models, chartism may be rational even if charts
contain no relevant fundamental or long-term information).
122 Langevoort, supra note 119, at 871 n.62; see also id. at 906 ("Much of recent noise
theory argues that there can be a contrived run-up in the price of a stock based on hopes
and illusions that the smart money either waits out or joins.").
123 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517; see also id. at 513.
124
Cf Carney, supra note 97, at 863 (arguing that few insider trades induce others to
trade).
125
See Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading,53 ECONOMEMCA 1315
(1985) (suggesting that informed traders maximize their profits by using noise trading to
camouflage their informed trading); see also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d
Cir. 1991) (stock parking and secret accumulation), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 63 (1991));
Carney, supra note 97, at 874-75 (discussing insider trading and bids for corporate control); Meulbroek, supra note 104, at 1662-63 (noting that corporate insiders are not likely
to report their violative transactions to the SEC); Thel, supra note 17, at 403-04 ("[T] raders
who believe that revealing their trading will necessarily reveal information that they possess
... may try to hide their identities."); cf Levine et al., supra note 53, at 51-64 (discussing
parking); MICHAEL J. FISHMAN & KATHLEEN HAGERTY, THE MANDATORY DiscLosuRE OF
TRADEs AND MARKET LIQurDITY (Northwestern University Department of Finance Working

Paper No. 107, 1991) (finding that insiders will not voluntary disclose trades).
126 See BREALEY & MYERs, supra note 22, at 307-08; Scholes, supra note 36, at 205; Seppi,

supra note 82, at 73-75.
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that a trader is informed. 127 On the contrary, one reason people with
information expend resources to hide their trades is that they believe
their trades will reveal their secrets. Similarly, the perceived information content of trades explains why market professionals devote significant resources to finding out who is trading large blocks and why the
trading reports required of insiders by section 16(a) of the Exchange
Act are so widely followed.
Market participants will not ascribe any information to a trade
if they believe that the trader is either uninformed or a manipulator
who is mimicking an informed trader or trying to move prices for
some other reason. Ironically then, the more prevalent that manipulation is thought to be, the more difficult it is to accomplish. Fischel
and Ross do not mention this barrier to manipulation, perhaps because it works only if market participants believe that manipulation is
possible. Fischel and Ross may not believe in manipulation, but some
market participants do, 128 and this creates a problem for manipulators, especially in situations that present obvious opportunities for
manipulation. Fortunately for the manipulators, however, market
participants also believe that many traders possess nonpublic information, and manipulation is possible so long as market participants are
29
not sure whether trading is informed or manipulative.'
Although trades can be used to get other market participants to
reevaluate securities, manipulators will be reluctant to risk their capital on manipulative trades when there is no guarantee that their trading will have the desired effect. However, manipulators may be able
to move price with very little exposure by using so-called fictitious
transactions. Wash sales, in which the same party is buyer and seller,
and matched orders, in which confederates simultaneously enter offsetting purchase and sale orders, are supposed to be standard manipulative tools. For example, manipulators use these tools to create a record of rising prices that suggests that informed interests are buying. 130
127
Moreover, the perceived informational content of large trades may be higher for
smaller firms, which are more typically involved in alleged manipulations. See Hasbrouck,
supra note 38, at 197-200.
128
See House COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SHORT-SELLNG Acrvrrv IN THE
STOCK MARKET: MARKTr EFFEars AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION (PART I); H.R. REP. No.

414, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991) ("many investors have a perception that short sellers
have great manipulative power over stocks"); see also id. at 15 (market participants may
believe manipulation is more common than it is).
129
See Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 514-18; see also Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19
(investigating the potential for manipulation due to the interaction between secondary
market trading prior to a seasoned offering and the pricing of the offering); Vila, supra
note 19 (using game theory to present examples of market manipulation); BAGNOLI &
LIPMAN, supra note 19 (discussing the use of takeover bids to manipulate price).
130 See United States v. Rubenstein, Litigation Release No. 11,945, 1988 SEC LEXIS
2532 (D. Or. Dec. 20, 1988) (addressing guilty pleas); see also Litigation Release No. 11,973,

1989 SEC LEXIS 165 (Jan. 25, 1989) (complaint of crossed orders outside trading range
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Fischel and Ross seem to recognize that wash sales and matched
orders are sometimes used "to mislead market participants into believing that buyers and sellers are trading in a security when in fact no
transactions are taking place." 131 This concession is telling, for it acknowledges both that trades can change the market's perception of
value, and that a manipulator bent on changing perceptions can use
trades to do it.132
The fictitious-trade cases highlight the possibility of manipulation
by brokers and market makers. Matched orders and wash sales at successively higher or lower prices cannot change anybody's perception
unless the record of the completed transactions is published. If the
orders are exposed to the market, however, it may be hard to complete the transactions because the orders may be matched against independent orders at the prevailing price. 133 Market makers and brokerage firm employees can avoid this problem by effecting fictitious
trades without exposing them to the market first.' 3 4 Such trades are
said to be commonly used by penny-stock brokers who control the
entire supply of thinly traded securities and make the whole mar-

prevailing on AMEX); Comment, supra note 55, at 626-68; 8 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note
39, at 3952-58; Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 536-37; Gilson & Kraakman, supranote 29, at
576 n.89; Kryzanowski, supra note 55, at 124-26; Lewis D. Lowenfels, Sections 9(a)(1) and
9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Analysis of Two Important Anti-Manipulative
Provisions,85 Nw. U. L. REv. 698, 698-705 (1991); Thel, supra note 7, at 430-31; Thel, supra
note 17, at 410-11. Penny-stock manipulators are said to employ similar techniques. See
EdwardJ. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1979); Goldstein et al., supra note
53, at 785-86; Lash, supra note 53, at 6; Levine et al., supra note 53, at 20-21, 35-51.
131 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 510; see also id. at 536-37.
132
See also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 576 n.89 (offering the "venerable
scam" of fictitious transactions by manipulators as persuasive evidence that market participants look for information in completed trades).
133
In other words, it is impossible to trade at a price above the excess demand function for a security. This proposition is illustrated by the excess demand functions in Figure
1, supra note 29, and Figure 2, supra note 52. These illustrations also suggest the communicative power of matched orders and wash sales. If market participants understand that
traders are price takers, they will assume that reported prices represent demand conditions
and that a new price represents a new equilibrium price. Accordingly, a fictitious transaction can (albeit falsely) communicate a substantial change in market expectations.
134
See In re Mercil, NYSE Hearing Panel Decision ("HPD") 86-99, 1986 WL 178917
(N.Y.S.E.) (Dec. 16, 1986) (specialist entered fictitious trades at the end of the day to
increase likely selling price of inventory); see also In re Nammack, HPD 86-98, 1986 WL
178916 (N.Y.S.E.) (Dec. 16, 1986) (related case); In re Blittner, HPD 82-30, 1982 WL
119035 (N.Y.S.E.) (Apr. 6, 1982) (bond clerk entered matched orders to depress price);
NYMEX Chairman, Others Charged With Trade, Reporting Violations, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 279
(BNA) (Feb. 26, 1993) [hereinafter NYMEX Chairman] (Commodity Futures Trading Commission charged exchange member with using wash sales to increase apparent value of
positions in order to avoid calls); see also infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
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ket. 3 5 Public investors can enlist the assistance of market makers or
36
brokers to effect fictitious trades as well.'
II
PROFTrING FROM MANIPULATED PRICES
Even if trades can be used to change reported prices, people are
unlikely to manipulate prices unless they can profit by doing so. The
profits of manipulation may not be easy ones; even if prices can be
controlled through trading, manipulation may still be a "sure-to-lose"
37
strategy that will deter itself.'
Fischel and Ross argue that manipulation is unlikely to be successful if the manipulator's profits depend on trading at the manipulated price. In a bull manipulation, for example, the manipulator
needs to bid the price of the stock up and then sell at the resulting
higher price. The difficulty is that the offsetting sales that are essential to the realization of a profit will tend to depress price. If the depressing effect of the offsetting sales is symmetrical with the inflating
effect of the initial purchases, there will be no profit. Moreover, the
manipulative scheme may prove costly.' 3 8 Given the poor prospects of
moving price by trading and the high cost of trying, the argument
goes, manipulation is likely to be self-deterring. However, like the argument that prices cannot be controlled in the first place, the argument that profits cannot be made by controlling prices substantially
overstates the case.

A.

Contracts

Whatever the strength of the argument that manipulation is selfdeterring, it is limited to cases in which the manipulator's profits are
solely derived by effecting offsetting trades at the manipulated price.
However, manipulative schemes are often most interesting-and, for
the manipulator, most attractive-when the profit comes not from
trading at the manipulated price, but from a contract or other ari35 See Goldstein et al., supranote 53; Lash, supranote 53; see alsoLewis D. Lowenfels &
Alan R. Bromberg, Securities Market Manipulations: An Examination and Analysis of Dominalion and Control Frontrunning,and Parking,55 ALB. L. REv. 293, 295-312 (1991) (discussing

the concept of domination and control of the trading markets).
136 See United States v. Bloom (E.D. Pa. April 5, 1978), SEC Litigation Release No.
8,402, 1978 SEC LEXIS 1635 (May 3, 1978); Comment, supra note 55, at 626-28; see also
infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
137 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517-19.
138 If it takes large trades to move a price, the manipulator will have to put substantial
capital at risk. The manipulator must also bear the liquidity costs of the offsetting trades
and pay brokers to handle both the initial and offsetting trades. Fischel & Ross, supranote
8, at 512-13, 518-19. However, the manipulator can avoid putting capital at risk by using
wash sales or matched orders, and transaction costs can be reduced or eliminated if a
broker or market maker participates in the scheme.
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rangement that will provide the manipulator with a profit if price
moves in a particular direction or reaches a certain level. If a manipulator can benefit from controlling prices without making offsetting
trades, manipulation will be profitable even if the price effects of
purchases and sales are perfectly symmetrical, so long as the profit
made possible by the price change exceeds the costs of the manipulative trades.
Contractual rights and obligations are often tied to reported security prices.' 3 9 Much wealth is held in the form of securities, and
people often enter into contracts designed to maximize or at least realize the value of their securities. Reported market price recommends
itself as a measure or proxy for value in such contracts. Securities can
generally be bought or sold at reported prices, so in an important
sense reported price is the value of a security. Moreover, other approaches to valuation, such as appraisal, are expensive and indeterminate, while reported prices, especially daily closing prices, are
precisely articulated and readily available.
When reported prices are used to measure or control rights or
obligations in contracts and other relationships, they are a tempting
target for manipulation. For example, two of the three recent and
well-known manipulation cases that Fischel and Ross discuss at length
involved allegations of contract-based manipulation. 140 Fischel and
Ross offer these cases as evidence of the increased interest in financial
market manipulation. Apparently, they feel that a major social cost of
the existing antimanipulation regime is that the much-publicized
prosecution of these cases has discouraged appropriate trading.
These cases do merit close attention, but not necessarily for the reasons Fischel and Ross suggest.
Michael Milken, the central actor in the best-known securities litigation of recent times, was the subject of one of the Fischel and Ross
cases. The United States charged Milken with manipulating the price
of the common stock of the Wickes Companies. 14 1 The government
dropped this charge when Milken pleaded guilty to other charges, but
142
asked the judge to consider it in connection with his sentencing.
The judge eventually decided not to consider the Wickes manipula'39
Cf 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (1988) (congressional finding that the securities markets
must be regulated because security prices are used for determining taxes and the value of
collateral); Levine et al., supra note 53, at 16 (defining price manipulation as controlling
price either to induce trades at artificial prices or "to induce other business decisions or
behavior").
140 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 527-34.
141 Indictment, United States v. Milken 55-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41); see also
Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 530-32.
142 Government's Sentencing Memorandum 98-101, United States v. Milken (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (No. 89 Gr. 41); Government's Post-Hearing Memorandum 1-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(No. 89 Cr. 41).
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don charge in her sentencing decision. 143 Although we do not know
what Milken did, he does not appear to have disputed that someone at
his firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert, manipulated the price of Wickes
stock; he simply denied that he did it.'4 In any event, the circumstances of the case do show that manipulation can sometimes be successful and quite profitable, and that is the reason the case is discussed here.
In 1986, Wickes had over $200,000,000 of exchangeable preferred stock outstanding, paying a 10% dividend. 145 Wickes wanted to
redeem this preferred stock as soon as possible, 14 6 but could not do so
until May 1, 1988, unless the closing price of Wickes common stock
equalled or exceeded $6 1/8 on twenty of thirty consecutive trading
days. Milken and Drexel, which was Wickes' investment banker, stood
147
to profit if Wickes redeemed the preferred stock.
According to the government, after Wickes common stock had
closed at or above the trigger price for nineteen of twenty-eight consecutive trading days, Milken caused Drexel employees to ask Ivan
Boesky's firm to buy Wickes common stock for the purpose of causing
it to close at or above $6 1/8 per share. 148 Later that day, Boesky's
United States v. Milken, 759 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
See Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 4.
145 This discussion of the allegations relating to the manipulation of Wickes common
stock is based on the Indictment, supra note 141, the Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supranote 142, and the Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142. These allegations may be false.
146
The dividend on the preferred stock was a heavy burden, and Wickes wanted to call
the preferred stock as soon as possible. Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 2-3.
In December 1985, Wickes offered to exchange its common stock for the preferred, but
the offer was only moderately successful. Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 2.
Fischel and Ross cite the fact that Wickes had to pay investment banking fees as evidence
that a manipulation designed to trigger a redemption right had a small expected value.
Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531 n.128. However, Wickes was free to decline to redeem
the preferred after the trigger was satisfied. Thus, Wickes' decision to redeem shows that
at least Wickes thought redemption would be advantageous.
147
Drexel stood to receive substantial fees in connection with a redemption. See infra
note 149 and accompanying text. Milken and Drexel had other reasons to desire a redemption. Wickes was an important client that generated over $118,000,000 in fees and
commissions for Drexel. Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 2; see also CoNNIE
BRUCE, TiE PREDATOR'S BALL 292-95 (1989) (stating that Wickes was so central to Milken's
business that he would not tolerate losing it as a client). Milken and Drexel wanted to
keep the client happy, and the client wanted the preferred stock redeemed. Milken and
Drexel stood to reap another, albeit unquantifiable, benefit if the redemption right was
triggered, because they would be able to tell potential clients of their success with the
Wickes preferred.
148
According to Fischel and Ross, the government alleged that "Milken... asked...
the Boesky organization ... to purchase enough Wickes stock to cause it to close at or
above 6 1/8 and... guaranteed Boesky against loss." Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 530.
In fact, the government alleged that Milken "caused" the Boesky organization to buy. Indictment, supra note 141, at 56. As noted in the text, Milken did not dispute the allegation
that Drexel initiated a manipulation, but only denied that he had done so himself. Apparently, a lower-level Drexel employee asked Boesky to buy Wickes stock, and the question
143

144
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firm purchased 1,900,000 shares during the last half-hour of trading,
and the price closed at $6 1/8, entitling Wickes to redeem the preferred stock. Wickes then redeemed the preferred stock, and Drexel
149
earned $2,300,000 for handling the redemption.
Drexel and Milken faced a potentially profitable manipulative opportunity, 5 0 and if the government's allegations are true the scheme
could hardly have been anything else. 15 1 When Boesky began to
trade, Wickes common stock was trading at $6 per share, so only a
small increase in price was necessary to trigger the redemption right.
was whether Milken was responsible for the request. See id. at 4-10. The Government's
Sentencing Memorandum does not identify the person at Drexel who directed the Boesky
organization to support the price of Wickes. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142,
at 100.
149 Indictment, supra note 141, at 57.
150 Fischel and Ross concede that "[o]n one level, the alleged scheme appears plausible." Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 530. An apologetic popular account of the demise of
Drexel and Milken goes even further, concluding that "[t]he logic behind this allegation is
compelling." DAN G. STONE, APRIL FooLs 174 (1990); see also supra text accompanying note
144.
151 Fischel and Ross suggest that an innocent explanation of the charges against
Milken and Boesky is equally plausible, but there is no innocent explanation if the facts
that the government alleged are correct. As Fischel and Ross see it, Milken (or Drexel)
might have had Boesky buy simply because they thought Wickes common stock was a good
investment. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531. In this version of the story, it is merely a
coincidence that Boesky committed over $11,000,000 to buy 1,900,000 Wickes shares late
in the afternoon of a day on which the price of Wickes common stock was down, but on
which a higher closing price would lead to a substantial profit for Milken and his firm, who
were directing Boesky's trades. That remarkable coincidence aside, it is unlikely that Boesky's purchases looked like a good investment at the time, for, as Fischel and Ross themselves note, "stock returns are usually negative around the announcement of a call." Id. at
531 n.127; see also Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 8 (Drexel's trader expected redemption to depress the stock price). Moreover, Drexel's request and the
mechanics of Boesky's purchases are both inconsistent with investment intent. According
to the government, Drexel did not ask Boesky to buy a large amount of stock or to buy at
the best price; it asked the Boesky organization to move the price up. In any case, if the
Boesky organization was trying to make a good investment, presumably it would not have
bought a large amount so quickly that it would force price up.
Fischel and Ross also argue that it "is impossible using objective evidence to distinguish between the manipulative and non-manipulative explanations for the trading" in
Wickes stock. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531. The intended meaning of this statement is not clear, but whatever it is, the statement requires some qualification. Fischel and
Ross may simply be restating their initial position that manipulation is a crime of intent.
The question of whether Boesky's purchases of Wickes common stock were manipulative
does turn on the subjective state of mind of Boesky, Drexel or Milken, at least according to
Fischel and Ross' definition of manipulation. Objective evidence of state of mind is often
available, however. People sometimes say what they are thinking or explain why they make
requests, and such statements and explanations are fairly good, objective evidence of what
those people are thinking. The government claimed to have such evidence in the Milken
case, in the form of testimony that Drexel employees asked Boesky employees to bid up the
price of Wickes common stock. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 100; see
also Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 4-5 (noting testimony of Peter Gardiner, a Drexel trader, that while Wickes was trading below $6 1/8 late in the day, Milken
directed his attention to his Quotron and said "Peter, Wickes, 6-1/8," which Gardiner understood to be an instruction to purchase in order to make the stock close at $6 1/8).

19941

SECURITIES MANIPULATION

251

Boesky and any confederates could have expected concerted trading
to produce a small price rise. Because only a small rise was to be engineered, Boesky could have been reasonably confident of unwinding
his trades without incurring substantial losses. In any case, Drexel
stood to earn much more on the redemption than Boesky stood to
lose from trading, absent a dramatic fall in the price of Wickes stock.
Fischel and Ross question whether the prospect of investment
banking fees would have been a sufficient incentive for Drexel to manipulate the price of Wickes common stock, because "[a]t the time...
it seemed likely that Drexel would receive these fees soon in any
event."1 52 They point out that Wickes would have been entitled to
redeem the preferred anyway if its common had closed at or above $6
1/8 on the day Drexel allegedly asked Boesky to trade, or the next
day, or on any nine of the next seventeen days, or any twenty of thirty
days thereafter. In other words, Milken might have earned the fees
from redemption without manipulating the stock.
Wickes was in a hurry to redeem the preferred stock, however.
Moreover, Milken might have preferred the certain profits of a redemption triggered by manipulation to profits contingent on the market rising on its own. Wickes common stock was trading below $6 1/8
late in the day on which Boesky bought, and Drexel's traders were
concerned it would close below that price.' 5 3 As it turned out, Wickes
common never did satisfy the conditions of the redemption provision
after Boesky traded, so that, leaving aside the wisdom of violating the
law, Milken would not have been wise to wait.' 5 4 Wickes presented a
profitable opportunity for manipulation, and if Milken and Drexel
manipulated the price of Wickes stock, they made a lot of money doing so.
Another case that Fischel and Ross discuss at length is United
States v. Mulheren.'5 5 Boesky also figured prominently in Mulheren, but
this time as the protagonist. In 1985, Boesky acquired approximately
3.4 million shares of Gulf & Western Industries stock, "at the suggestion of his long-time friend, Carl Icahn, a prominent arbitrageur and
152 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531.
153 Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 4-5.
154 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531. Fischel and Ross suggest that Milken
should have been confident that Wickes would be able to redeem the stock in any event
because the price of Wickes common stock was likely to rise further, because stocks generally have positive expected returns. See id. at 531 n.129. This suggestion seems strained,
however, particularly for a volatile stock like Wickes. See also Post-Hearing Memorandum,
supra note 142, at 3 (arguing that at the time of the alleged manipulation, the price of
Wickes common could have been expected to fall if Wickes terminated an announced
tender offer).
155 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991); see Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 532-33 (discussing
Mulieren); see alsoJAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THirvms 197-200, 364-65 (1991) (recounting a
popularized version of the Mulheren facts).
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corporate raider," who also had a large position in Gulf & Western
stock. 15 6 Later that year, Boesky proposed taking control of Gulf &
Western through a leveraged buyout, but his proposals were repeatedly and emphatically rejected by Martin Davis, the chairman of the
company's board of directors. 157 After being rebuffed, Boesky proposed selling his stock back to the company for $45 per share, which
was above the market price. Gulf & Western was engaged in a stock
repurchase program at the time, 158 and Davis expressed some interest
in Boesky's proposal, but would not agree to pay $45.159
After the market closed on October 16, 1985, Boesky telephoned
Davis, again offering to sell his stock to the company for $45 per
share. Davis indicated that the company would buy the stock back,
but would pay only the market price prevailing at the time of the
sale. 160 Gulf & Western had closed that day at $44 3/4. Later that
night or early the next morning, Boesky telephonedJohn Mulheren, a
principal of the brokerage firm of Jamie Securities Co. According to
the government, Boesky arranged to have Mulheren buy Gulf & Western stock for the purpose of increasing its price. Boesky testified that
"Mulheren asked me if I liked the stock .... I said I liked it; however,
I would not pay more than 45 for it and it would be great if it traded at
1 61
45." To this, Mulheren responded, "I understand."
Shortly after 11:00 on the morning of October 17, Jamie Securities ordered 50,000 shares of Gulf & Western at the market through a
floor broker. At 11:04 a.m., the broker bought 16,100 shares for $44
3/4 per share and, unable to fill the entire order at that price, bought
the rest at $44 7/8 per share between 11:05 and 11:08 a.m. Jamie
938 F.2d at 366.
157 Id. According to the government, Boesky and Icahn met together with Davis and
proposed a leveraged buy out. Brief for the United States at 8, Mulheren, (No. 90-1691).
158 938 F.2d at 366; see also Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 8.
159 According to the court of appeals, Boesky first proposed to sell his stock to the
company for $45 per share in a meeting with Davis, and Davis indicated that he would
consider the purchase but could not immediately agree to a price. 938 F.2d at 366. According to the government, however, Boesky's investment banker proposed the sale to
Davis, and reported back to Boesky that the company would buy the stock but only at the
market price. Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 8-9. The court of appeals
mentions this meeting, but does not say what occurred. Thus, according to the government, by early October, Gulf & Western had indicated that it would buy back the stock at
the market price, but Boesky wanted $45 per share. As the court of appeals recounts the
events, however, Boesky had indicated that he would sell at $45, but the company had not
yet decided whether it would repurchase, or if so, at what price.
160 According to the court of appeals, Davis told Boesky that Gulf & Western would
buy the stock, but only at the market price existing at the time of the sale, and instructed
Boesky to have his investment banker contact the company's investment banker to arrange
the sale. 938 F.2d at 367. According to the government, however, Davis told Boesky that
the company would consider buying the stock the following day, but only at the market
price. Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 9.
161
938 F.2d at 367.
156
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then ordered another 25,000 shares at $45 or less. The floor broker
was unable to get any stock at $44 7/8, and executed the purchase for
$45 at 11:10 a.m. A few minutes later, at 11:17 a.m., Boesky and Icahn
sold their stock back to the company at $45 per share. The stock fell
during the afternoon, and Jamie sold its 75,000 shares at the end of
the day for a loss of $64,406.162

Mulheren was later indicted for, among other things, purchasing
75,000 shares of Gulf & Western stock for the purpose of raising its
price to $45 per share. 163 The government argued and-given that
Mulheren was convicted-the jury apparently found, that the import
of the telephone call between Boesky and Mulheren was that Boesky
wanted Mulheren to trade in a way that would move the price of Gulf
& Western to $45 and that Mulheren did as he was asked. The Second
Circuit disagreed and reversed Mulheren's conviction, finding that no
16
rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court concluded that the meaning of the cryptic conversation between Boesky and Milken was ambiguous at best, and that Jamie's
purchases were just as likely motivated by investment intent as the desire to create a favorable price at which Boesky could sell his block
back to Gulf & Western.
Fischel and Ross agree with the Second Circuit's analysis of the
facts and with what they take to be the court's suggestion that trading
for the purpose of affecting the price of the traded security may not
be illegal. 165 As in the case of the Wickes allegations, we do not know
why Mulheren had his firm trade. Maybe he thought Gulf & Western
was a good investment, or maybe he wanted to move the price up so
that Boesky would increase his profits from the sale to Gulf & Western. It is certainly possible that Mulheren was simply trying to profit
from what he thought was Boesky's advice. On the other hand, the
jury did find that Mulheren bought the stock in order to move its
price for Boesky. Perhaps the government did not prove this beyond
a reasonable doubt, but its story was not unreasonable. More to the
point, for the purpose of this discussion, this was a situation in which
manipulation would have been very profitable. That is to say, aside
from the risk of legal sanctions, the potential profits of manipulation
greatly exceeded the likely costs. Jamie's trades moved the price of
162
163

Id. at 368.
Id. at 365.

164 Id. at 366; see also id. at 368 (explaining government's theory and expressing
misgivings).
165
See Fischel & Ross, supranote 8, at 533 ("Although the court did not say so explicitly, its analysis calls into question whether actual trades should be prohibited as manipulative."). The court's misgivings may have been directed at the government's argument that
failure to disclose an intent to manipulate is a violation of rule 10b-5. See Mulheren, 938
F.2d at 368 n.2.
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the stock, those trades entailed relatively little risk, and the price
change yielded a substantial profit.
Jamie's trades caused the market price of Gulf & Western stock to
increase 1/4 point in about six minutes. Fischel and Ross do not suggest that the price would have changed without Jamie's trades, and
even the Second Circuit said that Jamie's purchases caused the stock
to rise from $44 3/4 to $45.166 WhenJamie began to trade, "the market price was holding steady at $44 3/4.1167 Jamie's broker then

bought all of the stock that was available at $44 3/4 (16,100 shares),
all that was available at $44 7/8 (33,900 shares) and finally 25,000
shares at $45.
Not only didJamie's purchases boost the price, Mulheren could
have predicted that they would do so. Between the opening of the
market at 9:30 a.m. and the time Jamie began to buy, only 32,200
shares of Gulf & Western had traded, 168 and the largest trade during
this period was only 5,000 shares. 169 Jamie then ordered 50,000 shares
at one time. When Jamie placed its second order a few minutes later,
it knew that it had already acquired all that was available at the previous prevailing price, and could have known that it was quickly absorbing the supply immediately available in the market. This second order
was for 25,000 shares, and the Gulf & Western specialist testified that
at that point a 5,000 share trade "definitely" would have raised the
70
price at least another 1/8 point.'
If Mulheren was in fact assisting Boesky in a manipulation, it
turned out to be a profitable one. Although Jamie lost a total of
$64,406 on its trades, 17 ' Boesky made a much larger profit on the
price change those trades occasioned.' 7 2 The 1/4 point rise in the
reported price of Gulf & Western between the execution of Jamie's
first order and the closing of Boesky's sale of 3.4 million shares to Gulf
& Western resulted in Boesky receiving about $850,000 more than he
would have received had Jamie not traded. This figure may in fact
understate the profit Boesky stood to realize from moving the price,
166
167

938 F.2d at 368.

168

Id.
Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 10.

169
170

Id. at 367.

938 F.2d at 370. The court of appeals suggested thatJamie's purchase of 25,000
shares in its second order, when according to the specialist a 5,000 share purchase would
have been sufficient to move the price, was inconsistent with manipulative intent because
the large purchase exposedJamie to more risk than necessary to move the price. Id. However, Mulheren would not have known as well as the specialist how much he needed to buy
to move the price, and he could hardly have asked his broker to buy only as much as was
necessary to move the price. In any event, the riskJamie accepted when it bought an extra
20,000 shares was greatly outweighed by the profit Boesky was likely to realize.
171
Id. at 368.
172 The court of appeals ignored Boesky's disproportionate profit when it suggested
that Jamie's loss was inconsistent with a manipulation charge. See id. at 370.
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because he might not have been able to sell at all if the price had
stayed below $45. Boesky and Icahn had agreed that $45 per share
was a reasonable price for their stock,1 3 and Boesky might have been
embarrassed to sell for less; he might even have felt that he promised
Icahn not to do so. The $850,000 figure certainly understates the total profit that resulted from the price change that Mulheren's trades
occasioned, because Icahn sold his stock to the company at the same
time Boesky did. Together, Boesky and Icahn realized $1,678,925
more than they would have if they had sold at the price that prevailed
before Mulheren's purchases. 174 Leaving aside the cost of the subsequent litigation, the profit from the price change greatly exceeded the
costs associated with the trades that produced it.
Milken and Mulheren are prominent examples of recent manipulation schemes, but they are not the only cases in which people are alleged to have used concerted trading to manipulate prices and thus
alter contractual rights or obligations. 175 Indeed, in the Milken litigation the government alleged that Drexel frequently manipulated
prices for the purpose of triggering the contractual rights of clients or
176
firms in which it was otherwise interested.
173

Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 8.

174 Boesky and Icahn sold the company a total of 6,715,700 shares. Mulheren, 938 F.2d
at 368. Boesky never, in fact, suggested that Icahn was involved in the manipulation.

175 In 1978 a hearing panel of the NYSE found that a specialist had engaged in a
manipulative scheme remarkably similar to that alleged in Mulheren. See In re Fried, HPD
78-82, 1978 WL 22181 (N.Y.S.E.) (Nov. 1, 1978). The specialist that was registered for a
stock held 7.9% of the issuer's outstanding stock. The issuer, fearful of a hostile takeover,
authorized a repurchase but did not publicly announce the decision. The issuer then
agreed to buy most of the specialist's position for $8 per share. However, a proposed SEC
rule required an independent bid or trade at that price before the repurchase could be
made, and the stock had not traded at that price for a year. When the stock opened at $7
1/4 the next morning, the issuer ordered its broker to buy 225,000 shares (equal to most
of the block) at $8, but on the condition that there first be an independent bid or trade at
$8. Over the next two trading days, the specialist was a net buyer. The hearing panel
found that the specialist's bids and purchases placed a bottom on the stock's price and
helped continue its upward trend. Six minutes after the specialist purchased 100 shares at
$7 3/4, 2,700 shares traded at $8, and six minutes later the issuer purchased 225,000 shares
at $8, with the specialist selling 215,900 of those shares. The panel found that the specialist
had violated NYSE rules by trading for the purpose of influencing the market price.
176 See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 97 ("The manipulation of the
underlying common stock price to facilitate a convertible securities offering or other corporate event was a frequent occurrence in the High Yield Department throughout the
early to mid 1980's, according to at least four former High Yield employees."). The government alleged that Drexel caused Boesky to bid up the price of Stone Container Corporation common stock in order to increase the price at which convertible securities could be
sold toward the end, encouraging Stone to proceed with the offering. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, at 350-51 (discussing the Drexel indictment). The government also
alleged that Drexel had caused another entity to depress the price of the C.O.M.B. Co.
common stock in order to make it easier for the company to sell convertible securities to
the public. Id. at 351-54. Although the Stone and C.O.M.B. schemes played upon contractual conversion rights, they would succeed only if the price changes induced the public or
the issuer to trade. See infra part II.B.
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Price manipulations designed to trigger contract rights are not a
recent development. On the contrary, they have been cited as a seri177
ous problem since the federal securities statutes were first enacted.
One of the best-known examples involved the Georgia-Pacific Corporation (G-P). As part of a conglomeration program, G-P bought several businesses and agreed to pay for them with G-P common stock,
the exact number of shares in each case to be determined by reference to the closing price of G-P common on the NYSE on particular
future dates. According to the Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC), G-P and related entities then bought G-P stock "in a manner
which would and did ...cause the last sale price of G-P common stock
on the NYSE to rise in order that G-P's obligation to issue additional
shares" under the agreements would be reduced or eliminated. 17 s GP eventually consented to an injunction against "[b]idding for or
purchasing any security of G-P for the purpose of creating actual or
apparent active trading in or raising the price of any security of G79

P."1

The Georgia-Pacific case illustrates only one way that someone
whose fortune is tied to the reported price of securities may profit
from manipulation. Employees whose positions or compensation are
dependent on the price of stock might find manipulation profitable as
well.' 8 0 Manipulation is particularly unlikely to be self-deterring in
this situation, because the employee can use the employer's money to
trade and thus will not bear the full loss if the stock eventually returns
to its original equilibrium level. This scenario is common among traders employed by securities or brokerage firms. For example, a few
years ago a group of brokerage firm employees whose annual bonuses
were based on the prices of the securities held in the portfolio that
they managed caused the portfolio to buy large quantities of those
securities in the final minutes of trading on the day the bonus was to
be computed, and the prices rose. When the prices dropped the next
trading day, it was the portfolio, not the employees, that suffered the
loss. The brokerage firm discovered the scheme and refused to pay
the bonuses, but the employees would have profited handsomely from
the temporary price spike had they not been discovered.' 8 '
177 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988).
178 SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,680, at 95,489 (S.D.N.Y. April 27, 1966).
179 SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,692, at 95,525 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1966); see 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 4060
n.208.
180 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 523; see also MAYER, supra note 79, at 57-59 (asserting that investment funds employ practice of "guaranteeing the close," using concentrated purchases in a few stocks late in the day to enhance reported performance).
181 SEC v. Choset (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1983), SEC Litigation Release No. 10,036, 1983
SEC LEXIS 1466 (June 15, 1983); In re Choset, HPD 83-62, 1983 WL 116065 (N.Y.S.E.)
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This scheme illustrates the common practice of "marking the
close," in which trading at the very end of the day is used to control
reported closing prices. In recent disciplinary proceedings before the
SEC,' 8 2 NYSE' 8 3 and National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD),' 8 4 numerous traders and brokerage firm employees have
been found to have marked the close, employing
pattern [s] of actual or deliberate close-of-day trading designed to influence closing share prices of certain stocks. In those instances,
traders or salespersons attempted to artificially influence a closing
price because of inventory positions in particular securities, margin

(June 2, 1983) (consenting to censure, suspension and fine); In reLepley, HPD 83-63, 1983
WL 116066 (N.Y.S.E.) (June 2, 1983) (consenting to censure, suspension and fine); Richard E. Rustin & Gary Putka, Menill Lynch Unit FiresTwo Executives in Risk Arbitragefor Violations of Policy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1982, at A4.
182
See, e.g., In re Levin, Exchange Act Release No. 31,124, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,046 (Sept. 1, 1992) (accepting settlement of charge that investor marked the close to
reduce or avoid margin calls); In re Doherty, Exchange Act Release No. 29,545, [1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,842 (Aug. 12, 1991) (finding that investor,
aided by broker, marked the close to reduce or avoid margin calls); In re Black, Exchange
Act Release No. 28,630, 1990 SEC LEXIS 3624 (Nov. 20, 1990) (affirming N.A.S.D. findings
and sanctions after trader admitted entering fictitious trades to enhance apparent performance of portfolio); In re E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,340, 1978
SEC LEXIS 283 (Nov. 17, 1978) (instituting public administrative proceedings on charge
that on thirty-five of thirty-seven days customer entered market orders to purchase 100
shares at the close in an attempt to cause the price to close at the ask, thereby minimizing
margin calls); see also NYMEX Chairman, supra note 134 (noting that Commodity Futures
Trading Commission charged the chairman of the New York Mercantile Exchange with
using wash sales to increase apparent value of positions in order to avoid calls).
183
See e.g., In re Beggs, NYSE HPD 89-105, 1989 WL 379964 (Nov. 20, 1989) (marking
the close to avoid margin calls); In rejahoda, NYSE HPD 88-45, 1988 WL 360185 (Nov. 2,
1988) (marking the close to reduce unrealized losses in firm account managed by manipulator); In re Ross, NYSE HPD 87-13, 1987 WL 225759 (Mar. 10, 1987) (firm with capital
problems marked the close to increase the value of the firm's proprietary positions); In re
Sprague & Nammack, NYSE HPD 86-97, 1986 WL 178915 (Dec. 16, 1986) (by marking the
close, specialist firm increased apparent value of its positions and enhanced likelihood of
subsequently selling inventory at higher price or covering short positions at lower price);
In re Ohlandt, NYSE HPD 86-62, 1986 WL 178883 (Sept. 15, 1986) (block position trader
marked the close to improve apparent value of firm's inventory); In re Sheehy, NYSE HPD
86-63, 1986 WL 178884 (Sept. 15, 1986) (block position trader marked the close to improve apparent value of firm's inventory); In reLunny, NYSE HPD 85-120, 1985 WL 152313
(Oct. 31, 1985) (block trader marked the close to help sales people sell the block at higher
price); In re Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., NYSE HPD 78-12, 1978 WL 22119 (Feb.
23, 1978) (marking the close to enhance margin resources).
184 See, e.g., In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1139 (NASD Market Surveillance Comm., June 22, 1992) (trader marked the close to avoid criticism for losses in portfolio and perhaps to influence bonus based on closing prices); In reWeinraub, Decision in
Complaint No. MS-1037 (Dec. 18, 1991) (trader solicited customer orders and used them
to mark the close at higher price); In re Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, Decision in Complaint No.
MS-847 (Aug. 3, 1990) (trader admitted marking the close to avoid losing job for losses in
portfolio); In re Sherwood Securities Corp., Decision in Complaint No. MS-660 (Jan. 18,
1989) (fictitious trades at higher price reported when firm had long proprietary positions,
at lower price when firm had short position).
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difficulties in personal or customer accounts, or substantial personal or customer holdings in a stock. 185

In marking the close, a manipulator can take advantage of the bid-ask
spread to move the closing price a small amount' 8 6 -enhancing the
apparent value of a long position by ensuring that the last trade is a
buy, or enhancing the value of a short position by ensuring that the
last trade is a sale. Even a small price move no greater than the bidask spread can yield important profits for a manipulator with a large
position.18 7 The costs may also be low, because a trade of only 100
shares may be sufficient to move price between the bid and ask,' 8 8 and
brokerage firm employees can sometimes hold back part of a customer's order and use it at the close.' 8 9
The practice known as "shorting a seasoned offering" is another
form of contract-based manipulation.1 90 If an issuer or holder of a
publicly traded security wants to sell that security in a public offering,
it must file a registration statement for the securities and announce
that it will sell them at a future date.1 9 ' Thereafter, the seller and its
underwriters will try to determine the level of buying interest, typically
expressed in terms of the number of shares an investor will take at a
185

Members Urged to Monitorfor "Markingthe Close," NASD REG. & COMPLIANCE ALERT,

Dec. 1992, at 12. The NASD regularly advises its members to take steps to prevent marking
the close. See, e.g., NASD Focuses on TradingActivity at End of the Day, NASD REG. & COMPLIANCE ALERT, Dec. 1990, at 3-4; NASD Targets Abusive Late Trade Reporting, NASD REG. &
COMPLANCE ALERT, Nov. 1989, at 8.
186
187

See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., In re Levin, Exchange Act Release No. 31,124, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,046 (Sept. 1, 1992) (to avoid or reduce margin calls on position of over 400,000 shares
of an AMEX-listed stock, investor executed series of purchases at the close, usually causing
the price to close 1/8 to 3/8 higher by causing the price to uptick from the bid to the ask);
In re Doherty, Exchange Act Release No. 29,545, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
84,842 (Aug. 12, 1991) (similar trades, in which broker knowingly participated).
Those who mark the close often do so repeatedly over long periods. See, e.g., In re E.F.
Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,340, 1978 SEC LEXIS 283 (Nov. 17, 1978); In
re Beggs, NYSE HPD 89-105, 1989 WL 379964 (Nov. 20, 1989); In rejahoda, NYSE HPD 8845, 1988 WL 360185 (Nov. 2, 1988); In re Ross, NYSE HPD 87-13, 1987 WL 2257-59 (Mar.
10, 1987); In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1139; In re Sherwood Securities,
Decision in Complaint No. MS-660.
188 See, e.g., In re E.F. Hutton & Co., 1978 SEC LEXIS 283; In reBeggs, 1989 WL 379964;
In re Sprague & Nammack, 1986 WL 178915; In re Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.,
1978 WL 22119; In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1139.
189 See, e.g., In re Beggs, 1989 WL 379964; In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No.
MS-I 139; In re Weinraub, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1037; see also In re Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., 1978 WL 22119 (vice president who marked the close made unauthorized trades in client accounts).
190 See CHARL.ESJ.JoHNSON, JR., CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SEcurrmms LAWs 198-201
(1990); Thel, supra note 17, at 421-22; see also Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19 (modeling
manipulation by informed traders in the same context).
191 Some holders may be able to sell their securities directly into the market without
prior announcement, but the issuer and holders who control the issuer may have to register their securities under the Securities Act before they sell. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1), 77e
(1988); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1992).
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particular discount to the market price at the time of sale. The seller
will then set the price for the securities-typically after the close of the
market the day before the sale-and include that price in the final
prospectus. 19 2 For a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that
potential buyers can purchase in the market instead, this selling price
193
is usually set at or below the prevailing market price.
Manipulation may be possible when seasoned offerings are sold
at or below reported market price. Just before the price is to be set, a
manipulator can sell the stock short with the intent of depressing the
reported price and subscribing for part of the offering. If these short
sales depress price, the manipulator can cover its short position with
shares purchased in the public offering, thereby locking in a profit
that is a function of the price decline caused by its short sales.' 9 4 The
seller, on the other hand, will sell at a price below that which would
have prevailed absent the short selling. The seller can protect itself by
abandoning the sale, but in doing so will incur the cost of delay and

See 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 39, at 317-19, 380-596, 1467-71, 1474-1574.
192
When the securities belong to a class already traded, the registration statement will initially
state that the offering price will be set by reference to market price at the time the security
is eventually sold. See i& at 533 n.52; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (1992) (preliminary prospectus need not include price information); Gerard & Nanda, supranote 19, at 214, 21921 (discussing institutional practices in pricing secondary offerings); Loderer et al., supra
note 49, at 38-40 (modeling the pricing of secondary offerings). The issuer will eventually
change the registration statement to include the price at which the security is offered; the
final prospectus used when the securities are sold must include the selling price. See 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.430, 230.430A (1992).
193 See Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 213, 220-21, 235 n.21; see also Loderer et al.,
supranote 49, at 42-45 (explaining that seasoned offerings are seldom priced above previous market price, and NASDAQ stocks are more likely to be priced below than are NYSE
stocks); Parsons & Raviv, supra note 36 (predicting that secondary issue will be priced below previous market price).
194 In 1988, the SEC adopted a rule prohibiting short sellers from covering their sales
in a public offering. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21(T) (1992). The comments submitted to the
SEC while the rule was under consideration cite many examples of the practice. See Exchange Act Release No. 26,028, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,315,
at 89,386 (Aug. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Exchange Act No. 26,028]; Exchange Act Release
No. 24,485, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,127 (May 20, 1987); see
also In reJ.A.B. Securities Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,948, 17 SEC Docket 1086
(June 25, 1979) (citing three such instances); Exchange Act Release No. 34-31,003, 1992
SEC LEXIS 1831, at *25 (Aug. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 31,003];
H.R. Rep. No. 414, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 22 (1991);JoHNsoN, supra note 190, at 199-200
(discussing circumstances surrounding the adoption of Rule lOb-21); Gerard & Nanda,
supra note 19, at 213-16 (predicting that manipulative selling will occur during seasoned
offerings and suggesting that empirical findings are consistent with manipulation of the
sort predicted by their model); id. at 222 ("The larger the new issue and the smaller the
secondary market order flow, the cheaper and the more prevalent is manipulation."); cf.
infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text (discussing manipulation allegedly designed to
counteract shorting).
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the expense of the distribution effort. If the seller goes ahead, it will
receive less than it would have in an unmanipulated market. 195
Program trading, in which substantial investors trade large packages of securities as part of various investment strategies, may also
present opportunities for manipulation. The execution costs of these
large trades (consisting of commissions and price changes occasioned
by the trades) cannot be predicted with certainty, yet the investors
may require certainty for their own ends. Thus, brokers sometimes
guarantee these investors a certain price for the entire package of securities. For example, if an investor wants to sell a large package at
the end of the day, early in the day its broker might promise the investor the closing price of the package less a discount. When, as in this
example, the guaranteed price is a function of a future price level,
manipulation is possible: the broker might sell stock at the end of the
day to depress closing prices and, accordingly, the amount due the
19 6
investor.
Stock-index futures may also create manipulative opportunities,
because they involve contractual rights that are a function of reported
market price.' 97 The owner of a stock-index future does not get the
stocks in the index at expiration, but receives a cash payment based
on the reported prices of those stocks at expiration. A manipulator
might buy futures and then, on the settlement date, bid up the price
of the underlying stocks. 198 The manipulator will receive an inflated
settlement, and sell the stock, perhaps at a loss if the effect of the spot
purchases dissipates. The scheme will be profitable if the spot market
195
However, market participants, including the seller, discount for the possibility of
foreseeable manipulation. Thus, short-selling affects price less than it would otherwise.
Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 213-15; see also infra notes 276-79 and accompanying
text.
196
SeeJEFFREY D. MILLER ET AL., PROGRAM TRADING: THE NEW AGE OF INVESTING 121-27
(1989); cf. In re Salomon Bros., Inc., NYSE HPD 90-169, 1990 WL 446685 (Dec. 10, 1990)
(broker purchased more securities than customer's program required, kept low-priced securities and allocated high-priced securities to customer). Program traders have developed strategies to protect themselves from brokers, which suggests that the problem is a
real one. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
197
See Kumar & Seppi, supra note 19, at 1487-95; see also Thomas A. Levine et al.,
Manipulative Practices, in 3 ALI-ABA POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
1431 (1990) (discussing capping, pegging and mini-manipulation between options and
underlying stock); Wood, supra note 19, at 147-48 (describing a "manipulative legging
strategy" which "is purportedly one of many similar strategies that can be utilized to temporarily push markets out of equilibrium for gain").
198 This "manipulation" differs from the so-called manipulative squeeze or comer that
typically concerns commodity regulators. See Richard D. Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: UnderstandingCommodities Market Manipulation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1990); Thel, supra note
17, at 432-35. As Fischel and Ross observe, squeezes and comers present a different problem (one of monopoly power). Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 542-52. While squeezes and
comers do not involve trades designed to change price, the abuse of monopoly power may
be within the power of the SEC to regulate "manipulative" activities. See Thel, supra note
17, at 432-35, 437-38; Thel, supra note 7, at 431 n.202, 487 n.287.
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is less liquid than the futures market and the futures position is larger
than the spot position. 199
Thus, contracts in which rights are contingent upon reported security prices create tempting opportunities for manipulation. The Exchange Act itself cites the possibility that manipulation can injure
contractual parties as justification for federal control of the securities
markets. Contract-based manipulations also figure prominently in Fischel and Ross' discussion of manipulation. Nonetheless, manipulation is not limited to triggering or avoiding contractual obligations.
B.

Offsetting Trades

In the schemes just discussed, the manipulator profited merely by
moving the reported price of the manipulated security; she did not
need to trade at that price. Profit was available because another was
obliged or disposed to confer a benefit on the manipulator that was
tied to reported price. The securities manipulator of lore, however, is
not someone who takes advantage of a contract (although the publicity surrounding the Milken affair may have changed this popular conception). Instead, the manipulator takes control of the market and
trades at the manipulated price: bull manipulators pushing price up
with purchases and then selling at a profit, bear manipulators pulling
price down with short sales and then covering at a profit.
Manipulations that depend on profitable offsetting trades are
much more likely to be self-deterring than contract-based manipulations-at least in the sense that the manipulator cannot be as confident of success. In addition to moving price, the manipulator whose
profits are to arise from trading must trade at the manipulated price.
A bull manipulator, for example, must buy in a way that raises price,
and then sell at that price. Trading at a manipulated price may be
2 00
more difficult than moving the price in the first place.
For a trade-based manipulation to succeed, the initial trades must
change the value that other market participants place on the security.
If the initial purchases drive up the prevailing price solely because
they absorb all the stock held by holders willing to sell at the previously prevailing market price, offsetting trades cannot be made at the
resulting price, because no one (other than the manipulator) will buy
stock above the previously prevailing price. Anyone who valued the
stock at the new price would have already purchased at the previously
prevailing lower price.2 0 1 Moreover, those from whom the manipula199
See Kumar & Seppi, supra note 19 (suggesting that manipulation of this sort may be
profitable under a wide range of assumptions in futures markets with cash settlement).
200
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517-19.
201 The manipulator's situation is illustrated by the excess demand functions shown in
Figure 2, supra note 52. When the manipulator enters the market to buy, he shifts the
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tor bought may be unwilling to buy back what they sold even at their
sale price, 20 2 and if they are willing to buy it back, presumably they will
not buy more than they sold. Consequently, if a manipulator boosts
prices solely by buying enough stock to shift the price at which buying
and selling interests intersect, when he is ready to sell he will not find
buyers who will buy for more than he paid.
In addition, trade-based manipulations cannot be based on initial
purchases that increase price only because they are effected too
quickly to allow offsetting supply to mobilize. Such a price increase
will last only until supply responds to the premium price, and the manipulator will not be able to profit even by effecting offsetting trades
before the price rebounds. The higher price simply results from the
manipulator's purchases, and, like the price created by buying a lot of
stock with inelastic supply, reflects only the manipulator's buying interest. Accordingly, the manipulator will find no buyers at the higher
03
price.2
Thus, offsetting trades cannot be profitable unless the initial
trades change the market's valuation of the security. As discussed
above, it is possible for trades to alter the market's perceptions; inexcess demand function from curve D, to curve D2, and the market-clearing price rises.
When the manipulator sells, however, the excess demand function shifts to the left, and
the price falls. If no other market participants' preferences have changed in the interim,
the price will fall at least to the level maintained before the manipulator began to buk, and

may in fact fall further.
Fischel and Ross may actually understate the difficulty of manipulation in this context.
They note the high cost of moving price up by taking advantage of inelastic supply, but
they fail to mention the difficulty (and perhaps impossibility) of effecting offsetting trades
at the resulting price. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 518-19. This omission may reflect
their suspicion that trades move price only when they convey information. If a trade
changes price by conveying information, price will not immediately revert to its previous
level after a change.
202 Sellers may be willing to buy back stock if they initially believed that the intrinsic
value of the stock was higher than the market price. See Hal R. Varian, Divergence of Opinion
in Complete Markets, 40J. FIN. 309 (1985). Even then, however, their opinions may change
after they part with the stock. Moreover, the sellers might have had a high reservation
price because of factors no longer relevant after they sold the stock, such as the tax implications or transaction costs of their sales. See Bagwell, Dutch Auctions, supra note 35, at 81;
David T. Brown & Michael D. Ryngaert, The Determinantsof TenderingRates in Interfirm and
Self-Tender Offers, 65J. Bus. 529 (1992) (suggesting that capital-gains tax liabilities explain
differing reservation prices); Kraakman, supra note 32, at 899. Disparate valuation is most
likely to present opportunities for manipulation in the market for penny-stocks. In that
market, disparate valuation is likely to result from the difficulty that holders face when they
try to sell, and it seems unlikely that those holders will be willing to buy again after they
sell. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
203 The manipulator's problem is illustrated by the excess demand functions in Figure
3, supranote 59. If the manipulators's initial trade takes place above the prevailing price, it
is because the quickly executed trade takes place at a very short-term equilibrium price.
When the manipulator unwinds, the trade will take place at the lower, long-term equilibrium price. If the manipulator unwinds quickly, the trade will take place at the even lower
short-term equilibrium price for sales.
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deed, the dominant view among financial economists is probably that
trades change price only by conveying information. 20 4 Nevertheless,
even if the manipulator can change the market's valuation of a security, at least two barriers stand in the way of profiting from offsetting
trades. First, the reported price must not change too quickly; the initial trades must convince the market that the manipulator possesses
important secrets, but the manipulator must take a position before
that change in conviction changes market price. 205 Second, the offsetting trades must be effected at the manipulated price. This will be
difficult if the offsetting trades convey an impression counter to that
conveyed by the initial trades, because that impression will offset the
price effect of the first set of trades.20 6 For example, if the initial set of
purchases boost price by conveying the impression that the buyer has
good news, the offsetting sales may depress price by giving the impression that the manipulator-now a seller-has bad news. Thus, the
manipulator must construct the offsetting sales so that they do not
convey offsetting information, or at least so that the offsetting information will not be incorporated into market prices until after the off20 7
setting trades are completed.
The first task-taking the initial position at the pre-manipulation
price-should not be too difficult. The market takes time to incorporate new information into prices; 208 it does not translate the information content of trades into price changes instantaneously.2 09 Prices
may respond very quickly to trades that convey information, but even
on the NYSE prices do not instantaneously adjust fully to the new information conveyed by trades.2 10 Thus, a manipulator may be able to
trade in a way that conveys information, but complete the trade
204
In any case, a price change resulting from immediate trading or inelastic demand
may itself change other investors' perceptions. See supra part I.B.2.
205
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517-18 (suggesting the difficulty of taking a
position before price changes).
206
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 518.
207
Moreover, if the offsetting sales are large (which is likely if the manipulation is to
be worth the trouble) the manipulator may pay immediacy costs to unload quickly, making
it even more difficult to profit. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 518-19.
208
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29; cf. Harris & Gurel, supra note 29, at 816
("[I]immediate information about non-information-motivated demand shifts may be costly,
and hence... short-term demand curves may be less than perfectly elastic."); Hasbrouck,
supra note 38; Kyle, supra note 125 (suggesting that the nonpublic information of informed
traders is gradually incorporated into price as trading occurs).
209
See Dann et al., supra note 93; Scholes, supra note 36, at 207; see also Allen & Gale,
supra note 19, at 508-09. Delay in market response to the publication of new information is
to be expected. The speed of price adjustments is limited by the fact that profit-maximizing participants will trade only if the expected profits of their trades exceed their costs. See
Dann et al., supra note 93, at 3; Scholes, supra note 36, at 207; see also Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 29, at 592-626; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 571 n.10.
210
Dann et al., supra note 93, at 20-21; see also COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 93, at
374-75.
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before the price changes to fully reflect that information (although if
the trade is large, the manipulator may have to pay some premium for
trading quickly). 2 1 ' In any event, manipulators can avoid the problem
21 2
by taking a position before entering the initial price-affecting trade.
The second task-effecting offsetting trades at the manipulated
price-may be more difficult. Even if the manipulator takes a position before manipulating the price, offsetting trades will not be profitable if purchases and sales have symmetrical and offsetting effects on
the market's perception of value, at least not if those effects lead instantly to a new market price.2 1 3 Offsetting trades may not, however,
have offsetting effects on price. As noted above, sales may convey less
information than purchases,2 1 4 so that a manipulator may be able to
2 15
bid price up with purchases and then sell without depressing price.
Moreover, a manipulator may be able to structure the initial trades to
maximize their impact on price and the unwinding trades to minimize
their impact. Perhaps the impression conveyed by a large initial
purchase effected in a way that maximizes its price impact will not be
offset by several small sales effected later at prevailing market prices.
Alternatively, a manipulator might buy a large block on the exchange,
signalling that he is informed by foregoing the upstairs market. The
manipulator might then sell the block in the upstairs market, where
he can credibly establish that he knows nothing. Purchases and sales
are even less likely to have symmetrical effects on price if the market is
prone to overreact to new information or if substantial numbers of
market participants are preoccupied with trading data rather than
fundamental stock value. 21 6 For example, a manipulator might push
211 See Allen & Gale, supranote 19, at 507-14 (presenting model in which a successful
trade-based manipulator acquires her position in trades that imitate those of an informed
investor, leading to an increase in market price); Hasbrouck, supra note 38, at 182-85; Kyle,
supra note 125, at 1315-17. It seems unlikely that the market will fully reflect the informational content of a trade as the trade is executed, given the expense of acquiring and
analyzing information. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. Presumably the market
takes time to respond to new information impounded in trades for the same reasons it
takes time to respond to the disequilibrium occasioned by immediate trading.
212 In the 1930s, manipulators were thought to begin their operations by acquiring
options on large positions. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURrnIEs AcT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE
Acr OF 1934, at Item 18 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATrWvHIsTORY]; 8 LosS & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 3959-62; Thel, supra note 7, at 439.

More recently, penny-stock manipulators are said to begin their schemes by acquiring the
entire company whose shares they plan to manipulate. See Goldstein et al., supra note 53,
at 776-78.
213
See Allen & Gorton, supra note 19, at 624-28; Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 214.
214
See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
215 Allen & Gorton, supra note 19, at 624-28.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 118-22; cf. DeBondt & Thaler, supra note 120, at
799-803 (suggesting that positive and negative news do not have symmetrical effects on
price).
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price to a level that others take as a buy signal, and then sell into the
resulting new demand.
As a theoretical matter, then, trade-inducing manipulations are
not necessarily self-deterring. As a practical matter, however, trading
in a way that will induce others to follow suit is undoubtedly difficult.
A would-be contract-triggering manipulator knows the upside of the
scheme before beginning and does all of the trading that makes the
scheme work. A manipulator who wants to cause others to trade, on
the other hand, cannot be confident that moving the price will be
enough .to induce others to trade. Faced with this uncertainty, people
who want to trade at a manipulated price have an incentive to lie
about the securities that they want to trade. In fact, most people
charged with using trades to induce others to trade are charged with
making false statements as well.2 1 7 Perhaps relatively few trade-based
manipulations are carried out without false statements,2 1 8 although
there might be more silent manipulations if manipulative trading
were permitted.2 1 9 Nevertheless, trade-induced price movements can
lead people to reevaluate securities, and people sometimes trade to
2 20
cause others to engage in such reevaluation.
Offsetting Trades into the Market-The events leading to the collapse of the stock market in 1929 offer at least anecdotal evidence that
trades can induce overreaction, and that offsetting trades need not
have offsetting effects on price. Although section 2 of the Exchange
Act justifies regulation by referring to the way manipulated prices injure people who are not trading, the legislative history emphasizes the
activities of manipulative pools. 221 According to the conventional
conception of how they worked, the pools typically manipulated the
stock of companies whose float they could control. After making sure
217
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 55, at 626-28 (discussing "simplified composite picture" of manipulative pools); see also sources cited supra note 53 (discussing false statements and other inappropriate practices used by penny stock manipulators).
218
But see Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 521.
219 It is not clear what (if any) significance Fischel and Ross would attach to trading in
cases in which a person buys a stock while making false positive statements about it and
then sells at the resulting higher price. The buyer's state of mind will be at issue if a rule
1Ob-5 case is brought on the basis of the false statements. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680
(1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). A pattern of purchases accompanying the price increase followed by large sales, might suggest that the speaker did not
believe that her statements were true. See Booth, supra note 20, at 1115 n.207. Attaching
evidentiary significance to those trades, however, might undercut the goals that lead Fischel and Ross to conclude that actual trades should not be prohibited regardless of intent.
220 Cf Vermaelen, supra note 20 (arguing that announced issuer repurchases at premium prices communicate positive information).
221
See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACrICES, S. REP.

No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-55 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note
212, at item 21; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SEcUlrry MARKETs 563-609 (1935);
Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 503-04, 536-38; Thel, supra note 7, at 424-61; Thel, supra
note 17, at 362-82.
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that no large holders would sell into the market, they secured
favorable publicity and then bought and sold stock to increase the
price and create the illusion of substantial buying interest. After the
public began to buy, they then carefully unloaded their positions at a
profit. 222 The pool operators found (or at least the supporters of the

Exchange Act thought they found) that it was possible to buy in a way
that indicated one had information and then sell without revealing
the secret. In other words, purchases and sales did not necessarily
carry symmetrical information effects.
The pools may be problem of the past, if they were ever really a
problem, but recent evidence indicates that trades are sometimes
used to cause other market participants to reevaluate and trade securities. In many cases litigated since the Exchange Act was enacted, market operators have been charged with bidding up the price of a stock
with conspicuous trades in order to induce others to buy at the resulting inflated price. 22 3 More recently, at least one commentator has
suggested that the profits reaped from this type of manipulation may
help to explain why "[1] arge traders frequently buy and then sell substantial blocks of stock, even though they are apparently not interested in taking over the firms. 2 2 4
Trade-based manipulation may prey on investors who rely on the
price history of a security in deciding when to trade it. For example,
so-called technical analysts often take certain prices to be resistance
levels, which, when realized, indicate that the prices will subsequently
rise or fall. 22 5 If a substantial group of traders take the market's

achievement of a particular price as a signal to buy, a manipulator
could use concentrated trades to move the price to that level, thereby
triggering a market reaction that would allow the manipulator to realize a profit by selling a previously acquired position or by selling short.
One might object by arguing that trading strategies based on past

222 See S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 221, at 36-50; Comment, supra note 55, at 626-28;
see also 8 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 3941-42 (quoting Comment); Fischel & Ross,
supra note 8, at 536-37 (quoting Comment).
223
See SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (offering the
use of trades to create a "portrait of an active market with a broad base of interested brokers" that attracts buyers); SEC v. Torr, 22 F.Supp. 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) ("It is axiomatic that it is the ticker record of a stock that attracts customers."); 8 Loss & SELIGMAN,

supra note 39, at 3967-76 (offering proof that prices were manipulated to induce others to
trade); Kryzanowski, supra note 55, at 125 (suggesting that by actively trading and moving
price up, manipulators may be able to entice others to buy at the inflated price); Lowenfels, supra note 130, at 702-13 (discussing cases).
224

Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 521; see also BAGNOLI & LiPMAN, supra note 19 (dis-

cussing the possibility that takeover bids are sometimes motivated by a desire to increase
share price so that the bidder can sell his initial holdings and drop the bid).
225

BURTON G. MAUGEL, A RANDOM WALK DoNN WALL STREET 113-19 (1990).

1994]

SECURITIES MANIPULATION

prices do not work, 226 but many people nonetheless base their trading

decisions on technical analyses of price trends. 227 So long as people
treat price changes as trading signals, manipulative trading to set off

technical triggers may work. 228 In fact, manipulative schemes of this
type are reportedly common in the commodities markets, where for2 29
mal trading systems are widely used.

Negotiated Offsetting Trades-Large transactions and public distributions often are effected in negotiated deals or through a sales force
at prices derived from contemporaneously reported prices. An engineered price movement may improve the manipulator's price in such
transactions. A person who owns a large amount of a security, for
example, might bid up the security's price in the market and then sell
230
the whole block at the market price in a negotiated deal.

Manipulations of this sort are possible because the price-setting
and market-clearing mechanisms in the trading market and the negotiated deal are different, but participants in the negotiated deal con23 l
tinue to look to reported market prices for an indication of value.
People will treat the reported market price of a security as a measure

of its value-and thus will be willing to trade at the reported price-if
they believe that securities can be traded at contemporaneously re226
See COPELAND & WESrON, supra note 93, at 349-50; LORIE ET AL.., supranote 27, at 5663. But see Williarm Brock et al., Simple Technical Trading Rules and the Stochastic Propertiesof
Stock Returns, 47J. FIN. 1731 (1992) (arguing that trading strategies based on past prices are
sometimes successful).
227
See MALKmEL, supra note 225, at 142-51; Brock et al., supranote 226, at 1731-32 (discussing the long history of technical analysis and asserting that it is enjoying a renaissance);
cf.Froot et al., supranote 120, at 1480 (observing that technical trading persists in the face
of a consensus that better forecasting methods probably exist and suggesting that this persistence is rational).
228
See supra text accompanying notes 118-22. Limit and stop loss orders, which contemplate trades being made after prices change, also present manipulative opportunities.
See ScWvTARrz, supra note 18, at 17, 46-49 (describing limit and stop-loss orders).
229
See Elyse Tanouye, 'Gunning' Plays Can Claim Victims in the Futures Pi WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 1992, at Cl (describing concerted trading designed to trigger stop orders).
230 This pattern of manipulation is similar to contract-based manipulation, in that the

manipulator profits by getting price to rise to a particular level. Here, however, price is
manipulated to induce offsetting trades by people who look to reported prices for information or evidence of value, whereas in contract-based manipulations, price is changed to
trigger a right to trade under a preexisting contract. See Thel, supra note 17, at 418 n.249.
The practice of shorting into a public offering, discussed supra text accompanying notes
190-95, might be considered trade-based manipulation of the sort discussed here, for the
person making the public offering is not obligated to complete the offering. Shorting into
the public offering, however, plays on the fact that the offeror is effectively obliged to sell
at or below reported price because of the money already sunk into the registration statement and sales effort.
231
See Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 214 ("The situation around a [seasoned offering) is special because the price-setting and market-clearing mechanisms in the secondary
market and in the [seasoned offering] are very different."); Parsons & Raviv, supra note 36,
at 378.
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ported market prices.23 2 Many people do believe, however, that they
can trade securities at or near the prevailing price.2 33 They are usually
correct too, inasmuch as securities usually can be bought or sold at
reported prices2 3 4 (recall that Fischel and Ross' premise is that it is
(nearly) impossible to trade at anything but reported prices).
It is probably easier to effect profitable offsetting trades in negotiated transactions or through a sales force than through anonymous
sales into the market. If the offsetting transactions in a trade-based
manipulation are to be made in the market, the manipulation will not
be successful unless the manipulator can actually effect offsetting
trades in the market at reported prices. However, if the offsetting
trades are to be made in negotiated deals or through a sales force, it
will be enough if trading partners believe that trades can be effected
on the market at reported prices.
The last of Fischel and Ross' three high profile cases, United States
v. GAF Corp.,235 may have involved trading designed to manipulate
price to facilitate a negotiated transaction. In October 1986, the GAF
Corporation held almost 9.6 million shares of Union Carbide Corporation common stock after an unsuccessful tender offer. The price of
Union Carbide stock had been falling for several months, and GAF
began to solicit possible buyers for all or part of the block.2 3 6 The
GAF executive in charge of the sale, James T. Sherwin, received bids
that were slightly below prevailing market prices,2 37 and knowledge
that GAF's block was available threatened to depress the price of
Union Carbide further.238 In mid October, Sherwin asked the chief
executive officer of Jefferies & Co., a firm that specialized in trading
large blocks for institutional investors, whether it could make Union
Carbide stock close at or above a particular price for several days in a
row. 23 9 The Jefferies executive indicated that it could.240
On October 28, Union Carbide closed at $21 7/8, and publicly
available information suggested that a large amount of Union Carbide
232 SeeJAMEs D. Cox Er AL., SEcuarriEs REGULATION 314 (1991) ("By far the most accurate reflection of a security's value is its price in a free and efficient market.").
233 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (1988). It is noteworthy that broker-dealers often use re-

ported prices to gauge the performance of portfolio managers. See supra notes 180-85 and
accompanying text.
234

See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.

235 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 527-29 (discussing the GAF case).
236 The fact that GAF was unwilling simply to sell the stock into the market is
instructive.
237 928 F.2d at 1256.
238 Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.
1991) (No. 90-1352).
239 928 F.2d at 1256.
240

Id.
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stock was available for sale below $22.241 On October 29, Sherwin
asked the CEO ofJefferies to cause Union Carbide to close at or above
$22 that day, and the executive agreed to do so. Shortly before the
NYSE closed for the day, Jefferies' chief trader placed an order to buy
140,000 shares of Union Carbide. Jefferies' broker bought 50,000
shares at $21 7/8, exhausting the supply available at that price, and
then bought several thousand more shares at $22. The Union Carbide specialist then executed three buy-at-close orders at $22, which
were the last trades of the day on the NYSE. Jefferies then bought
8,000 shares on the Pacific Stock Exchange for $22,242 which was the
2 43
consolidated closing price reported in the newspapers.
Even though Jefferies' broker acquired only 60,000 of the
140,000 shares thatJefferies ordered on October 29, Jefferies was not
in the market the next morning. Union Carbide traded below $22
until late in the day, when Jefferies again intervened.2 44 In the last
half hour of trading, Jefferies had its broker purchase 27,100 shares at
$21 7/8, then bought 10,000 shares in the last two trades of the day on
the NYSE, causing the stock to close at $22 1/8.245 Jefferies then
bought all the Union Carbide shares available on the Pacific Stock
Exchange at $22 1/4, and then another 1,500 shares at $22 3/8, at
which price the stock closed. 246 Jefferies sold its Union Carbide shares
at a loss on November 3 and 4. GAF sold 5,000,000 shares for $115
million in a negotiated transaction on November 10.247
The government brought criminal charges to trial three times,
arguing that Jefferies' October trades were designed to increase the
price of Union Carbide common stock in order to attract buyers and
increase GAF's price in a negotiated sale. Fischel and Ross find this
interpretation implausible; in fact, they cannot see any clear purpose
for the alleged manipulation.2 48 The third jury, however, apparently
accepted the government's argument, convicting both GAF and Sherwin. Maybe juries are unable to understand Wall Street, butJefferies'
trades might indeed have been designed to get a better price for GAF.
As a preliminary matter, Jefferies probably did cause the price of
Union Carbide to close higher on October 29 and 30, notwithstanding Fischel and Ross' suggestion that there might be other explana241

Id.; Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 5.

928 F.2d at 1256.
Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 8.
244
928 F.2d at 1256; Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 10-11.
245
Fischel and Ross state that the NYSE closing price was $22 7/8. Fischel & Ross,
supra note 8, at 528.
246
928 F.2d at 1256; Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 11.
247
Ferrara et al., supra note 31, at 211.
248 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 529.
242

243
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tions.2 49 Had it traded earlier in the day, Jefferies might have effected
its purchases at lower prices, and thus, the closing prices might have
been lower. According to the court, a substantial amount of stock was
25 0
thought to be available at less than $22 while Jefferies was buying.
Yet on each day, Jefferies did not order until late in the day and its
purchases exhausted the supply represented in the market. As a result, its orders had to be completed at prices above the previously prevailing price. On both days, the market closed at those higher
prices. 251
Fischel and Ross insist that the October trades could not have
been designed to influence the price that GAF would realize in its sale
of Union Carbide stock, because GAF did not sell its Union Carbide
stock until November 10, eleven days after the manipulation and several days afterJefferies sold its stock at a loss. As they see it, any purchaser negotiating to buy the Union Carbide stock on November 10
would have considered all recent price changes, so that small changes
in the price on October 29 and 30 would not have had any effect on
the price GAF received for its shares. Finally, Fischel and Ross conclude thatJefferies' sales on November 3 and 4 "negated any possibility of profit from the alleged scheme, which suggests that there was
252
never a scheme in the first place."
However, GAF was trying to sell its stock when Jefferies traded.
Thus, the eventual buyer, with which GAF was negotiating when Jefferies traded, may have been influenced by earlier prices when it evaluated the Union Carbide stock. 25 3 In any event, in trying to figure out
whether the October trades were part of a "scheme," the critical inquiry is not what GAF did afterJefferies sold, but what GAF wanted to
do when Sherwin asked Jefferies to buy. GAF had an interest in the
price of Union Carbide stock on October 29 and 30, and it stood to
benefit from a scheme such as the one the government alleged. Even
though GAF did not have a contract that allowed it to sell at market
price, any buyer in a negotiated block trade would be influenced by

249

See id. Fischel and Ross seem to take the position that, if a trade occasions a price

change because of liquidity costs or the bid-ask spread, the trade does not cause the price
change.
250
GAF, 928 F.2d at 1256.
251
In fact, most ofJefferies' October 29 order was not even filled. The price fell during October 30 trading while Jefferies failed to support it. Id. See also In re Melton, Exchange Act Release No. 28,313, 1990 SEC LEXIS 2817 (Aug. 6, 1990) (Jefferies' trader
placed orders so that resulting trades would be the last reported for the day, and bought
enough to clear the specialist's book).
252
Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 529.
253
See SEC v. GAF Corp. & Sherwin, Litigation Release No. 12,401, 1990 SEC LEXIS
376 (Mar. 8, 1990) (in its civil complaint against GAF and Sherwin, which was settled, the
SEC alleged that GAF had begun negotiating with its eventual buyer by October 29).
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reported market price. 2 54 Potential buyers would look to the market
for information about the likely future of Union Carbide stock, or at
least for a sense of what the buyer would get if it decided to resell. By
inflating the market price, Jefferies' October trades might have influenced the buyer's thinking.
The market's collective judgment about Union Carbide was in
flux when Jefferies traded. The stock had rallied in October, but on
October 28 it closed down for the first time since October 7. In those
circumstances, the closing price on October 29 was important. Last
sale prices are widely reported, and the daily change was likely to
shape potential buyers' impressions of the market.2 55 Moreover, large

trades on an uptick might have conveyed an impression that was particularly important to those buyers. GAF might not have been able to
convince the market that Union Carbide would have unexpectedly
large income. However, by buying large amounts of Union Carbide
stock at premium prices, apparently without regard to liquidity costs,
Jefferies could have conveyed the impression that substantial traders
thought that Union Carbide was a likely takeover candidate. 2 56 Union
Carbide had been the subject of a takeover bid, but speculation had
diminished when GAF entered into a widely publicized standstill
254
See id. (SEC civil complaint alleged that, at the time of the alleged manipulation,
GAF was negotiating with buyers whose bids were made in relation to the market price of
Union Carbide stock).
255
See, e.g., In re Sprague & Nammack, HPD 86-97, 1986 WL 178915 (Dec. 16, 1986)
(finding that by marking the close, specialist firm enhanced likely selling price of inventory); In re Lunny, HPD 85-120, 1985 WL 152313 (Oct. 31, 1985) (finding that block trader
marked the close to help sales people sell block at higher price); cf In re Mercil, HPD 8699, 1986 WL 178917 (Dec. 16, 1986) (finding that specialist entered fictitious trades at the
end of the day to increase likely selling price of inventory); In re Nammack, HPD 86-98,
1986 WL 178916 (Dec. 16, 1986) (discussing related circumstances).
256 Cf Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 537 (quoting charge that pool operators disseminated false rumors of impending mergers). The importance of takeover rumors at the
time of the Jefferies' trades is evidenced by one of the charges to which Milken pleaded
guilty, involving the sale of a large block of the stock of MCA, Inc., held by Golden Nugget,
Inc., a Drexel client. After Golden Nugget decided to sell the stock, Milken asked Boesky
to buy MCA stock in the market, at some point guaranteeing Boesky against any loss upon
his resale. Milken pleaded guilty to the charge that the conduct violated section 10(b) and
rule 101>5. In connection with Milken's sentencing, the government argued that the price
of MCA would have fallen had the market learned that Golden Nugget was not interested
in acquiring MCA, and that Milken had caused the sales to be made through Boesky in
order to hide the fact that Golden Nugget was selling. Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 37-41; see also Levine et al., supra note 53, at 1533 (maintaining
that the purpose of the transaction was to conceal the fact that Golden Nugget was selling
and to create the appearance of additional demand). Milken admitted that he had made
the guarantee and stated that his purpose was to allow Golden Nugget to get a better price
on its sale. He argued that there was nothing wrong with masking Golden Nugget's sales,
and suggested that the reason the conduct was illegal was that he failed to cause the Boesky
guarantee to be reflected on Drexel's books. Sentencing Memorandum of Michael i.
Milken 83-86, United States v. Milken (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41); Allocution of
Michael i. Milken, United States v. Milken (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41), reprinted in
STONE, supra note 150, at 201-205.
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agreement. Jefferies' large trades might have led the market to believe that arbitrageurs still thought Union Carbide was in play. Substantial purchases effected in the way that these were may change the
market's judgment of value and create new buying interest, especially
if the market is keyed to respond quickly to takeover speculation.
GAF could have expected to profit from that buying interest when it
sold its stock.
The fact that Jefferies sold at a loss on November 3 and 4 does
not mean that GAF never had reason to expect that the scheme would
be profitable. GAF might have expected to close its own sale quickly
when Jefferies bought, or at least to complete its sale before Jefferies
sold. 25 7 In any case, Jefferies' sales might not have convinced poten-

tial buyers of GAF's block thatJefferies' initial purchases did not disclose important positive information about the value of the stock.
Potential buyers might have ignored the decline occasioned by Jefferies' sales, and in any case, the decline might have seemed less significant than the price increase. For example, Jefferies structured its
initial sales (unlike its purchases) to avoid overwhelming the market.258 EventuallyJefferies dumped its stock, but even those sales may

have conveyed little news, since they were effected only after the mar259
ket began to react adversely to other news about Union Carbide.
Although GAF might have profited from the scheme that the government alleged, Fischel and Ross suggest that the only evidence of
Jefferies' manipulative intent was the timing of its trades and GAF's
promise to make up any trading loss Jefferies suffered. 26 0 The timing
of the trades is suspicious, but it is hardly the only evidence that the
government offered. The government alleged that Sherwin askedJefferies to raise the price of Union Carbide. Indeed, the defendants
never took Fischel and Ross' position thatJefferies' trading was innocent. Although GAF denied that Jefferies had acted on its behalf, it
did not deny thatJefferies had manipulated Union Carbide. On the
contrary, the defendants conceded thatJefferies had manipulated the
stock; they simply argued thatJefferies did so "on its own initiative...
26 1
and for its own purposes."
257
Nor did Jefferies' loss, as opposed to its sale, negate the prospect of a profitable
manipulation. If GAIT was trying to manipulate Union Carbide stock, it was hoping to
profit from its negotiated sale of five or ten million shares. The incremental profit from a
small price increase in such a large sale might easily have offsetJefferies' loss on its trades
of 100,000 shares.
258
928 F.2d at 1256.
259
Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 12.
260
Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 528-29.
261
928 F.2d at 1258, 1262; id. at 1266 (MahoneyJ., dissenting); Brief for Defendant at
30, United States v. GAP Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-1352). In both criminal and administrative proceedings, BoydJefferies, the C.E.O. ofJefferies & Co., admitted
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Another recent high-profile manipulation case, United States v. Regan,262 involved the manipulation of reported prices for the purpose
of inducing a seller to enter into a large transaction, but with the interesting twist of a public sale in the background. In 1985, Drexel was
underwriting an offering of convertible debt for C.O.M.B. Co., and
believed that the company was bidding up the price of its common
stock to get a better price for its convertible debt. 263 Drexel allegedly
responded by asking Princeton/Newport Partners, a Drexel client, to
sell C.O.M.B. stock in order to drive the price down and offset the
C.O.M.B. manipulation. With the stock price lower, Drexel could
more easily sell the convertibles. 2 6 In a lucky break for the government, Princeton/Newport recorded the telephone call in which a
Drexel trader instructed a Princeton/Newport trader to sell C.O.M.B.
stock and promised to cover any losses Princeton/Newport sufthat he had manipulated the price of Union Carbide stock. ScotJ. Paltrow, BoydJefferies in
Exie, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1989, Pt. IV, at 1.
Jefferies traded Union Carbide again on November 6 and 7, and at trial the defendants argued that the patterns of these trades were identical to those of October 29 and 30.
928 F.2d at 1258. Fischel and Ross cite this argument to support their point that trading at
the end of the day is not evidence of manipulative intent. Fischel & Ross, supranote 8, at

528 ("Indeed, the defendants pointed out thatJefferies & Co.'s purchases on November 6
and 7, which were not alleged to be part of the manipulative scheme in the government's
bill of particulars at the third trial, also occurred at the end of the day."). Fischel and Ross
can be read to suggest that the defendants argued-and, more importantly, that the government conceded-that the November trading was not manipulative. Neither is true.
The government's first bill of particulars, filed before the first trial, stated that both
the October and November trades were part of the series of manipulative trades alleged in
the indictment. 928 F.2d at 1257-58; see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 528 n.111.
Before the third trial, the government amended the bill of particulars to include only the
October trades. 928 F.2d at 1258. The government presumably omitted the November
trades because it feared that its failure to prove that both sets of trades were manipulative
would prevent it from prevailing on either. See id. at 1264-65 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
Nor did the defendants suggest that the November trades were innocent. On the
contrary, they acknowledged that the November trades were unlawful; their "chief contention" was simply thatJefferies was responsible for the trades. Id. at 1255. The defendants
argued that, because the trading patterns were identical andJefferies was responsible for
the November trades, Jefferies must have been responsible for the October trades. Id. at
1258, 1262. Far from denying that the October (and November) trades were manipulative,
the defendants argued thatJefferies "had motives to manipulate Union Carbide stock on
its own behalf, and in fact did exactly that." Id. at 1266 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
262
937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), modified, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
2273 (1992); see also United States v. Zarzecki, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1482 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 1992) (No. 88 Cr. 517) (vacating the sentences of two defendants).
263
937 F.2d at 829; see also Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 108-10. Issuers want the conversion price of convertible securities to be high; that is, they want to give
less of their stock in exchange for surrendered convertible securities. Conversely, buyers
want the conversion price to be low; in other words, they want to get more stock in return
for their surrendered securities. The conversion price is typically set just before the convertible securities are sold to the public. This price is conventionally a function of the
closing price of the underlying common stock on the day before the public sale.
264
Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, at 351 (citing Information, United States v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41)).

274

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:219

fered. 26 5 Princeton/Newport responded by making substantial short
sales, driving the price of C.O.M.B. down to the requested level. The
C.O.M.B. convertibles were priced on the basis of a lower stock
price. 2 66 Drexel subsequently admitted manipulating the price of
C.O.M.B. stock; 267 the Drexel trader who initiated the trades and the
head trader at Princeton/Newport were convicted on criminal
2 68
charges.
GAFand Regan are not the only recent cases in which the government has plausibly alleged that prices were manipulated with a view
toward effecting offsetting transactions at the manipulated market
price in negotiated deals or through a sales force. Dealers in penny
stocks, for example, set prices in controlled markets and then use
high-pressure sales tactics to convince customers to buy at those
prices.2 69 Borrowers who have pledged securities as collateral are
often accused of supporting the reported price of the securities in
order to convince their creditors that the collateral is valuable, and
thus, to discourage them from calling their loans. 270 The practice of
stabilizing the market while distributing securities may be designed to
influence potential purchasers who look to the market for an assurance of value.
Stabilization is a complicated subject, and the practice has long
been controversial. 271 Fischel and Ross find stabilizing trades something of a mystery. Reasoning that there is no need to support the
market, and that underwriters probably cannot support prices anyway,
they offer the surprising suggestion that stabilizing trades may never
Id. at 352 (quoting the transcript of the telephone conversation).
266 Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 109-10. Underwriters may employ a
similar technique to dispose of sticky offerings. For example, in November 1990, underwriters of a large distribution of Conagra Inc. stock, which was to be offered at the consolidated closing price on November 20, expected the price to close at $33 and arranged sales
at the price. A trade at the end of the day caused the price on the NYSE to close at $33 3/
8. This price would have yielded more money for Conagra, but would have made it more
difficult to complete the distribution. The underwriters then arranged a trade at $33 1/4
on the Pacific Stock Exchange, which closed after the NYSE. As a result, the offering was
completed at $33 1/4. See Laurie P. Cohen, Shearson,Ex-Stock Trading Co-ChiefSettle Alleged
265

Share Manipulation Case,WALL ST. J., May 19, 1992, at Cl; Richard D. Hylton, Shearson Suspends Officials for Stock Trade Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1991, at D1.
See SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
267
(CCH) 94, 474, at 93,026 (June 20, 1989); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, at 353.
268
937 F.2d at 829-30.
269
See sources cited supra note 53.
270
See United States v. Gleave, Litigation Rel. No. 12024, 1989 SEC LEXIS 466 (D.
Utah Mar. 8, 1989) (manipulating price with a view toward pledging stock as collateral);
Goldstein et al., supranote 53, at 782 (discussing the use of manipulated securities as collateral for loans); supra text accompanying notes 180-89.
271
See 9 Loss & SELGMAN, supra note 39, at 3987-4071; Cox Er AL., supra note 232, at
314; Hanley et al., supra note 19, at 194; Nicholas Wolfson, Rule 10b-6: The Illusory Searchfor
Certainty, 25 STAN. L. REv. 809, 810 (1973).
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occur. 27 2 We may not know what motivates underwriters to stabilize

the market during distributions, but it is clear enough that stabilization has not been rare. 2 73 Potential buyers in underwritten distribu-

tions may use reported market prices to measure the value of the
distributed security, inasmuch as the market offers both an alternative
source for the security and an indication of the price at which they will
be able to resell. If buyers are looking to the market, the underwriters
27 4
have an interest in supporting the market price with trades.
The SEC requires underwriters who want to stabilize the market
to disclose their plans, 2 75 and Fischel and Ross suggest that potential
buyers will discount market prices if they know that the market is being stabilized. 27 6 Underwriters apparently sometimes find stabilization worthwhile, however, even when they must disclose it. Potential
buyers may rely on the availability of market prices, even when they
know that those prices may have been stabilized, so long as they are
confident that stabilizing trades cannot hold up the price against a
consensus valuation, but can, at most, only offset the temporary price
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 538-39; see also id. at 534-37.
273 See Exchange Act Release No. 17,371 [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,705, at 83,850 n.17 (Dec. 12, 1980) (Witnesses "testified that stabilization frequently occurs in offerings of equity securities, but almost never in offerings of debt securities."); 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 3993 n.19 (noting that between 1939 and
1952, the right to stabilize was reserved in over one-half of registered offerings, and prices
were actually stabilized in about 1/6); Hanley et al., supra note 19 (arguing on the basis of
changes in bid-ask spreads that stabilization is common); Ruud, supra note 19 (contending
that underwriter stabilization may explain the anomoly of the underpricing of inital public
offerings); id. at 140 ("Practitioners are reluctant to speak in specific terms about the frequency of IPO stabilization .... They do acknowledge that it would not be atypical to find
that 10-20% of IPO's are stabilized."). The SEC requires that those who effect stabilizing
transactions keep records, but it no longer requires reports of stabilization. Id. at 3990-91.
It is therefore difficult to document how often stabilization is employed. Stabilization may
have become less common recently due to improved pricing or innovations such as bought
272

deals. SeeJENNINGS ET AL, SECURmTES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIAIS 584-85 (1992).

Underwriters still want the opportunity to stabilize in some situations, however, as evidenced by the requests that the SEC receives to exempt international offerings from the
stabilization rules and the rule changes it has proposed in response. See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 4011-12; Stabilizing to Facilitate a Distribution, Exchange Act Rel.
No. 28,732 [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 84,704 (Jan. 3, 1991).
274 Fischel and Ross question the existence of and incentive for stabilization because,
they insist, the distribution will not temporarily depress the market price and underwriters
cannot bid up the price anyway. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 538-39. Once again,
however, the evidence that distributions do not have a temporary pressure effect is itself
based on distributions in which underwriters have taken steps to dissipate the pressure,
perhaps including the step of stabilization.
275 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-6, 240.10b-7 (1993).
276 Fischel & Ross, supranote 8, at 538. Fischel and Ross' conclusion that stabilization
may be rare is all the more remarkable given their argument that the very announcement
of a plan to stabilize is likely to drive price down. Id. Prospectuses frequently announce
that the underwriters reserve the right to stabilize. As Fischel and Ross have it, underwriters depress the market price by making this announcement in order to preserve the right
to stabilize, a right that is of little value and one that they do not use anyway.
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pressure of the distribution. Perhaps investors are confident of this;
they may assume that the SEC rules governing stabilization prevent
distortion of the market, or like Fischel and Ross, they may be confident that stabilization cannot prevail against real trading interest.
Nevertheless, Fischel and Ross are probably right when they suggest that supporting the market price while negotiating large distributions is more likely to be profitable if the supporting transactions can
be kept secret. Substantial sellers sometimes resort to secret
purchases. 277 For example, in another of the high-profile cases that
Fischel and Ross mention, the principal of a brokerage firm pleaded
guilty to criminal charges, agreed to disgorge $475,000 and consented
to the imposition of administrative sanctions in connection with the
manipulation of the closing price of a stock. The manipulation occurred on the day that the sale price of 8,000,000 shares of the stock
and 8,000,000 warrants to buy the stock was to be set. The principal,
who had significant financial ties to the firm selling the stock, was
charged with causing the price of the stock to rise 1/8 point by having
Jefferies & Co. buy 410,000 shares. 278 Admitting that the charges were
true, the principal offered the novel explanation that he was merely
trying to counter others who were selling the stock in an attempt to
2 79
depress the price in the public offering.
Milken and Drexel were also charged with manipulating prices in
order to influence the price at which underwritten securities could be
sold to the public.2 80 For example, in March 1986, Stone Container
Corporation asked Drexel to manage the distribution of $200,000,000
of its convertible securities. Stone was reluctant to proceed with the
offering until its common stock was trading at $46, so that the conversion price would be about $60.281 The stock remained below $46
from early April until April 14, 1986, when Drexel allegedly instructed
277 Cf James Sterngold, New-Issue PracticesDraw Fire, N.Y. Tims, March 23, 1987, at DI
(suggesting that the practice of stabilization is common).
278
See SEC v. Lewis, SEC Litigation Rel. No. 12,569, 1990 SEC LEXIS 2834 (Aug. 6,
1990) (consent decree); In re Lewis, Exchange Act Rel. No. 28,333, 1990 SEC LEXIS 2886
(Aug. 13, 1990) (administrative proceedings); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, at
348-49; William R. McLucas et al., SEC Enforcement; 46 Bus. LAw. 797, 812 (1991); Kurt
Eichenwald, Fine and Probationfor Lewis in Stock Manipulation Cas4 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1989, at Dl; Stephen Labaton, A ProminentTraderAdmits He Schemed to Rig a Stock Pric N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1989, at Al; BrokerageFirm is Censured,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1989, at D7; see
also United States v. Lewis, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,479
(S.D.N.Y.June 15, 1989) (criminal proceedings); Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 505 (mentioning case).

See Labaton, supra note 278; see also Eichenwald, supra note 278.
280 According to the government, on several occasions Milken manipulated the price
of common stock down to make it easier to sell derivative securities. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 110-11 (alleging that Milken manipulated the common stock
price lower in order to reduce the price that would be set for the exercise of warrants, thus
facilitating the sale of the warrants).
281 See supra note 263.
279
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the Boesky organization to buy Stone common, making it clear that
the trades were supposed to support or increase the price. The
Boesky organization bought a substantial portion of the shares traded
that day, and the stock closed at $46 3/4. Stone agreed to go ahead

28 2
with the deal and Drexel earned substantial fees.

The temptation to manipulate may be particularly acute when
the manipulator contemplates the acquisition of an entire company in
a single transaction. Around the same time that the SEC accused
Georgia-Pacific of boosting its share price with purchases in order to
minimize its contractual obligations, 283 the Commission charged
Genesco, Inc. with boosting the price of its stock while negotiating the
amount of stock that it would give in exchange for businesses that it
was acquiring. Genesco denied any wrongdoing, but agreed that it
would make subsequent repurchases only under conditions similar to
28 4
those that Georgia-Pacific had accepted.
In an interesting variation that occurred a few years later in connection with a takeover contest, 285 the Second Circuit found that a

rival suitor used price manipulation to defeat the Crane Company's
efforts to acquire Westinghouse Air Brake Company. After Crane announced that it would solicit proxies to elect directors to Air Brake's
board, the directors of Air Brake decided to support a merger with
American Standard, Inc. In response, Crane offered to exchange $50
face amount of its securities for each share of Air Brake stock
tendered. On the day that the offer was to expire, Air Brake opened
at $45 1/4 on the NYSE. During the day, American Standard bought
170,000 shares of Air Brake on the NYSE, and Air Brake eventually
282 This description is based on the SEC's civil complaint against Drexel and Milken,
SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 6209 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1988) (as summarized in SEC Litigation Rel. No. 11,859 [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,999 at 90,659 [hereinafter Drexel Litigation Release)), and the information in
United States v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41)
(as summarized in Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, at 350-51), and the Sentencing
Memorandum, supra note 142, at 94-98.
283 See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
284 See Genesco, Inc., Prospectus 19-23 (May 10, 1966), reprinted in [1964-66 Transfer
Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,354. Genesco was also selling its convertible securities to the public at the same time. Id.
Similar allegations were made a few years later in Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 264 A.2d 597
(Pa. 1970). Davis sued Pennzoil to recover compensation for providing Pennzoil's predecessor with a business plan that contemplated Pennzoil's advancing the price of its stock by
purchasing its shares in the open market and subsequently using the stock to acquire other
businesses. Id. at 599-600. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that any promise to
pay compensation for the plan was unenforceable because the repurchases that the plan
recommended would violate the federal securities laws. Id. at 604.
285 See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.
1973); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1000 (1975) (disgorgement under Exchange Act § 16(b)).
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reached $50, with American Standard buying all but 100 of the 26,300
shares that traded at that price. 2 86 Crane's offer appeared less attractive as the market price of Air Brake rose, and the tender offer
failed. 28 7 The Second Circuit found that American Standard's extraordinary purchases caused the increase in the price of Air Brake
stock and the consequent failure of the Crane tender offer.2 88 The

court also found that American Standard bid up the price of Air Brake
28 9
stock to frustrate Crane's tender offer.
More recently, in yet another variation, the SEC charged an acquirer with selling substantial quantities of its target's stock just before
commencing a tender offer, thereby depressing the price and making
the tender offer more attractive. 2 90 The most notorious use of manipulation to facilitate an acquisition, however, was probably Guinness
P.L.C.'s manipulation of its own stock in connection with the $4 billion takeover of the Distiller's Company, which the New York Times
286
419 F.2d at 792-93. Before the market opened, Standard agreed to sell 100,000
shares at $44 1/2 to an institutional investor in an unreported trade. Id.
287
Id. at 792.

288

Id.

Id. at 792-93; see also Edward C. Schmults & EdmundJ. Kelly, Cash Take-Over BidsDefense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115, 124 (1967) (noting the possibility that issuer repurchases
might drive up prices enough to defeat a tender offer). According to the court of appeals,
The net result of [American Standard's purchases] was to represent to the
public, whose primary source of information is the tape, that there was a
great demand for Air Brake at an increased value. It is reasonable to conclude that many Air Brake stockholders who might otherwise have chosen
to tender to Crane chose not to do so because their own holdings in Air
Brake looked better as the price went up.
....
[On April 19, Standard] sold 120,000 shares at a price of just
above $44 1/2, and purchased 170,000 shares at an average price of $49.08,
for a net trading loss exceeding one-half million dollars. Standard had
"painted the tape" in Air Brake stock ....
Standard's extraordinary buying here, coupled with its large secret
sales off the market, inevitably distorted the market picture and deceived
public investors, particularly the Air Brake shareholders. The effect of
these purchases was to create the appearance of an extraordinary demand
for Air Brake stock and a dramatic rise in market price, as a result of which
Air Brake shareholders were deterred from tendering to Crane.
419 F.2d at 792-93. The court may have been wrong about American Standard's motives,
of course. The court rejected American Standard's argument that it bought large quantities on April 19 because that was the last day it could acquire stock that it would be entitled
to vote at the upcoming shareholders' meeting. 419 F.2d at 792 n.9, 795. See also 490 F.2d
at 336 n.4. American Standard might also have bid up the price to $50 as it sought to
acquire all the stock anyone might be willing to tender in response to Crane's exchange
offer.
290 See SEC v. Zico Investment Holdings, Inc., Litigation Rel. No. 11,617, 1987 SEC
LEXIS 3093 (Dec. 2, 1987) (announcing complaint); SEC v. Zico Investment Holdings,
Inc., Litigation Rel. No. 11,763, 1988 SEC LEXIS 1205 (June 13, 1988) (announcing consent to injunction and stating that by controlling closing price for four days, the manipulators created the impression in the financial press that the target's price was falling and
caused the price to decline for ten days).
289
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called "Britain's biggest financial .

.

279

. scandal in decades." 29 1 In a

heavily contested bid for control of Distiller's, Guinness offered Distiller's shareholders cash and Guinness stock in exchange for their Distiller's stock. After Guinness prevailed, it was revealed that several
Guinness executives had arranged for large purchases of Guinness
stock in order to increase the reported price, making the Guinness
offer appear more attractive to Distiller's shareholders. 29 2 In subsequent criminal prosecutions, no one seemed to deny that Guinness
bid up the price of its stock; the chief executive officer of Guinness
simply denied knowledge of the scheme, and the people who arranged or made the trades just denied that they knew that their actions were illegal. These defenses were unavailing, and the
participants were convicted of various crimes for their roles in the
2 93
scheme.
III
RESPONDING TO MANIPULATION

Contract-based and trade-based manipulation is neither impossible nor self-deterring. Plausible economic models indicate that manipulation can be profitable. Manipulative trading may or may not be
common, but it is possible and tempting in a variety of significant and
common situations. Some, or even most, of the cases discussed above
may have innocent explanations, but we cannot be confident that manipulation does not occur.
The exact contours of the manipulation problem are obscure,
and this obscurity may be irremediable. The trading techniques used
to manipulate prices must be keyed to market structure, as well as
trading and contracting practices. Accordingly, manipulative techniques change as those structures and practices evolve, and thus, at
any given time, manipulative practices may vary among markets.
Aside from being diverse and transitory, the details of common ma291 Deborah Stead, Guinness Trial BeginningAfter Many Legal Delays, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12,
1990, at D12; see also 'Guinness Affair' Shakes British FinancialCircles, LA. TIMES, May 13,
1988, Pt. IV, at 5 (describing the case as the "financial trial of the century").
292 The government charged that Guinness had caused outsiders, including Boesky, to
buy Guinness stock, and had paid them fees and promised to hold them harmless against
losses arising from their purchases. The Guinness Affair, THE ECONOMisT, Sept. 1, 1990, at
72; see alsoJohnJones,Jan. 13, 1987, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (discussing guarantees
that Guinness' investment bankers allegedly made to induce outsiders to boost the price of
Guinness stock); Stead, supra note 291; 'GuinnessAffair' Shakes British FinancialCircles, supra
note 291 (discussing Guinness' investment of $185 million in a Boesky fund after Boesky
bought Guinness shares and Guinness' subsequent efforts to recover $46 million in payments made to those who bought Guinness stock during the takeover battle); American Tied
to British Fraud Case Arrested, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1987, Pt. IV, at 5 (reporting that Guinness
wrote off $205 million for payments and investments relating to illegal actions in the
takeover).
293 The Guinness Affair, supra note 292, at 72.
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nipulative techniques are hard to discover. The success of many manipulative schemes often depends upon the target's ignorance, and
often the techniques employed are illegal. Thus, manipulative practices are likely to be disguised, and accordingly, they are hard to study.
While the manipulation problem cannot be deemed nonexistent
and ignored, the ambiguity surrounding the problem makes it hard to
craft a solution. This ambiguity counsels against incautious legal intervention. I am not sure exactly how the law should respond to manipulation, but the complexity of the problem indicates that the
response should not be guided by the flights of legal imagination that
the subject of manipulation sometimes inspires.
A.

Private Responses

If manipulation is taking place, market participants can be expected to be wary of manipulative practices and respond accordingly.
In fact, private actors do recognize and address manipulative trading.
Although this reaction suggests that manipulation is not self-deterring, it also shows that manipulation can be deterred.
1.

ContractualPrecautions

People who agree to govern themselves by subsequent security
prices can, and often do, try to protect themselves from manipulation.
The fact that private parties take extensive measures to reduce the risk
of manipulation suggests that manipulation really is possible. 2 94 At
the same time, private precautions serve as a reminder that the existence of a problem does not necessarily justify government intervention, although perfect contractual protection is no more possible here
295
than elsewhere.
Those who structure their contractual relationships on the basis
of reported market prices can take a number of steps to reduce the
risk that a party will manipulate market price. They might simply
agree that no party will trade in a way that will influence market price,
and in fact this may be an implicit term or legal norm incorporated
into any contract that turns on market price. 296 Even if the parties are
prepared to agree to forego trading, however, a contractual prohibi294
Even Fischel and Ross acknowledge that contracting parties are concerned about
the possibility of manipulation. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 532 n.130 (The Wickes
"preferred stock indenture was designed to make... manipulations highly unlikely.").
295 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 525.
296 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs §§ 225, 245 (1981); Fischel & Ross, supra
note 8, at 523-24; cf. In re Sheehy, HPD 86-63, 1986 WL 178884 (Sept. 15, 1986) (firm
withheld bonus from employee who marked close to influence apparent value of portfolio); In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1139 (NASD Market Surveillance
Comm. June 22, 1992) (firm terminated trader who marked the close); Rustin & Putka,
supranote 181 (discussing the termination of employees who marked the close to increase
bonus).
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tion is an incomplete solution for at least two reasons. First, a party
may be able to trade in violation of the agreement without being discovered. 297 The parties might address the difficulty of monitoring
compliance by providing a substantial sanction in the event of discovery, but courts would likely treat such a provision as a punitive damage
clause and refuse to enforce it.298
Second, even if the parties can somehow prevent each other from
trading, their rights and obligations may be determined by price aberrations caused by other people's trading.29 9 Consider the undisputed
facts of United States v. Mulheren.3 00 Gulf & Western repurchased Carl
Icahn's stock at the same time it bought Boesky's. Had Gulf & Western bought Icahn's shares at the price that would have prevailed if
Mulheren had not traded, it would have paid Icahn about $800,000
less. 30 1 Icahn reaped-and Gulf & Western paid-an extra $800,000
as a result of Mulheren's trades, regardless of whether Icahn had anything to do with Mulheren's trades, and indeed even if Mulheren
traded innocently.
Icahn was probably entitled to receive the manipulated price for
his stock because the contract seemed to allocate to Gulf & Western
the risk of a price spike occasioned by trading like Mulheren's. The
problem, however, is that the risk of disruptive trading is one the parties would rather not have to allocate. People usually tie contractual
rights and obligations to reported market prices because they are concerned with the price at which securities can be traded and they believe that securities can be traded at reported prices. Whenever trades
result in reported prices that do not indicate the price at which trades
can be made, the market's value as a price discovery mechanism is
compromised.3 0 2 To the extent that reported prices may deviate from
297 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 148-49, 160-62 (discussing allegations of
trading through another). The allegation that Milken traded through Boesky is particularly revealing in this respect, for, according to Fischel and Ross, the indenture for the
Wickes preferred stock "was designed to make such manipulations highly unlikely." Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 532 n.130.
298 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 356(1) (1981); U.C.C. § 2-718(1)
(1990); E. ALLAN FARNSwoRTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRAGTS § 12.18 (1990).
299 See, e.g., In re Doherty, Exchange Act Release No. 29,545 [1991 Transfer Binder]
84,842 (Aug. 12, 1991) (noting that marking the close has
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
repercussions for indexes and margin credit); H.R. REP. No. 414, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 22
(1991) (price declines due to short sales can trigger margin calls); cf Floyd Norris, Salomon's Error Went Right toFloor,N.Y. TimES, Mar. 27, 1992, at DI (explaining how at the close
of the market, brokerage clerk erroneously entered order to sell $11,000,000 of stock as
order to sell 11,000,000 shares, precipitating a price drop).
300 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991); see supra text accompanying notes 155-74.
See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text. As noted above, however, it is not
301

clear that Gulf & Western in fact had contracts with Boesky and Icahn. See supra notes 15960.
302 The importance of reported prices for price discovery is the subject of a growing

literature. See ScI-WvARTz, supra note 18, at 514-28; Schreiber & Schwartz, supra note 51, at
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market value-because of the trading of parties or strangers to the
contract-they are unsuitable as contractual proxies for available
price.
Contracting parties can sometimes address both the possibility of
manipulation and the risk of independent disruptive trading by
changing the contractual trigger from the reported price at a particular time to the average or sustained price over a period of time. 0 3 For
example, Wickes was allowed to redeem its preferred stock only if its
common stock closed at or above $6 1/8 for 20 of 30 consecutive trading days. An extended trigger period like this makes manipulation
more difficult and temporary price aberrations less important. It does
not, however, make manipulation impossible, as Milken demonstrates. 30 4 Moreover, a contractual trigger can be extended only so
far. An extreme term, such as one requiring that the price remain
above a certain level for a long period,3 0 5 simply shifts the risk of disruptive trading. It also creates the possibility that the other party will
be able to avoid its obligations by manipulating price.
The technique of extending the contractual trigger is a less effective response to manipulation and disruptive trading in other contexts. It does not work as well when parties use reported price to set
the amount of a payment, rather than to trigger the payment of a
certain sum. For example, if a corporation is to compute an officer's
bonus on the basis of the reported price of the corporation's stock, it
cannot eliminate the risk of manipulation and disruptive trading by
making the bonus a function of the average price over an extended
period of time. Disruptive trading by strangers or manipulation of the
price by the parties themselves during part of the period will still influence the market bonus, albeit to a lesser extent than they would if the
bonus were based on a single closing price. An extended contractual
reference period may be entirely unsuitable when the contract is to
trade at the reported price in the future. For example, a program
trader who must sell a basket of stocks at the closing price wants to be

23-27. Legal scholars have so widely accepted the proposition that reported prices ought
to reflect contemporary equilibrium market value that they generally ignore it in discussing the importance and achievement of stock market efficiency.
03
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 524-25.
304
Nonetheless, it is much more difficult to manipulate prices for twenty to thirty days
than for one day in thirty. Thus, even if a contract like that involved in the Wickes case is
manipulated, the manipulation is unlikely to trigger an event except when the parties
could probably trade in the market at or near the trigger price, which is presumably the
point of the contract. Slight manipulation might even be thought appropriate on the theory that it mitigates the all-or-nothing quality of the triggered condition.
305
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 524-25 (suggesting that a firm concerned about
manipulation could condition a bonus on share price remaining above the trigger price
for a certain period).
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promised the closing price for that day, not the average closing price
over several days.306
The parties may find other ways to structure their affairs so as to
reduce the risk of manipulation. For example, program traders who
pay their brokers for the promise of the closing price for a package of
securities can protect themselves from broker manipulation of the
closing price by refusing to describe the package of securities precisely. They may reserve the right to deliver one of several packages
or contractually describe the package so that the specific securities to
be delivered cannot be determined before delivery. The broker cannot easily manipulate the closing prices because it does not know what
stocks it will have to buy.30 7 These strategies, however, also leave the
broker unsure of exactly what risk it has assumed, and the premium
price that the trader must pay to get the broker to accept this uncertainty is a cost of the possibility of manipulation.
Notably, all of these strategies for dealing with manipulation and
disruptive trading in the context of contracts tied to reported market
prices have evolved over time. Even contracting parties who recognize
that manipulation is possible cannot protect themselves against all
forms of manipulation.3 0 8 Because even sophisticated market participants sometimes fail to protect themselves against manipulation, it
would seem that public investors are particularly unlikely to take contractual precautions. Investment bankers may attend to the interests
of public investors, but they have mixed motives. For example, even if
Milken and Drexel Burnham did nothing wrong in connection with
the Wickes redemption, the prospect of future investment banking
fees from Wickes may have tempered their incentive to bargain hard
for a contract that would have protected the buyers of the preferred
stock.30 9 Similarly, when a public corporation is the target of contract306
See supra text accompanying note 196. An extended reference period will not prevent manipulative shorting into a public offering or marking the close to prevent a margin
call. See supra notes 180-95 and accompanying text.
307 See MULER ET AL., supra note 196, at 121-24; see also id. at 126 ("The program trading relationship between broker and money-manager client begins to resemble an exotic
dance.").
308
Cf Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 532 n.130 ("At the time the [wickes] indenture
was written no one would have expected the price of the stock on any one day to matter.").
Note that brokerage firms frequently use closing prices rather than the less-manipulable
midpoint of the bid-ask spread to evaluate employees and to calculate margin calls. See
supra text accompanying notes 180-89.
309
Of course, the price at which securities are first sold to the public may reflect the
possibility of manipulation. Cf Allan C. Eberhart & RichardJ. Sweeney, Does the Bond Market Predict Bankruptcy Settlements7, 47 J. FIN. 943 (1992) (violations of the absolute priority
rule, which are common but small, are fairly well predicted in market prices for bonds
around the bankruptcy announcement date). However, there is reason to question
whether initial sale prices respond to such possibilities. See Victor Brudney, CorporateBondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1821, 1825-27,
1849-52 (1992) (questioning the assumption that the market price of debt instruments
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based manipulation, management may have insufficient incentive to
protect public shareholders. For example, when Gulf & Western
agreed to repurchase well over $300,000,000 of its stock from Boesky
and Icahn, it apparently did little to protect itself from manipulation
or the risk that a small, temporary price change would cause it to
spend millions of dollars extra. Indeed, the management of Gulf &
Western might have been tempted to permit manipulation of its stock
so that it could pay a premium price without appearing to pay
greenmail.
Although contracting parties can reduce the possibility of manipulation and the effect of disruptive trading by unrelated parties, they
cannot completely eliminate the problems by themselves. 310
2.

Trader Reactions

Traders who look to reported price for an indication of value and
to reported trades for information also have an interest in protecting
themselves from manipulation. As a precaution, traders may develop
a skepticism of reported prices, especially in situations where manipulation is likely. Moreover, other traders have an incentive to search
for manipulation, because they can profit by taking advantage of manipulative trades. Consider, for example, the way that the market will
react to trading around the time a secondary offering is being priced.
When outsiders learn that a holder or issuer is about to sell a
large quantity of a publicly traded security, they may be tempted to
depress the market price for the purpose of lowering the offering
price.3 1 1 Sellers who suspect such manipulation can try to convince
potential buyers that the reported price has been manipulated. More
importantly, investors who suspect that manipulation is occurring will
bid in the market and in the secondary offering in an attempt to obtain bargain prices. This bidding will work against the manipulator's
3 12
sales, making it more difficult to depress price.
Investor skepticism about market prices is not likely to prevent all
manipulation, however. So long as investors cannot be sure whether
discounts for the possibility of debtor opportunism); see also Allan C. Eberhart, Chapter11Surprisingly Goodfor Shareholders,WALL ST.J., Mar. 26, 1992, at A14 (noting that it is virtually
impossible to test whether the original issue price of debt is discounted for future violations of the absolute priority rule).
310
Because parties cannot construct a perfect contractual response to manipulation,
Fischel and Ross concede that there may be some benefit to a legal prohibition of manipulation, although they suggest that such benefit may be trivial. Fischel & Ross, supranote 8,
at 524-25.
311
See Gerard & Nanda, supranote 19, at 220-21; see alsosupra text accompanying notes
190-95.
312 The seller cannot offset the manipulative trading, however, because of rules against
buying during a distribution. See 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-6 (1992); see also text accompanying
notes 269-72.
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reported trades are the product of informed trading or manipulation,
manipulation may be profitable.3 1 3 Moreover, investor skepticism
provides no check at all when the market fails to recognize a manipulative opportunity. Market participants are likely to underestimate the
potential for manipulation when off-market transactions are being effected at market price or when contracts are tied to reported prices.
The opportunities for manipulation in these circumstances arise not
from the dynamics of the market, but from exogenous circumstances;
market participants who are unaware of these contracts or transactions will not be on the alert for manipulation. Those involved in the
transaction have reason to be careful, but they may not fully comprehend that market prices are susceptible to manipulation. Once again,
it is instructive to note that contractual precautions against manipulation have evolved in response to the development and employment of
unforeseen manipulative techniques. Consider once again the facts of
Mulheren. Although it is not clear that Gulf & Western and Boesky had
an enforceable agreement,3 14 Gulf & Western nevertheless paid the
reported price for a tremendous quantity of its stock just after the
price had jumped 1/4 point. Although the sellers had the incentive
and wherewithal to manipulate the price of the stock, the buyer
showed no skepticism at all.
Investor skepticism is a significant check on manipulation, but it
is unlikely to prevent all trade-based manipulation. Even when it
works, investor skepticism may be excessively costly. Skeptical investors have to investigate and put their capital at risk. Duplicative investigation by many market participants may be wasteful. In fact, the
disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws are often justified with the argument that they reduce the cost of investigation by
skeptical investors. Perhaps the prevention of manipulation is also a
public good that ought to be provided by a centralized agency that
can efficiently investigate and address the problem.
3.

Market Reform

The market itself can be structured to reduce manipulation. The
prices reported from a market depend very much on the way that securities are traded in that market. Thus, different markets are likely
to be more or less susceptible to different forms of manipulation.
Those who operate the markets can arrange them so that manipulation is difficult.
Reported prices are one of the most important products of financial markets, and providers of market services have an interest in en313 See Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 509; Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 220-22;
BAGNOLI & LiPMAN, supra note 19, at 1-5.
314 See supra notes 159-60.
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suring that reported prices reflect the price at which trades can be
made. 315 To the extent that traders and issuers are worried about manipulation, they will turn to markets that minimize the problem. As
competition for listings and trading increases among securities markets, those who provide market services may find it worthwhile to perfect and offer measures that will protect the pricing process and
316
discourage manipulation.
The organized securities markets have taken many measures
against manipulation,3 17 and the NASD's recent initiative on short
selling suggests that markets may act against manipulation in response
to competitive pressure. SEC rule 10a-1 prohibits short sales of exchange-listed stocks except on or after an uptick; that is, short sales of
exchange-listed stocks must be made at a price above the last different
price.3 1 8 The uptick rule does not apply to stocks that are traded on
the NASDAQ and not listed on an exchange. Many NASDAQ issuers
want the protection of an uptick rule, however, and thus, they might
list on an exchange that provides such a safety measure.3 19 In response, the governors and members of the NASD approved an uptick
rule for NASDAQ.3 20 When the NASD filed the proposed rule with
the SEC, it discussed both sides of the short-sale debate.3 2 1 The ultiSee Mulherin et al., supra note 18; Van Zandt, supra note 18.
See Baker & Edelman, supra note 62, at 71 (surveying literature on issuer choices of
trading market and concluding that issuers transfer listings from the AMEX to the NYSE
when the latter offers liquidity benefits); Cowan et al., supra note 62 (surveying literature
on issuer choices of trading market and concluding that firms move from NASDAQ to the
NYSE for liquidity); Cox & Michael, supra note 60, at 842-43 (detailing the use of linked
markets to preserve liquidity); Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1014-16 (describing competition among stock markets); David M. Schizer, Note, Benign Restraint: The SEC's Regulation of Execution Systems, 101 YALE Lj. 1551 (1992) (arguing that competition among
markets will yield the best mix of systems for executing trades); cf.Jerry W. Markham, The
315
316

Commodity Exchange Monopoly-Reform is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 977 (1991) (concluding that trading abuses would decline if exchanges were permitted to compete in trading particular contracts).
317
See supra note 6. Of course, these rules and procedures may have been adopted in
response to pressure from government regulators or market professionals pursuing their
own interests rather than the demands of consumers of market services. See Thel, supra
note 7, at 436-37 (discussing stock exchange rules against manipulative practices in place
before 1934); Myerson, supra note 67, at D1 (explaining NYSE adoption of rules to limit
volatility upon expiration of futures contracts in order to keep investors from leaving the
market); see also Hazen, supra note 120, at 1012-13, 1031-32 (describing NYSE responses to
volatility).
318 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1992); see Ralph S.Janvey, Short Selling20 SEC. REG. L.J. 270,
277 (1992); Macey et al., supra note 31, at 805-08.
319
See H.R. REaP. No. 414, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1991); Exchange Act Release No.
31,003, supra note 194, at 6 (hundreds of issuers submitted short form responses favoring a
short-sale rule for NASDAQ); id. at 25 (investment bankers may recommend exchange
listing due to the lack of NASDAQ short-sale regulation); JENNrNGs ET AL., supra note 273,
at 583 (issuers have defected from NASDAQ to get protection of uptick rule);Janvey, supra
note 318, at 277.
320 Exchange Act Release No. 31,003, supra note 194.
321 Id. 1992 SEC LEXIS 1831, at *20-28.
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mate concern of the NASD, however, was that, without a rule, it would
3 22
lose listings to the exchanges.
B.

Legal Intervention

The inability of private ordering to prevent manipulation does
not dictate that the law should intervene. Perhaps markets work best
without government intervention. However, even Fischel and Ross,
who express as much confidence in the power of markets as anyone,
do not make the simple argument that a rule against manipulation is
bad because markets should not have rules. Instead, they argue that
the social costs of such a rule outweigh any benefits that it might
23
yield.3
This conclusion is difficult to evaluate. Fischel and Ross justify it
in terms of relative costs and benefits, but the costs of manipulation
and the existing legal regime are not clear. We do not know how
often prices are manipulated, how much harm manipulation does or
how existing manipulation rules influence behavior. Given the available evidence, it is hard to justify either the status quo or radical
change. In the face of this uncertainty, perhaps regulators should
study the markets and the way that their rules work, reforming the law
as evidence becomes available. Fischel and Ross, on the other hand,
argue that the evidence already available demonstrates such a clear
imbalance between costs and benefits that the law should be changed
now.3 24 They may, however, exaggerate the cost of legal rules.
1.

Objective Rules

According to Fischel and Ross, the legal prohibition of manipulation creates extraordinary-and unacceptable-costs because "manipulation depends entirely on the state of mind of the trader."3 25 The
costs of enforcing a prohibition of intentional manipulation are particularly high because observable acts do not reliably signal manipulative intent. Moreover, they argue, because intent is hard to discern,
any legal regime prohibiting intentional manipulation will be underinclusive or overinclusive, or both. Fischel and Ross' biggest problem
seems to be that a rule against manipulative trading casts a broad
shadow on innocent and useful trading: "Because the sanctions for
322 Id. at *27 ("Finally, the NASD believes that adoption of the proposed rule will enhance the Nasdaq Stock Market's ability to compete with exchange markets for listings.
From a competitive standpoint, some exchanges regularly use the lack of a short sale rule
as an argument to try to persuade companies to list."). The proposal specifically noted that
issuers were concerned that the lack of a short-sale rule would subject them to shorting
into seasoned offerings. Id. at *25.
323 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 522-23.
324 See, id., at 535-36.

325

Id. at 522.
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engaging in manipulation are severe and include criminal penalties as
well as the possibility of a lifetime ban from the securities industry,
traders, particularly high profile traders such as takeover arbitrageurs,
will avoid conduct that might be characterized as manipulative." 2 6
The overdeterrence that so worries Fischel and Ross can be ame3 27
liorated if severe sanctions are applied only to ill-motivated acts.

Failing (or supplementing) this, overinclusiveness can be avoided if
clear rules can be tailored to prevent objectionable practices without
discouraging a great deal of appropriate conduct.3 2 8 Rules that
clearly state what they require or forbid may have problems of their
own, but they need not cause the sort of investor paralysis that Fischel
and Ross think results from a blunt prohibition of trading with manipulative intent.
If the law prohibits trading for a particular purpose, then enforcing the law entails troublesome inquiries into what traders are thinking.3 29 These inquiries can be avoided with rules that proscribe

trading practices that are often used for the purpose of influencing
prices, without regard to the reason the trades are effected in a particular case. Rules that do not turn on a trader's intentions obviate most
of Fischel and Ross' criticism. Objective rules can interdict undesirable trades without a costly and perhaps hopeless inquiry into the
trader's motives. If they are carefully targeted and clearly state what
they require or forbid, such rules can also reduce the risk of
overdeterrence. 33 0 If the regulated conduct is easily detected, such
rules can be enforced with relative ease.33 '
Rules that do not turn on intent have the additional advantage of
controlling entirely innocent trading that temporarily disrupts re-

326

327
328

Id. at 523.
See infra part III.B.2.
See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precisionof AdministrativeRules, 93 YALE LJ.

65 (1983) (exploring general assumptions concerning administrative policy); Isaac Ehrlich
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974)
(discussing efficiency of the legal process as a function of specificity);James A. Henderson,
Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CoNELL L. REv. 901 (1982) (explaining the effect of
efficiency considerations on substantive tort law); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992) (comparing the relative costliness of promulgating rules and standards).
329 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 507, 512.
330
Cf Wolfson, supra note 271, at 810 (The stabilization rules represent "an effort to
get away from the vagueness of [statutory prescriptions] and to provide government regulators and the regulated with a clear and precise description of specific, prohibited
behavior.").
331
The SEC's regulation of short sales is a good example of a rule that clearly states
what it requires and is easily enforced. 17 C.FR. § 240.10a-1 (1992). Cf Kaplow, supra
note 328, at 563, 581-84 (explaining that the benefit of avoiding future costs may outweigh
the enforcement cost).
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ported prices.3 3 2 Recall that the temporary price changes associated
with the trading of Milken and Mulheren had important consequences that the parties to the Wickes and Gulf & Western contracts
probably would have wanted to avoid, and that the trading had those
consequences regardless of whatever motivated the traders. Similarly,
even if Jefferies bought Union Carbide only because it thought the
stock was a good investment, the price spikes caused by the purchases
may have misled other investors.3 3 3 Legal rules that reduce the incidence of trades that produce temporary price anomalies may be beneficial regardless of the reason that those trades are effected.
This is not to say that rules that precisely specify what traders can
and cannot do are worth the price. Even economists who believe that
manipulation is possible warn that "the welfare effects of banning manipulation are ambiguous. ''334 So long as the mechanisms by which
trades affect price are in dispute, any set of manipulation rules will
rest on controversial premises, and if those premises are wrong the
rules may well have grossly inappropriate consequences.3 3 5 These
problems aside, even very clear rules directed at particular trading
practices may deter some socially desirable trading, and rules sufficiently narrow to avoid overdeterrence may not deter anything.3 3 6 For
example, the harsh criticism sometimes directed at the SEC's stabilization rules suggests that it is not always possible to draft rules that
clearly state what is required of the regulated.33 7 On the other hand,
the SEC's very clear and easily enforced rules on short selling may
deter desirable conduct.3 3 8 Nevertheless, rules can be fine tuned to
increase their benefits and reduce their costs. If precise rules are inadequate, it is not because high-profile traders faced with Draconian
sanctions will abstain from trading because they cannot determine
what is prohibited.
One attempt to discourage manipulation while limiting the burden on socially desirable trading is the SEC's rule on short selling
332
See Myerson, supra note 67, at DI (restrictions on computerized trading, publication of securities with order imbalances, morning expirations and developments in trading
strategies have reduced volatility when options and futures expire).
333 Cf Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714 (M.D.N.C. 1980) (alleging that plaintiffs
were induced to buy stock when defendants bid up price to discourage shareholders from
tendering shares to issuer).
334 Allen & Gale, supranote 19, at 507; see also id. at 521; Gerard & Nanda, supra note
19, at 231-32, 234-35; BAGNOLI & LrPmAN, supra note 19, at 17-20; cf Allen & Gorton, supra
note 19, at 626-28 (restrictions on short sales create opportunities for manipulation).
335 The perhaps irresolvable dilemma that discordant economic theories pose for
those responsible for making corporate and securities law has attracted attention recently.
See Booth, supra note 20, at 1114-16; Kraakman, supra note 32, at 938-41; Langevoort, supra
note 119, at 872-73, 886-89, 912-13, 919-20.
336 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 522-23.

337

See, e.g., Cox Er AL.., supra note 232, at 314-15; Wolfson, supra note 271.

338

See Macey et al., supra note 31.
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prior to secondary offerings. As discussed above, when an issuer announces that it will sell securities into the market, a manipulator may
sell the stock short in order to depress the market price, thereby lowering the price at which the issuer will sell. The manipulator may plan
to cover the short-sales in the public offering, thus earning a profit at
very little risk, or he may simply hope to buy stock in the public offering for less than what he believes the stock is worth.
SEC rule lOb-21 (T) regulates short-selling in connection with secondary offerings into the market. 33 9 The rule provides that a person
who sells an equity security short after a registration statement for securities of the same class is filed may not cover those sales in the public offering. This rule makes it unlawful to earn a quick profit by
depressing price with short sales and then covering those sales in the
offering. The rule does not provide complete protection, however,
because a manipulator may still sell stock he already holds and then
buy more at a bargain price in the offering, or sell short and cover in
the market at a bargain price after the secondary distribution takes
place. Whatever good the rule does, it does it at relatively low cost.
The rule does not prohibit short selling,3 40 and thus should have minimal impact on the non-manipulative and perhaps beneficial short
3 41
sales of traders who simply believe the stock is overpriced.
Rule 10b-21 (T) may still be a bad rule, of course. It makes shortsales of bona fide investors more expensive than they would otherwise
be because without the rule such sellers might be able to cover their
short positions more cheaply in the public offering. Furthermore, it is
possible that by discouraging some manipulators, the rule may actually hurt issuers and other market participants.3 42 Perhaps in recognition of this uncertainty, the Commission adopted rule 10b-21 (T) on a
temporary basis, suggesting that it might revisit the issue after the rule
343
has been in place for some time.
Fischel and Ross themselves seem to recognize the value of prophylactic rules against certain trading practices that are convention339 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21(T) (1992).
340 Fischel and Ross describe rule lOb-21 (T) accurately in a footnote, see Fischel &
Ross, supra note 8, at 522 n.81, but in the text they incorrectly state that it prohibits short
sales in advance of public offerings. Id. at 522. On that premise they argue that the rule
"imposes costs because it prevents those with negative beliefs ... from acting on them by
trading." Id.
341 A rule prohibiting all short sales before a public offering might discourage people
who believe that a security is overpriced from selling short, and thus would undermine the

informational content of reported prices. See Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 234-35;
Macey et al., supra note 31, at 800, 813-14. In adopting rule lOb-21 (T), the SEC emphasized that it would not interfere with non-manipulative short sales. See Exchange Act Release No. 26,028, supra note 194, at 89,387-88, 89,390-91.
342
See Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 226-29, 234-35.
343
See Exchange Act Release No. 26,028, supra note 194, at 89,387 n.16. The SEC may
also grant exemptions from rule 10b-21(T). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21(T)(c) (1992).

1994]

SECURITIES MANIPULATION

ally called manipulative-wash sales and matched orders. As noted
above, manipulators sometimes move price and stimulate trading interest with wash sales, in which the same party is both buyer and seller,
and matched orders, in which confederates simultaneously enter offsetting purchase and sale orders. 344 Fischel and Ross call wash sales
and matched orders "a form of fraud by conduct," and would apparently forbid them absolutely, going substantially further than current
law, which forbids them only when employed for certain purposes.3 45
2.

IntentionalManipulation

Fischel and Ross' thesis is that the law should not prohibit actual
trades as manipulative regardless of the trader's intent.3 46 The core of
their argument is that if severe sanctions turn solely on a trader's state
of mind, fear of prosecution will deter socially desirable trading.3 47
Although this argument has at least two targets, heavy sanctions and
See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 510-11; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1) (1988)
(wash sales and matched orders are unlawful when used "[f]or the purpose of creating a
false or misleading appearance of active trading ... or a false or misleading appearance
with respect to the market.").
Although Fischel and Ross seem to find wash sales and matched orders objectionable,
they insist on characterizing them as a species of fraud, "designed to mislead market participants into believing that buyers and sellers are trading in a security when in fact no
transactions are taking place." Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 510.
As a technical matter, those initiating wash sales or entering matched orders do not
act fraudulently-they neither make false statements nor cause others to do so. They deliver and pay for the securities that they trade, and they do not report transactions that
never occur. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 525 (1976) (misrepresentation is an
element of fraud). To be sure, they do not expect their transactions to result in a change
in beneficial ownership, but they never maintain otherwise. At most, they play on the
market's understanding that reported trades represent transactions between traders dealing at arms' length. Nevertheless, these traders do not affirmatively misrepresent their
opinions, intentions or any other fact; moreover, there is no reason that the market's interpretation of the act of entering an order is binding on traders so as to make matched
orders and wash sales "false." If the market's understanding is enough to make matched
orders "false," then it would seem that a purchase designed to increase price is just as
"false," given the market's understanding that buyers try to get the lowest price possible. In
fact, the common law had trouble dealing with fictitious transactions, and the language of
the opinions finding such transactions objectionable would often apply equally to trades
designed to move price. See 8 Loss & SEUIGmAN, supra note 39, at 3946-53.
Fischel and Ross insist that the concept of fraud cannot be used to forbid actual
trades. They argue that the concept of fraud works for wash sales and matched orders
because those "fictitious" trades are "bad acts," so that the law can identify objectionable
conduct by applying objective criteria. Actual trades, on the other hand, are objectionable,
as Fischel and Ross see it, only if made with bad intent; thus, the law cannot be made to
turn on objective evidence. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 511. However, laws against
actual trades can turn on objective evidence if the law simply makes it unlawful to effect
actual trades in certain situations. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10a-1 (short sales), 240.10b21(T) (shorting into seasoned offering) (1992).
346 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 507, 553.
347 See id. at 522.
344
345
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open-ended, intent-based rules, Fischel and Ross focus on the latter.3 48 To put the argument in perspective, however, it is important to
bear in mind that the government brings relatively few securities manipulation cases, let alone criminal cases.3 49 Moreover, the setbacks in
United States v. GAF Corp. and United States v. Mulheren will likely cause
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York to
pause before initiating new criminal cases. The likelihood of future
prosecutions was further reduced when the criminal sentences for manipulation in the Princeton/Newport case were vacated. In that case
the trial judge concluded that the defendants "made a persuasive argument that the government would not have proceeded criminally
against these defendants solely on the" manipulation charges. 350
Even if few cases are brought, there remains the question of
whether the law should inquire into the motives of securities traders.
It may be impossible to prevent manipulation without resorting to a
residual rule against willful manipulation. 35 1 Because market and
contracting practices are diverse and constantly changing, neither private parties nor regulators (whether self-regulatory or government
agencies) are likely to foresee all possible manipulative devices or to
be able to describe those devices in precise rules.3 52 Moreover, any set
of objective rules sufficient to catch all or even most intentional manipulative trades would almost surely cover a substantial amount of

348

For a discussion of the use of criminal sanctions in securities cases, see John C.

Coffee, Jr., Hush! The CriminalStatus of ConfidentialInformation After McNally and Carpenter
and the EnduringProblem of Overriminalization,26 AM. CRM. L. REv. 121 (1988). As Coffee
notes, "[flair notice alone does not minimize [the cost of complying with the law]; only

restricting the scope of the criminal law can do that." Id. at 151.
349
See McLucas & Angotti, supra note 55, at 633 n.1. The SEC aggressively pursues
penny-stock schemes, but these typically involve fraud and breach of fiduciary duty as well
as manipulative trading. Id.
350
United States v. Zarzecki, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1482 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1992); see
also Christi Harlan, Law Firm is Barredfrom Taking CaseAgainst Former Client AM?, WAL. ST.
J., Sept. 9, 1992, at B8 ("Calling the alleged manipulation of [C.O.M.B.] securities 'supposedly criminal,' Judge Carter said that an administrative disciplinary action was a more appropriate response than a criminal prosecution.").
351
Edmund Kitch has criticized rule lOb-5 on the ground that Congress would have
enacted a generalized prohibition itself if it wanted one. Edmund W. Kitch, A FederalVision
of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REv. 857, 861 (1984). I have previously indicated sympathy
with Kitch's position. SeeThel, supra note 7, at 463. However, section 10(b) may be interpreted to allow the SEC to decide whether to address manipulation with a generalized
prohibition, and the SEC's decision to adopt rule lOb-5 reflected the decision that a generalized approach was appropriate. See American Bar Association, Conference on Codification of
the FederalSecurities Laws, 22 Bus. Lv. 793, 922 (1967) (Milton Freeman describing adoption of rule 10b-5); Milton V. Freeman, Foreward: HaMy Birthday 10b-5: 50 Years of AntifrandRegulation, 61 FoRDHam L. REv. 51 (1993); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5
as an Adaptive Organism,61 FoRDAm L. REv. 57 (1993) (arguing that the ambiguity of Rule
10b-5 has contributed to its survival).
352
See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 328, at 268.
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innocent and valuable trading. Accordingly, an effective legal regime
35 3
may have to supplement precise rules with broad standards.
Fischel and Ross argue that the law cannot identify traders who
trade for the purpose of moving price. They argue that a person who
trades for the purpose of moving price does not engage "in any conduct that can be objectively determined to be socially undesirable.
The only act is trading, trading that cannot be distinguished from
other trading using objective measures."3 5 4 However, a plaintiff cannot prevail in a manipulation case simply by proving that the defendant's trades moved price, or even that those trades moved price and
induced others to trade.3 55 Indeed, the securities laws do not make it
unlawful to trade for the purpose of moving price. The closest they
come is section 9 (a) (2) of the Exchange Act, which makes it unlawful
to change price for the purpose of inducing others to trade.3 56 Rule
10b-5, which does not even use the word manipulate, is violated only
357
when a defendant acts with the intent to deceive.
Objective evidence may demonstrate that a defendant acted with
an intent to induce others to trade or to mislead traders who believe
that reported prices reflect trades between market participants who
are trying to buy and sell at the best price possible. Consider once
again the Milken, Mulheren, GAF and Princeton/Newport cases. This
article discusses these cases only as situations in which manipulation
may be possible, and I express no opinion on what the defendants
were trying to accomplish or on whether what they did was unlawful.
Nonetheless, these were important cases, and the record should be
clear.
Fischel and Ross suggest that it is unlikely that the first three of
these cases involved manipulative schemes. They also suggest that the
objective evidence of manipulative intent was too ambiguous to allow
for a determination of manipulative intent. However, the government
did not rest on ambiguous evidence of trading patterns in any of the
353

For an argument that the intent-based rules against commodities manipulation has

been successful despite some lapses, see 3 PtLiu MCBRrDEJOHNSON & THOMAs

LEE HAZEN,

ch. 5 (1989). Other commentators reject this conclusion, however. See Friedman, supra note 17, 35-37;Jerry Markham, Manipulationof Commodity Futures
Prices-The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALEJ. ON REG. 281 (1991); Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulationof Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 345 (1987).
354 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 511.
355
See Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Trane Co. v. O'Connor Securities, 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.),
appealdismissed, 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983).
356
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1988).
357
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976); see also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); cf. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992) (SEC rulemaking power under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e) (2) extends to nondeceptive conduct).
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four cases. In each, the government offered objective evidence of manipulative intent that was not equally consistent with innocent trading.
In Milken, the government had a witness prepared to testify that he
understood Milken to order him to manipulate the price of Wickes
common stock. In Mulheren, Boesky testified about his conversation
with Mulheren. In GAF,Jefferies' principal testified that the defendants asked him to manipulate Union Carbide stock. In Princeton/
Newport the request that initiated the manipulation was captured on
tape. Perhaps these witnesses lacked credibility, or perhaps the conversations were innocent; regardless, it is clear that probative, objective evidence of state of mind may be available in manipulation cases.
Of course, innocent traders should not have to bear the burden
of criminal prosecution or the risk of wrongly being found to have
acted with forbidden intent. However the government does not seem
to have been pursuing frivolous cases, and liability in private civil actions rests on proof of intent. Often the defendant will have realized
some benefit from a price change that will itself serve as objective evidence that the defendant had a purpose in moving price. In any case,
accused manipulators enjoy the same procedural protections as other
defendants, and they are more likely to have the resources necessary
to mount a vigorous defense.
Perhaps juries are apt to be too quick to believe the worst of defendants in manipulation cases. Judicial review is still available, however, and Fischel and Ross' three high-profile cases show that judges
are sensitive to the plight of those accused of manipulation. The convictions in GAF and Mulheren were reversed on appeal, and the trial
judge ignored the Wickes transaction when she sentenced Milken.
Moreover, the Second Circuit, when it reversed Mulheren's conviction, displayed its uneasiness with the concept of a crime that supposedly exists entirely inside the defendant's head. Indeed, the judge
who vacated the Princeton/Newport sentences expressed doubts
about whether manipulation is even a crime.
A prohibition of purposeful manipulation might chill socially desirable trading, but that chill can be ameliorated. Some prominent
commentators who oppose extensive government intervention in the
securities markets have expressed support for broad rules against willful misconduct. 358 Consider, for example, Judge Winter's dissenting
opinion in United States v. Chestman.3 5 9 Judge Winter, whose dissent is
probably the best judicial description of the quagmire of insider trad358
See Coffee, supra note 348, at 152 (Concluding that the proper approach is to restrict criminal prosecutions to "narrow, context-specific statutes (such as Rule 10b5) as

opposed to broader, sprawling rules borrowed from the common law.").
359
(1992).

947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991) (dissenting in part), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759
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ing law, recognized "that regulation of insider trading without legislative or regulatory guidelines would involve a mare's nest of analytic
and definitional problems."3 60 Nonetheless, he argued that it is a
crime to trade on misappropriated information, even though there is
no obvious relationship between such a proscription and the language
of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.3 61 Although he sympathized
with the majority's concern over the difficulty of drawing lines, he had
"little difficulty"3 62 in concluding that a criminal conviction could be

affirmed where the defendant's conduct indicated knowledge that his
3 63
actions were improper.
Consider also the position of former SEC Commissioner Edward
Fleischman. Near the end of his term, Commissioner Fleischman
published a letter to President Bush in which he vigorously criticized
the Commission's regulatory program.3 6 4 Commissioner Fleischman
argued that the SEC should replace or supplement the command-andcontrol rules that it regularly imposes with broadly stated performance standards. Taking the same tack as Fischel and Ross, Commissioner Fleischman argued that the problem with the existing regime is
that the benefits of regulation have been exaggerated and the costs
have been minimized.3 65 He did not conclude, however, that the government should abandon market regulation. Instead, he argued that
broad standards protect the public and promote liquidity better than
detailed rules do. He insisted that performance standards and general rules afford a safeguard against both harmful practices and intrusive regulation, suggesting that they should be used in place of-or as
3 66
alternatives to-detailed rules.

Commissioner Fleischman specifically advocated the use of broad
rules to regulate manipulation. Thus, he proposed that rule 10b-6,
which regulates trading by persons interested in the distribution of a
security, be changed to exempt transactions not engaged in for the
purpose of raising the price of the distributed security.3

67

He sug-

gested the same approach for the rules governing issuer repurchases.3 68 Commissioner Fleischman did not suggest that broad
360
361

Id. at 573.
Id. at 578.
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Id. at 579.

363 Id. at 580-81.
364 Letter from Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman to President George H.W. Bush
(March 25, 1992) (on file with the Cornell Law Review).
365 Id. at 8-9.
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Id. at 7.
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language should be limited to safe harbors, either.36 9 He praised the
use of "general anti-manipulative" rules to prevent recurrence of
"[t]he 'bear raids' of the 1920s [which] were manipulative at their
core,"3 70 and urged revision of the rules regulating short sales in a
37
similar manner. '
Commissioner Fleischman took leave of the conventional criticism of the SEC's regulatory program when he took as his model rule
10b-5, the Commission's "single most renowned rule."372 While he
recognized that broad rules may be harder to enforce, he considered
the cost worthwhile:
[R] eform of this Agency's regulatory program has the inevitable concomitant of expansion of the Agency's policing and prosecuting
program. ...

[This] leads me to the ultimate conclusion that this

Commission's enforcement program can fulfill the resulting additional responsibility and can fulfill it well-at a far lesser systemic
cost than prevails under the Commission's regulatory approach....
[Tihis Commission could and should be willing to rely more heavily on

a well-directed policing and prosecuting program to remove a real
amount of systemic cost without removing anywhere near an equal
extent of direct and indirect benefits to investors.
Performance standards, market mechanisms, and clarity in
rulemaking all contribute to removal of systemic costs. To the extent that in the securities markets those regulatory methods rely on
enforcement by market forces, by self-regulatory organizations and
by this Agency, that reliance is both well-founded and well-directed
to the maintenance of the fundamental investor protections that
have made and have kept the primary and secondary securities markets in the United States... "the deepest, the most liquid and the
3 73
fairest securities markets anywhere in the world."

CONCLUSION

As Fischel and Ross emphasize, "[m]uch of the regulation of financial markets seeks to prevent manipulation." The law should not
lightly abandon this quest, Fischel and Ross' arguments notwithstanding. Manipulators can sometimes control prices with trades, and by
369 For example, he may have meant to suggest that illicit purpose should be a threshold element of rule lOb-6.
In fact, the underlying objective of the rule, which is to allow the free forces
of supply and demand to fix the trading price for securities in distribution,
would be achieved so long as persons interested in the distribution did not
engage in transactions for the purpose... of creating actual or apparent
active trading or of raising the price of the distributed security.
Id. at 7.
370
Id. at 11.
371
Id. at 11-12.
372 Id. at 10.
373 Id. at 23-24.
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doing so they can reap profits, whether by taking advantage of preexisting contracts or by inducing other market participants to trade at
manipulated prices.
Private actors and institutions can do much to discourage manipulation, and when the problem appears acute, private agents do respond. However, it is unlikely that manipulation can be completely
deterred without legal intervention, and deterring manipulation has
been a central goal of the federal securities laws. Nonetheless, the
law's primary method of dealing with manipulation has not been to
make it unlawful to trade for the purpose of changing price, notwithstanding Fischel and Ross' heated argument that the law should not
prohibit actual trades on the basis of a trader's intentions.
The securities statutes do not forbid people to trade for the purpose of influencing price,3 74 and they do not forbid the employment
of "manipulative devices" except in certain exceptional circumstances. 375 Instead, the Exchange Act makes it illegal to engage in a
few clearly defined practices for specific purposes.3 76 Otherwise, it
simply allows the SEC to regulate manipulative devices and contrivances. In turn, the Commission has promulgated a series of rules
against particular trading practices, most of which do not turn on a
trader's motives. These rules are supplemented by rule 101>5 when
manipulators use novel or particularly outrageous practices.
For the most part, this response is what Fischel and Ross have
shown is necessary. It is often hard to tell what motivates a particular
trade, so rules that turn on intentions would be unlikely to prevent
intentional manipulation. Objective rules may more accurately identify and prevent manipulative trading, but they have their own
problems. The contours of manipulation are difficult to discover, and
it is unlikely that any set of rules could discourage all inappropriate
trades, and only inappropriate trades. Moreover, practices in financial markets change quickly, so that even if a perfect set of rules could
be drafted, they might soon become obsolete. Accordingly, the SEC
and markets themselves are likely to do better ajob of regulation than
Congress, because administrative rules can be modified as their consequences become clear or practices change. Finally, precise rules will
leave loopholes, especially if practices evolve more quickly than rules.
Judicious use of rule 101>5 for novel or outrageous conduct can provide a useful backup to the regulatory scheme.
374 The closest that the Exchange Act comes is to prohibit effecting trades in an exchange-registered security changing the price of such security, "for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2) (1988).
375 The Exchange Act forbids brokers and dealers and those involved in tender offers
to employ manipulative devices. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(e), 78o(c) (1988).
376 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1988).
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Remarkably, the Exchange Act established this regulatory scheme
almost sixty years ago in response to many of the same arguments that
Fischel and Ross have just made.3 7 7 After the stock market collapsed

in 1929, numerous proposals were made to prohibit manipulative
trading. 3 78 However, both thoughtful reformers and those to be reformed objected on the grounds that trading practices were too complicated and dynamic to be governed by blunt rules. 3 79 Members of
Congress also heard about how difficult it would be to determine the
intentions of market participants.3 8 0 The argument that carried the
day in 1934 was that trading should be regulated gingerly, if at all, and

that any regulations should be constantly reexamined and refined. Instead of simply making it unlawful to trade for the purpose of changing price, the law charges administrators with studying and carefully
regulating manipulation. The law recognizes manipulation for the
complicated problem that it is.

377
The history of the law governing securities manipulation is also remarkably consistent with the predictions of Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner's dynamic model of the

process by which legal actors determine the degree of specificity with which legal commands are expressed. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 328, at 272-75.
378 See Thel, supranote 7, at 411-17 (discussing legislative proposals); see also id. at 451,
459 n.343 (noting that early House and Senate versions of the Exchange Act would have
prohibited trading for the purpose of changing price); id. at 451 n.306 (discussing rejected
amendment that would have prohibited stabilization).
379
For example, a prominent committee studying reform, organized by the Roosevelt
Administration, argued that
Stock exchanges raise essentially new problems in Federal regulation. They
do not present a static situation susceptible to fixed standards. On the contrary, it is a highly dynamic, ever-changing picture, subject to untold and
unknown possibilities and combinations that are today unpredictable. The
thing to be avoided is the placing of this complex and important mechanism in a straitjacket.
Report to Secretary of Commerce of Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation 6, in Letter
from the President of the United States to the Chairman of the Committee on Banking
and Currency with an Accompanying Report Relative to Stock Exchange Regulation (S.
Comm. Print 1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISroav, supra note 212, at Item 16; see also
David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5:JudicialRevision of LegislativeIntent?, 57 Nw.
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at 434-36, 439, 441, 447-78 (citing stock exchange support for administrative regulation);
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380 See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency on S.
Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 57 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6508-11, in 6
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